

SENATE

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1951

(Legislative day of Monday, January 8, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father God, we thank Thee that Thou hast implanted within us the breath of a divine life; that there is an infinite in us which, with all our cunning, we cannot quite conceal beneath the finite; that by the very constitution of our nature, we hunger and thirst after Thee. Forgive us that knowing this we have sought to satisfy the deepest cravings of our spirits with the things of time and sense.

Grant us some part, we beseech Thee, in the fulfillment of Thy mighty purpose for the world. Let Thy hand be laid in healing upon our turbulent day. Show us where we have gone wrong. Enlarge the areas of our sympathy for the want and woe of all mankind. Stir up our wills and kindle our imaginations that we may find the way to a just and ordered society where all will gain the due reward of their labor and where men will serve Thee and one another in harmony and good will. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of Monday, January 8, 1951, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Hendrickson	Martin
Anderson	Hennings	Millikin
Bennett	Hickenlooper	Mundt
Brewster	Hill	Murray
Bricker	Hoey	Neely
Bridges	Holland	Nixon
Butler, Md.	Humphrey	O'Connor
Butler, Nebr.*	Hunt	O'Mahoney
Byrd	Ives	Pastore
Capehart	Jenner	Robertson
Carlson	Johnson, Colo.	Russell
Case	Johnson, Tex.	Saltonstall
Chapman	Johnston, S. C.	Schoeppel
Chavez	Kem	Smathers
Clements	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Connally	Kilgore	Smith, N. J.
Cordon	Knowland	Smith, N. C.
Dirksen	Langer	Stennis
Douglas	Lehman	Taft
Dworshak	Lodge	Thye
Eastland	Long	Tobey
Ecton	McCarran	Watkins
Flanders	McCarthy	Welker
Frear	McClellan	Wherry
Fulbright	McFarland	Wiley
George	McKellar	Williams
Gillette	McMahon	Young
Green	Magnuson	
Hayden	Malone	

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr.

BENTON], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] are absent on official business.

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is absent because of illness.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN] and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] are absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON] and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] are necessarily absent.

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 36)

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair has a message from the President of the United States relating to the decennial censuses and the apportionment of Representatives in Congress, which was laid before the House of Representatives a couple of days ago. It has already been printed in the Record in the House proceedings. Therefore, the Chair will refer this message, with accompanying papers, to the Committee on the Judiciary, without having it read or printed in the Record at this point.

REPORT ON CONDITION OF FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY FUND—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, with the accompanying paper, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report by the Secretary of State, showing all receipts and disbursements on account of refunds, allowances, and annuities for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950, in connection with the Foreign Service retirement and disability system as required by section 862, Foreign Service Act of 1946 (Public Law 724).

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

The White House, January 11, 1951.

(Enclosure: Report Concerning Retirement and Disability Fund, Foreign Service.)

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators be permitted to introduce bills and joint resolutions, submit petitions and memorials, and make insertions in the Record, without debate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred, as indicated:

REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC POSITIONS ESTABLISHED IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

A letter from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report cov-

ering the professional and scientific positions established in the Department of Defense, for the calendar year ended December 31, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT ON EXPORT CONTROL

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, his thirteenth quarterly report on export control (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT OF GEORGETOWN BARGE, DOCK, ELEVATOR & RAILWAY CO.

A letter from the president of the Georgetown Barge, Dock, Elevator & Railway Co., Washington, D. C., reporting, pursuant to law, on the activities of the company for the calendar year 1950; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

REPORT OF UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION

A letter from the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the thirty-fourth annual report of the Commission, for the calendar year 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Finance.

REPORT ON BUREAU OF MINES ANTHRACITE RESEARCH LABORATORY, SCHUYLKILL HAVEN, PA.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, reporting, pursuant to law, on the activities of, expenditures by, and donations to the Bureau of Mines anthracite research laboratory, Schuylkill Haven, Pa.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

CREDIT REPORT OF BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting pursuant to law, the annual credit report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Division of Resources, Branch of Extension and Credit, Department of the Interior, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to facilitate the management of the National Park Service and miscellaneous areas administered in connection with that Service, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORT OF FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

A letter from the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the sixteenth annual report of the Commission, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of the orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service suspending deportation of certain aliens, together with a detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law as to each alien and the reasons for ordering such suspension (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

GRANTING OF STATUS OF PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO CERTAIN ALIENS

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of the orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service granting the application for permanent residence to certain aliens, together with a detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law as to each alien, and the reasons for granting the

applications (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PENALTY MAIL MATTER

A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting, pursuant to section 302, title III, Public Law 785, approved June 25, 1948, a tabulation showing the number of envelopes, labels, wrappers, cards, and other articles bearing penalty indicia procured or accounted for through the Post Office Department during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950, and the number of pieces accounted for and on hand or on order at the close of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

PETITIONS

Petitions were laid before the Senate, and referred as indicated:

By the VICE PRESIDENT:

The petition of Fred C. Cole, of Washington, D. C., praying for the adoption of the World Peace Act of 1950 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

The petition of Fred G. Cole, of Washington, D. C., praying for the enactment of the Leadership Emancipation Act of 1950 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

A resolution adopted by the biennial assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, favoring the establishment of a Federal Commission on Civil Rights; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

A resolution adopted by the biennial assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, favoring ratification of the treaty on genocide; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Biennial Assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, approving the actions of the United Nations in Korea; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Biennial Assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, urging strong support by members of the United Nations to action taken in Korea; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Biennial Assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, favoring the process of negotiation for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Korea; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Biennial Assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, relating to economic aid to underdeveloped areas; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Biennial Assembly of the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Cleveland, Ohio, relating to effective action against aggression; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Texas Junior Chamber of Commerce, Abilene, Tex., relating to the reaffirmation of our faith in God and the use of daily prayer, and so forth; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Veteran Association of the Seventy-first Regiment, National Guard of the State of New York, New York, N. Y., favoring the adoption of legislation providing universal military training; to the Committee on Armed Services.

ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY—RESOLUTION OF DELAWARE COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., DELHI, N. Y.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I present for appropriate reference and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a resolution adopted by the Delaware County Electric Cooperative, Inc., of Delhi, N. Y., urging approval and

construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION 140—RECOMMENDATION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT

Whereas an abundant supply of low-cost electricity is needed for the operation of the Delaware County dairy industry now facing a labor shortage due to defense manpower need; and

Whereas the people of only six other States pay more for electricity in the home than the residents of New York; the industries of New York are burdened with power costs exceeded by but seven other States, and commercial business in New York is charged more for electric power than commercial enterprise in any other State; and

Whereas a large portion of Delaware County farms receive power from an electric cooperative which pays about 50 percent more for wholesale power than similar electric cooperatives throughout the United States; and

Whereas the economy of Delaware County is dependent upon the prosperity of its farm people who are now at a serious competitive disadvantage in relation to farmers in other areas; and

Whereas the northeastern States comprise the largest area in the country having no sizable hydroelectric power development to attract industry and expand farm markets; and

Whereas the abundant low-cost power potentials of the St. Lawrence River are undeveloped due, in a large degree, to controversies in regard to the seaway phase of the proposed project; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the board of supervisors of the county of Delaware hereby recommends construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project on a self-liquidating basis, and further recommends that provision be made to deliver the power so generated to lead centers where it will be made available to the people of the county of Delaware at the lowest possible cost; and be it further

Resolved, That our duly elected State and Federal representatives be urged to endorse the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, and that copies hereof be forwarded to them and to the Governor of the State of New York; and be it further

Resolved, That construction on the project be started as soon as economic conditions permit.

GOVERNMENT ENCROACHMENT IN FIELD OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE—RESOLUTION OF LIONS CLUB OF CATONSVILLE, MD.

Mr. O'CONOR. Mr. President, the widespread concern currently felt by a great number of our citizens with regard to Government encroachment in the field of private enterprise is expressed most forcibly in a resolution adopted by the members of the Lions Club of Catonsville, Md., at their regular meeting on January 5, of this year.

Because it represents so completely the views of Maryland citizenry as I have received them and because I am so thoroughly in accord with the sentiments expressed, I send the resolution to the desk for inclusion in the RECORD and appropriate reference.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas America is the product of a people's faith in constitutional law designed to

protect the property and enterprises of each citizen from political competition or confiscation; and

Whereas attacks upon this principle have produced many governmental agencies which are now in active conflict with the individual enterprises of the American people; and

Whereas many proposals now before Congress, will, if adopted by a mere majority, further jeopardize the rights of the American people to their individual property and enterprises; and

Whereas the intent and purpose of the tenth amendment to the Constitution was to prohibit governmental exercise of powers not specifically delegated to it; and

Whereas the intention of the fifth article of the Constitution was to provide a means for the proper delegation of powers to government through a procedure which requires a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress and the approval of three-quarters of the States: Therefore be it

Resolved, That we, the members of Lions Club of Catonsville, Md., in regular session assembled this 5th day of January 1951, exercise our constitutional power to petition the Congress to preserve the intent and purposes of the Constitution by initiating an amendment to the Constitution, for submission to the people of the various States, to provide that, the Government of the United States shall not engage in any business, professional, commercial or industrial enterprise in competition with its citizens except as specified in the Constitution; be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be spread upon the minutes of this meeting, and that copies of it be sent to (1) the President of the United States, (2) both Members of the United States Senate from this State, (3) Members of the House of Representatives from this and adjacent districts, (4) the Governor of this State, and (5) two copies to the American Progress Foundation, 7179 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles 46, Calif.

ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY—LETTER FROM AMERICAN VETERANS OF WORLD WAR II

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, like other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I have received this morning a letter from the distinguished national commander of the American Veterans of World War II, Harold Russell. This splendid American has rightly asked the support by the Congress of this great project which has been so long delayed, but which is now so essential in the interest of continental defense. It is utterly fantastic that we should allow ourselves to go without the use of this vital inland artery with its protected route for strategic materials.

I congratulate the officers and members of AMVETS for their continued heart-warming support of this magnificent project, and I assure them that I, for one, will continue the battle for its completion. We hope in the not too distant future to introduce a bill for this objective. I ask unanimous consent that the text of Harold Russell's fine communication be printed in the RECORD and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the letter was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN VETERANS OF WORLD WAR II,
Washington, D. C., January 2, 1951.
Senator ALEXANDER WILEY,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WILEY: At our national convention in Cleveland, Ohio, in September

1950, the AMVETS reiterated their stand in support of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. As a veterans' organization, we are vitally interested in the immediate construction of the St. Lawrence project because of the major contributions the project will make to national security.

AMVETS favor the St. Lawrence project because it will greatly add to the economic strength of Canada and the United States. We favor the project because of the need for low-cost St. Lawrence power to help in the expansion of aluminum and other essential defense industries. We favor the project because the protected inland waterway from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of St. Lawrence will save lives and assure us a supply of critical materials, particularly iron ore, in time of war.

This last factor is of great importance to AMVETS. It would be tragic if we are forced to risk the loss of ore boats, Navy convoy ships, and men exposed to submarine attack on the open seas, merely because construction of the seaway is delayed.

We urge that you declare yourself in favor of this project, so important to the lives and security of all Americans.

We should greatly appreciate a reply from you expressing your opinions as to the desirability of undertaking construction of the St. Lawrence project as a part of the mobilization program.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD RUSSELL,
National Commander, AMVETS.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PERSONNEL AND FUNDS

Pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, the following reports were received by the Secretary of the Senate:

DECEMBER 31, 1950.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Barbash, Jack, staff member.....	\$10,015.02	\$5,007.48
Bowman, Edna Raye, secretary.....	4,154.38	2,077.14
Christie, Alexander K., staff member.....	7,858.27	3,760.78
Cooley, Thomas M. II, counsel to July 12.....	10,846.00	361.53
Cullum, Robert M., staff member.....	7,022.16	3,337.26
Dillard, Patricia, secretary from Sept. 16.....	4,154.38	1,211.66
Dunstan, William N., staff member.....	7,022.16	3,337.26
Egan, John F., clerk.....	5,457.92	2,555.12
Freehill, Joseph H., associate counsel.....	10,097.97	4,656.24
Gustin, Evelyn M., secretary.....	5,197.21	2,424.78
Kaufman, Frances L., research analyst to Dec. 15.....	5,197.21	2,208.23
Klein, Samuel C., staff member.....	7,109.06	3,554.52
Johnson, Curtis E., staff member.....	8,936.64	4,468.32
Murdoch, Ray R., counsel from July 12.....	10,846.00	5,091.57
Presbrey, Vesta N., research analyst to Sept. 15.....	4,154.38	865.47
Prothero, John T., legal assistant from July 13.....	4,415.10	2,060.35
Stone, Russell E., staff member.....	7,858.27	3,760.78

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong..... \$133,000.00
Amount expended during 81st Cong..... 126,628.06

Balance unexpended..... 6,371.94

JAMES E. MURRAY,
Chairman.

DECEMBER 31, 1950.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Elizabeth B. Springer, chief clerk.....	\$9,849.11	\$4,924.50
Janice Everly, stenographer.....	4,936.51	2,468.22
Sam Oglesby, stenographer.....	4,588.89	2,294.40
Betty Mae Tapy, stenographer.....	3,980.59	1,894.67
Jesse R. Nichols, document clerk.....	3,980.59	1,990.26
Hal P. Phillips, professional staff member.....	7,775.31	3,887.64
Serge Benson, professional staff member.....	9,766.16	4,883.04

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure..... \$15,000.00

Amount expended Jan. 1, 1949, through June 30, 1950..... 9,146.80

Amount expended July 1 through Dec. 31, 1950..... 1,909.93

Balance unexpended..... 3,943.27

WALTER F. GEORGE,
Chairman.

JANUARY 1, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Everard H. Smith, chief clerk.....	\$10,846.00	\$5,422.98
Cecil H. Tolbert, assistant chief clerk.....	10,512.73	5,256.36
Herman E. Downey, professional staff member.....	10,512.73	5,256.36
Earl W. Cooper, professional staff member.....	9,932.07	4,966.02
Thomas J. Scott, assistant clerk.....	9,932.07	4,744.82
Harold E. Merrick, professional staff member.....	9,268.45	4,634.22
Francis S. Hewitt, professional staff member.....	8,770.74	4,385.34
Edmund T. King, professional staff member.....	8,770.74	4,385.34
Kimball Sanborn (to Sept. 15) professional staff member.....	8,770.74	1,827.22
Cecil C. McDaniel (from Sept. 15), professional staff member.....	8,273.03	2,412.93
Adelbert F. Teague, assistant clerk.....	8,521.88	4,260.90
Lawrence H. Wendrich, assistant clerk.....	7,194.65	3,597.30
Mamie L. Mizen, assistant clerk.....	6,326.94	3,163.44
Lois C. Joy, clerical assistant.....	4,241.29	2,120.64
Richard C. Venne, clerical assistant.....	4,415.10	2,207.52
Corinne Bryan, clerical assistant.....	4,849.61	2,283.55
Doris M. Elliott (to July 20), clerical assistant.....	3,719.87	206.65
Gloria S. Butland (from Aug. 16), clerical assistant.....	3,980.59	1,492.69

TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES

Hal Lackey, counsel.....	\$10,512.73	\$3,559.78
Roy J. Bullock, agent.....	9,932.07	3,463.00
Francis A. Johnston, agent.....	9,268.45	3,352.40
Gabriel R. Vogliotti, agent.....	9,268.45	3,352.40
Robert L. Fallow, agent.....	8,853.69	2,951.20
John F. Zimmerman (from Sept. 1 to 30) agent.....	6,587.65	548.97
Daniel W. Sullivan, fiscal officer.....	8,853.69	2,951.20
Emily Whitman, administrative assistant.....	4,849.61	1,659.96
Katherine S. Florence, clerical assistant.....	4,849.61	1,659.96
Olga K. Greene, clerical assistant.....	3,980.59	1,413.74
Dorothy L. Sankey, clerical assistant.....	3,980.59	1,413.74
John W. Wedge, Jr., clerical assistant.....	4,328.19	1,442.72

KENNETH MCKELLAR,
Chairman.

JANUARY 1, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report, in addition to the statement, showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES	Total salary received
Unexpended balance of amount authorized by S. Res. 129, June 26, 1947, as of July 1, 1950.....	\$24,151.49
Amount expended, July 1 to Dec. 31, 1950.....	
Balance unexpended as of Dec. 31, 1950.....	24,151.49
Unexpended balance of funds authorized by Reorganization Act and S. Res. 126, 185, and 293, 81st Cong., as of July 1, 1950.....	15,238.79
Amount expended, July 1 to Dec. 31, 1950.....	12,432.09
Balance unexpended as of Dec. 31, 1950.....	2,806.70

Funds authorized by Legislative Appropriation Act, 1951 (Public Law 759)..... 50,000.00

Amount expended, July 1 to Dec. 31, 1950..... 27,955.16

Balance unexpended as of Dec. 31, 1950..... 22,104.84

¹ Includes \$27,769.07 payroll of temporary employees.

KENNETH MCKELLAR,
Chairman.

JANUARY 8, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Walter L. Reynolds, chief clerk.....	\$10,846.00	\$5,422.98
Ann M. Grickis, assistant chief clerk.....	6,066.23	3,025.82
Mollie Jo Hughes, clerical assistant.....	4,328.19	2,149.59
Emily I. Tennyson (Mrs.), clerical assistant.....	4,415.10	2,185.79
Velda Blanche Holder, clerical assistant.....	4,415.10	2,178.55
Ray Barnett, clerical assistant.....	3,893.68	1,925.09
Glenn K. Shriver, professional staff member.....	9,766.16	4,827.74
Miles Scull, Jr., professional staff member.....	10,015.02	4,966.00
Herman C. Loeffler, professional staff member.....	10,846.00	5,422.98
Thomas A. Sappington, professional staff member.....	9,434.35	4,164.11

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure during 81st Cong..... \$10,000.00

Amount expended during 81st Cong..... 5,325.74

Balance unexpended..... 4,674.26

JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman.

JANUARY 8, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (S. RES. 205)

To the SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the

funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Paul H. Menk, Jr., staff member	\$9,932.07	\$4,813.94
Mary A. Feiman, clerical assistant ¹	3,806.78	888.24
Margot Lindsay (Mrs.), clerical assistant ²	3,806.78	74.02
Janet Valdes (Mrs.), clerical assistant ³	3,806.78	941.11

¹ To Sept. 24, 1950.

² Sept. 25 to Oct. 1, 1950.

³ Oct. 2 to Dec. 31, 1950.

Funds authorized or appropriated for subcommittee expenditure under S. Res. 205, 81st Cong. \$15,000.00

Amount expended under S. Res. 205, 81st Cong. 11,891.37

Balance unexpended 3,108.63

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Chairman.

JANUARY 8, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (S. RES. 205)

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Eli E. Nobleman, counsel	\$9,019.59	\$4,509.78
Katharine M. Ellis (Mrs.), secretary	4,328.19	2,149.59

Funds authorized or appropriated for subcommittee expenditure under S. Res. 205, 81st Cong. \$18,000.00

Amount expended under S. Res. 205, 81st Cong. 11,754.75

Balance unexpended 6,245.25

HERBERT R. O'CONNOR,
Chairman.

JANUARY 9, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE AVAILABLE FUEL RESERVES OF THE UNITED STATES (UNDER AUTHORITY OF S. RES. 374, AGREED TO DECEMBER 21, 1950)

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by its subcommittee for the period from October 30, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by its subcommittee:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Lenore V. Choate, clerical assistant	\$3,806.78	\$645.03

Funds authorized or appropriated for subcommittee expenditure \$20,000.00

Amount expended 645.03

Balance unexpended 19,354.97

JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY,
Chairman.

JANUARY 9, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by it and its subcommittees for the period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by it and its subcommittees:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Mills Astin, chief clerk	\$10,846.00	\$5,423.00
Nellie D. McSherry, assistant chief clerk	8,438.93	4,219.46
Albert A. Grorud, professional staff	8,438.93	4,219.46
Elmer K. Nelson, professional staff	8,438.93	4,219.46
Stewart French, professional staff	8,438.93	4,219.46
Arthur A. Sandusky, professional staff	8,438.93	4,219.46
Charlotte Mickle, clerical assistant	4,328.19	2,164.09
Saides Blair, clerical assistant ¹	3,719.87	300.14
Mary Moran, clerical assistant ²	4,328.19	1,278.00
Marie Mathew, clerical assistant	4,328.19	2,164.09
Geraldine B. Colevas, clerical assistant	4,154.38	1,384.80

¹ Terminated July 31, 1950.

² Terminated Nov. 15, 1950.

Funds authorized or appropriated for committee expenditure \$45,000.00

Amount expended 23,208.76

Balance unexpended 21,791.24

JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY,
Chairman.

JANUARY 9, 1951.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE INDIANS (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 292, AGREED TO JULY 13, 1950)

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE:

The above-mentioned committee, pursuant to Senate Resolution 123, Eightieth Congress, first session, submits the following report showing the name, profession, and total salary of each person employed by its subcommittee for the period from October 1, 1950, to December 31, 1950, together with the funds available to and expended by its subcommittee:

Name and profession	Rate of gross annual salary	Total salary received
Louis D. Luttrell, staff director	\$8,438.93	\$2,109.72
Mary Ryan, clerical assistant	3,806.78	687.33

Funds authorized or appropriated for subcommittee expenditure \$25,000.00

Amount expended 3,381.98

Balance unexpended 21,618.02

JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY,
Chairman.

CONTINUATION OF AUTHORITY FOR STUDY OF OPERATIONS OF RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, I report favorably a resolution to continue until May 1, 1951, the authority to study operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The subcommittee unanimously recommended the resolution, and the members of the full committee who have been available have been polled and have approved.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received, and under the rule referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The resolution (S. Res. 17) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That the authority of the Committee on Banking and Currency, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, under Senate Resolution 219, Eighty-first Congress, agreed to on February 8, 1950 (providing for a study of the operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and its subsidiaries), as continued by Senate Resolution 279, Eighty-first Congress, agreed to on May 19, 1950, and Senate Resolution 307, Eighty-first Congress, agreed to on July 13, 1950, is hereby continued until May 1, 1951, and the limit of expenditures under such resolution is hereby increased by \$20,000.

REFERENCE OF COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO HAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENTS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, so that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service may continue its study with regard to performance ratings and additional compensation for hazardous employments in Federal agencies, I am respectfully requesting that the Senate refer to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, of which I am chairman, the following executive communications which were referred to the committee during the Eighty-first Congress:

First. Report to the Senate by the Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission dated January 31, 1950, on efficiency ratings; and

Second. Report to the Senate by the Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission dated October 26, 1950, on additional compensation for hazardous employments.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from South Carolina? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

Bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. WHERRY:

S. 281. A bill for the relief of Col. Harry F. Cunningham;

S. 282. A bill for the relief of Richard Gregory Rundle and Baliquette Adele Rundle; and

S. 283. A bill for the relief of Akiko Mitshutata; to the Committee on the Judiciary. (Mr. WHERRY also, for Mr. CAIN (for himself, Mr. HENDRICKSON, and Mr. BRICKER) introduced Senate bill 284, to extend to personnel of the Armed Forces engaged in operations against hostile forces in the Korean theater certain benefits provided by law for veterans of World War II, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Committee on Finance, and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. SALTONSTALL:

S. 285. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain public works, and for other purposes," approved April 4, 1944; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 286. A bill to exempt members of the Armed Forces from the tax on admissions

when admission is free of charge; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 287. A bill for the relief of Shelby Shoe Co., of Salem, Mass.;

S. 288. A bill to provide for the reimbursement of Watertown, Mass., for the loss of taxes on certain property in such town acquired by the United States for use for military purposes; and

S. 289. A bill for the relief of Arno Edwin Kolm; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL (for himself and Mr. LONGE):

S. 290. A bill to authorize the coinage of 25-cent pieces in commemoration of the three hundredth anniversary of the Pine Tree Shilling; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. MARTIN:

S. 291. A bill for the relief of Claude Pierre Connelly;

S. 292. A bill for the relief of Michel H. Frank, Bessie Frank, and Herbert Frank;

S. 293. A bill for the relief of Sister Anna M. Alzbeta Sijarto-Hajdukova (also known as Sister M. Elizabeth);

S. 294. A bill for the relief of Sister Maria Urbana Cihovics (also known as Sister M. Urbana Cihovics);

S. 295. A bill for the relief of Michail Ioannou Bourbakis;

S. 296. A bill for the relief of Chaim Locker; and

S. 297. A bill for the relief of Tsung Hsien Hsu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG:

S. 298. A bill for the relief of Mary Osadchy;

S. 299. A bill for the relief of Pietro Bruno Tonino;

S. 300. A bill for the relief of Lloyd F. Stewart; and

S. 301. A bill for the relief of Joubbran A. Abcu Joubbran; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GREEN:

S. 302. A bill to amend section 32 (a) (2) of the Trading With the Enemy Act; and

S. 303. A bill for the relief of Richard F. Harvey; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HILL:

S. 304. A bill to authorize the payment by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs of a gratuitous indemnity to survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die in active service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 305. A bill to supplement the national transportation policy and to aid in achieving such policy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HILL (for himself and Mr. SPARKMAN):

S. 306. A bill to provide that the Veterans' Administration hospital being constructed at Birmingham, Ala., shall be named in honor of Gen. William Crawford Gorgas; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. RUSSELL (by request):

S. 307. A bill to correct an error in section 1 of the act of June 28, 1947, to stimulate volunteer enlistments in the Regular Military Establishment of the United States; and

S. 308. A bill to amend section 207 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 so as to authorize payment of claims arising from the correction of military or naval records; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 309. A bill to eliminate the additional internal revenue taxes on coconut oil coming from the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and for other purposes; and

S. 310. A bill to make permanent the act of December 5, 1942, to accord free entry to bona fide gifts from members of the Armed Forces of the United States on duty abroad; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 311. A bill to amend the act of August 1, 1947, providing appropriate lapel buttons for widows, parents, and next of kin of members of the Armed Forces who lost their lives

in the armed services of the United States in World War II, and for other purposes; and

S. 312. A bill to authorize certain land and other property transaction, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 313. A bill to authorize the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to settle, pay, adjust, and compromise certain claims for damages and for salvage and towage and to execute releases, certifications, and reports with respect thereto, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 314. A bill to amend section 4 of the act of March 2, 1933 (47 Stat. 1423), as amended, so as to provide that a mess operated under the direction of a Supply Corps officer can be operated either on a quantity or on a monetary ration basis;

S. 315. A bill to provide for crediting certain service of nurses, dietitians, and physical therapists in the Armed Forces toward retirement;

S. 316. A bill to provide for the designation and appointment of general officers of the United States Air Force in grades above that of major general, and for other purposes;

S. 317. A bill to authorize the training for, attendance at, and participation in, Olympic games by military personnel, and for other purposes;

S. 318. A bill to authorize the President to convey and assign all equipment contained in or appertaining to the United States Army Provisional Philippine Scout Hospital at Fort McKinley, Philippines, to the Republic of the Philippines and to assist by grants-in-aid the Republic of the Philippines in providing medical care and treatment for certain Philippine Scouts hospitalized therein;

S. 319. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to reproduce and to sell copies of official records of their respective departments, and for other purposes;

S. 320. A bill to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to provide for the promotion and maintenance of civilian recreation programs;

S. 321. A bill to authorize the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, to cause to be published official registers of their respective services;

S. 322. A bill to amend the act of October 30, 1941, as amended, to authorize Air Force officers, designated by the Secretary of the Air Force, to take action upon reports of survey and vouchers pertaining to the loss, damage, spoilage, unserviceability, unsuitability, or destruction of Government property;

S. 323. A bill to facilitate the performance of research and development work by and on behalf of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and for other purposes;

S. 324. A bill to amend the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 to provide for the crediting of certain service in the Army of the United States for certain members of the Reserve Components of the Air Force of the United States;

S. 325. A bill to provide for a Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and for other purposes;

S. 326. A bill to provide that personnel of the Reserve Components of the Army of the United States and the Air Force of the United States shall have common Federal appointments or enlistments as Reserves in their respective services, to equalize disability benefits applicable to such personnel, and for other purposes;

S. 327. A bill to amend further the act entitled "An act to authorize the construction of experimental submarines, and for other purposes," approved May 16, 1947, as amended;

S. 328. A bill to provide for sundry administrative matters affecting the Department of Defense, and for other purposes;

S. 329. A bill to authorize payment for the transportation of household effects of certain naval personnel; and

S. 330. A bill to amend section 12 of the Missing Persons Act, as amended, relating to travel by dependents and transportation of household and personal effects; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. MURRAY:

S. 331. A bill to declare that the United States holds certain lands in trust for the Blackfeet Indian Tribe of Montana; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 332. A bill for the relief of Brunhilda Elizabeth Baechle;

S. 333. A bill for the relief of the Thomas Cruse Mining & Development Co.;

S. 334. A bill for the relief of the owners of certain Finnish sailing vessels;

S. 335. A bill for the relief of Fares Nujra Saliba; and

S. 336. A bill to amend Public Law 441, Eighty-first Congress, so as to provide for the annual proclamation of National Children's Dental Health Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MURRAY (for himself, Mr. HILL, Mr. NEELY, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. LEHMAN, and Mr. PASTORE):

S. 337. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act and the Vocational Education Act of 1946 to provide an emergency 5-year program of grants and scholarships for education in the fields of medicine, osteopathy, dentistry, dental hygiene, public health, and nursing professions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. O'CONOR:

S. 338. A bill to incorporate National Service Star Legion; and

S. 339. A bill to prohibit the transfer of strategic commodities to countries whose armed forces are in conflict with Armed Forces of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GILLETTE:

S. 340. A bill to amend the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, to extend its provisions to coffee; and

S. 341. A bill to amend the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

S. 342. A bill to provide a Federal charter for the Federal Alcohol Corporation; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 343. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require the labeling of soaps and detergents; and

S. 344. A bill to prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of injurious, misrepresented, and uninformatively labeled household cleansers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

S. 345. A bill to enlarge the definition of cosmetic contained in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by removing the exception made in the case of soap; and

S. 346. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to nonnutritive ingredients in food; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. HOEY:

S. 347. A bill for the preservation of the public peace and the protection of property within the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

S. 348. A bill for the relief of Jacoba van Dorp; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(Mr. FULBRIGHT (for Mr. MAYBANK) introduced Senate bill 349, to assist the provision of housing and community facilities and services required in connection with the national defense, which was referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina:
S. 350. A bill for the relief of the Z. D. Gilman Co., Inc.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 351. A bill to amend Public Law 359, chapter 287, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session;

S. 352. A bill to simplify and consolidate the laws relating to the receipt of compensation from dual employments under the United States, and for other purposes;

S. 353. A bill relating to the time for publication of the Official Register of the United States; and

S. 354. A bill to amend Public Law 106, Seventy-ninth Congress, with regard to compensation for overtime and holiday employment; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. LANGER, Mr. ECTON, and Mr. NEELY):

S. 355. A bill to amend the act of July 6, 1945, as amended, so as to reduce the number of grades for the various positions under such act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FLANDERS:

S. 356. A bill for the relief of Edith Winifred Henderson; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(Mr. WILLIAMS introduced Senate bill 357, relating to the salaries and expense allowances of the President, Vice President, and the Speaker and Members of Congress, which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado (for himself and Mr. MILLIKIN):

S. 358. A bill to amend the authority given the Secretary of the Interior by the act of June 25, 1947, to construct the Paonia reclamation project, Colorado, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. McMAHON:

S. 359. A bill for the relief of John F. Condon; and

S. 360. A bill for the relief of Stefan Lenartowicz and his wife, Irene; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SMITH of New Jersey:

S. 361. A bill for the relief of Herk Visnapuu and his wife, Naima;

S. 362. A bill for the relief of Tu Do Chau (also known as Szetu Dju or Anna Szetu);

S. 363. A bill for the relief of Irmgard Kohler;

S. 364. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Suzanne Wiernik and her daughter, Genevieve;

S. 365. A bill for the relief of Anna Krueger, Jean Krueger, and Edith Krueger; and

S. 366. A bill for the relief of Stanislas d'Erceville; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DIRKSEN:

S. 367. A bill for the relief of Kay Adel Snedeker; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LODGE:

S. 368. A bill for the relief of Karl A. Eriksson; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BUTLER of Nebraska:

S. 369. A bill providing tax incentive for the creation of additional farm storage facilities; and

S. 370. A bill to provide for the deduction from gross income for income-tax purposes of expenses incurred by farmers for the purpose of soil and water conservation; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Texas:

S. 371. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Vera Raupe; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HENNINGS:

S. 372. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Ellen Knauff; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KILGORE:

S. 373. A bill for the relief of Gerasimos Athanase Haberis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CAPEHART:

S. 374. A bill to authorize the payment to the estate of Col. Ernest R. Baltzell, Army of the United States, Army serial No. O-476408, of a sum equal to that which he would have been entitled to receive if his claim for disability retirement pay had been filed, determined, and granted prior to his death; and

S. 375. A bill for the relief of William B. Garner; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. LANGER, Mr. NEELY, and Mr. ECTON):

S. 376. A bill to adjust the salaries of postmasters and supervisors of the field service of the Post Office Department; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. LEHMAN:

S. 377. A bill to provide reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the burial of those who served in the military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines while such forces were in the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to the military order of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself and Mr. MURRAY):

S. 378. A bill restoring to tribal ownership certain lands upon the Colville Indian Reservation, Wash., and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. McCLELLAN:

S. 379. A bill to authorize relief of authorized certifying officers of terminated war agencies in liquidation by the Department of Labor; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

By Mr. LANGER:

S. 380. A bill to extend the maximum amortization period of loans made under sections 3 and 4 of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, as amended, from 35 years to 50 years; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

S. 381. A bill to repeal section 509 of title 34 of the United States Code, approved June 30, 1876 (ch. 159, 19 Stat. 69);

S. 382. A bill to provide for the payment of subsistence allowances to members of the Armed Forces who were held captive by the enemy during World War II; and

S. 383. A bill to exempt persons who served in the merchant marine of the United States between September 16, 1940, and June 24, 1948, from induction or service under the Selective Service Act of 1948; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 384. A bill to provide judicial procedure for determining a taxpayer's liability for income-tax deficiencies;

S. 385. A bill to permit farmers to carry over and carry back net operating losses for 8 years for income-tax purposes;

S. 386. A bill to grant to veterans of World War II equal treatment in the matter of unemployment readjustment allowances;

S. 387. A bill to extend the benefits of title II of the Social Security Act to employees of certain nonprofit organizations, and for other purposes; and

S. 388. A bill to allow an exclusion from the gross income of an employee for income-tax purposes of payments, made by his employer, of premiums on not to exceed \$10,000 of term insurance on the employee's life; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 389. A bill to provide aid to persons in the United States desirous of migrating to the Republic of Liberia, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

S. 390. A bill to amend title VI of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

S. 391. A bill for the relief of Holger Kubischke;

S. 392. A bill to make it a crime for Federal employees to make unlawful threats to

a taxpayer for the purpose of collecting taxes;

S. 393. A bill to reimburse certain employees of the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice, and for other purposes;

S. 394. A bill providing for the substitution of their successors as parties in actions by or against public officers;

S. 395. A bill for the relief of Mohamed Fazal; and

S. 396. A bill prohibiting copyright in pictures, paintings, photographs, prints, or pictorial illustrations portraying Jesus Christ; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 397. A bill to authorize the appropriation of funds to assist the States and Territories in financing a minimum foundation education program of public elementary and secondary schools, and in reducing the inequalities of educational opportunities through public elementary and secondary schools, for the general welfare, and for other purposes;

S. 398. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to provide compensation for employees of the United States suffering injuries while in the performance of their duties, and for other purposes," approved September 7, 1916, as amended;

S. 399. A bill to increase annuities under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 by 25 percent, and for other purposes;

S. 400. A bill to amend the act approved August 4, 1919, as amended, providing additional aid for the American Printing House for the Blind; and

S. 401. A bill to make available medical and hospital treatment to certain individuals who have had a minimum of 10 years' service as civil officers or employees of the Federal Government; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

S. 402. A bill to abolish and correct unfair practices and substandard working conditions and to raise living standards among the employees of Federal agencies;

S. 403. A bill to clarify the provision of section 6 (b) of the act of August 24, 1912, relating to the payment of compensation to Government employees restored to duty after erroneous removal or suspension;

S. 404. A bill to authorize the Postmaster General to prescribe a uniform dress for groups of postal employees and to extend existing penal provisions covering unauthorized wearing of uniforms to these groups;

S. 405. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, so as to permit redeposit by reemployed annuitants of refunds of contributions and to allow credit for service covered by such redeposits;

S. 406. A bill to authorize the issuance of a special series of stamps to encourage the mailing of good-will letters between citizens of the United States and those of foreign countries;

S. 407. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, so as to provide certain benefits for annuitants who retired prior to April 1, 1948;

S. 408. A bill to amend section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912, as amended, with respect to the recognition of organizations of postal and Federal employees;

S. 409. A bill to amend the provisions of the postal salary law relating to rural carriers, and for other purposes;

S. 410. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, so as to include immigrant inspectors within the provisions thereof relating to annuities of personnel engaged in hazardous occupations;

S. 411. A bill to provide for granting 26 days' annual leave and 15 days' sick leave per year to postmasters and employees in the postal service;

S. 412. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, so as to permit the retirement of postal employees who have rendered at least 30 years of service;

S. 413. A bill to amend the act of July 6, 1945, as amended, with respect to automotive-equipment-maintenance payments to special-delivery messengers in post offices of the first class, and for other purposes;

S. 414. A bill to grant an option of overtime in lieu of compensatory time to postal employees for work performed on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays; and

S. 415. A bill to provide compensatory time for services performed on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays by clerks in third-class post offices; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. WILEY:

S. 416. A bill for the relief of Wacław Betlewski;

S. 417. A bill for the relief of Sui Ken Fong and Sui Tung Fong;

S. 418. A bill for the relief of Kristjan Kogerman;

S. 419. A bill for the relief of Henning C. L. Meyer;

S. 420. A bill for the relief of Gloria Wilson;

S. 421. A bill for the relief of Antonio Ubaldino Trombetta;

S. 422. A bill for the relief of Wang Chi-Yuen;

S. 423. A bill for the relief of Orazio Basso;

S. 424. A bill for the relief of Bror Rainer Heikel;

S. 425. A bill for the relief of Sverre K. Nedberg;

S. 426. A bill for the relief of Teruko Okuaki;

S. 427. A bill for the relief of Nene Baalstad;

S. 428. A bill for the relief of Brother John Munk;

S. 429. A bill for the relief of Constance Jenkins; and

S. 430. A bill for the relief of Mark G. Rushmann; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLAND (for himself and Mr. SMATHERS):

S. 431. A bill to provide for terms of court to be held at West Palm Beach, and at Fort Myers, in the southern district of Florida; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado:

S. 432. A bill to extend pension benefits under the laws reenacted by Public Law 269, Seventy-fourth Congress, August 13, 1935, as now or hereafter amended, to certain persons who served with the United States military or naval forces engaged in hostilities in the Moro Province, including Mindanao, or in the islands of Samar and Leyte, Philippine Islands, after July 4, 1902, and prior to January 1, 1914, and to their unmarried widows, child, or children; and

S. 433. A bill to eliminate the retroactive application of the income tax to employees of the United States working in the possessions or in the Canal Zone; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 434. A bill to authorize the training of an adequate backlog of airmen to meet the civil and military needs of the United States, and for other purposes;

S. 435. A bill to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, and for other purposes; and

S. 436 (by request). A bill to provide for the separation of subsidy from air-mail pay, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

(Mr. HENDRICKSON (for himself, Mr. O'CONOR, Mrs. SMITH of Maine, Mr. SCHOFFEL, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HUNT, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. AIKEN, Mr. TOBEY, Mr. BRIDGES, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. IVES) introduced Senate bill 437, to establish a National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which was referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. McCARRAN:

S. 438. A bill to provide economic, financial and other aid to China; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. MAGNUSON:

S. 439. A bill to grant succession to the War Damage Corporation; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

S. 440. A bill for the relief of Evangelos and Michael Dumas;

S. 441. A bill for the relief of Varee Woods;

S. 442. A bill for the relief of the Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co. of Juneau, Alaska; and

S. 443. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Blanche Richards; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(Mr. MAGNUSON also introduced Senate bill 444, to provide for the payment of extra compensation for certain work heretofore performed by customs officers and employees, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Committee on Finance, and appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. HILL (for himself, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. CORDON, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey; Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. MALONE, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. KNOWLAND, Mr. AIKEN, Mr. TAFT, Mr. NEELY, and Mr. LEHMAN):

S. 445. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize assistance to States and their subdivisions in the development and maintenance of local public health units, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 446. A bill to authorize the Postmaster General to enter into special agreements for certain switching service by railway common carriers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HILL:

S. J. Res. 8. Joint resolution providing for awards of honor for agricultural production; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. J. Res. 9. Joint resolution to authorize the issuance of a special series of blue and gray stamps to symbolize our national unity; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HILL (for himself and Mr. MALONE):

S. J. Res. 10. Joint resolution to create a National Cemetery Commission for the consolidation of national cemetery activities within one civilian commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. CAPEHART:

S. J. Res. 11. Joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States of America to proclaim October 11, 1951, General Pulaski's Memorial Day for the observance and commemoration of the death of Brig. Gen. Casimir Pulaski; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLAND (for himself, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. HOEY, Mr. SMITH of North Carolina, Mr. BYRD, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. O'CONOR, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. LONG, Mr. McCLELLAN, and Mr. FULBRIGHT):

S. J. Res. 12. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, relating to the qualifications of electors; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EXTENSION OF CERTAIN BENEFITS TO ARMED FORCES ENGAGED IN KOREA

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Washington [Mr. CAIN], for himself, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to extend to personnel of the Armed Forces engaged in Korea certain benefits provided for veterans of World

War II, and I ask unanimous consent that a statement explaining the purposes of the bill by the Senator from Washington be printed in the Record.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the statement by the Senator from Washington will be printed in the Record. The Chair hears no objection.

The bill (S. 284) to extend to personnel of the Armed Forces engaged in operations against hostile forces in the Korean theater certain benefits provided by law for veterans of World War II, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. WHERRY for Mr. CAIN (for himself, Mr. HENDRICKSON, and Mr. BRICKER), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

The statement of Mr. CAIN is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CAIN

On July 10 of last year the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON], and the junior Senator from Washington introduced a bill which would provide to personnel of the Armed Forces engaged in operations against hostile forces in Korea, the same benefits as provided by law for veterans of World War II. The bill was never reported out of the Finance Committee, to which it was referred.

The cruel and bloody war which was in progress in Korea and is in progress today is a war in every sense of that word, despite the official label "police action." There have been more than 40,000 casualties, including 6,761 dead, 27,997 wounded, and 6,148 missing in action.

Certainly no war in the history of our Nation has been more real to the men who are doing our fighting, certainly no war more heartbreaking to the families of these men than is our present so-called police action in Korea. Certainly the Congress of the United States will feel no hesitancy in extending to these soldiers the same care and benefits as were extended to the members of our fighting forces in World War II.

Section 4 of the original bill which would provide insurance benefits, has been struck out of the new bill as these benefits have now been provided by law.

As a part of the record there is included a copy of a letter written by the then Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. E. H. Foley, on December 29, to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], chairman of the Finance Committee, in which it is stated that the Department of the Treasury is in accord with the basic principles of the original bill but suggests certain technical changes. These changes can best be referred to the Finance Committee, which is much better qualified to consider them than is the junior Senator from Washington.

The letter reads, as follows:

"Further reference is made to your letter of July 12, 1950, requesting the views of the Treasury Department on S. 3890., to extend to personnel of the Armed Forces engaged in operations against the forces of the Government of North Korea certain benefits provided by law for veterans of World War II, and for other purposes.

"Section 1 of S. 3890 provides that any active service performed by members of the Armed Forces against North Korean forces shall be deemed to entitle such members to receive all benefits, under laws and regulations administered by the Veterans' Administration, as if this service had been performed during World War II. Section 2 would extend to such persons certain benefits of national service life insurance, which were

available only to persons serving in World War II. Section 3 would extend to such persons the educational benefits, loan guaranties, employment privileges, and readjustment allowances provided for by the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, with limitations to prevent duplication. Section 4 would reinstate to such persons family allowances as provided for in the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942. Section 5 would extend to such persons certain benefits of the Housing Act of 1937, as amended, relating to low-rent-housing projects.

"The Treasury Department is in accord with the basic principles of this proposed legislation, but is of the opinion that these meritorious objectives may not be achieved entirely in case S. 3890 is enacted. The bill would limit its benefits to those who become actively engaged against North Korean forces. Such a provision would be extremely difficult to administer and would inevitably result in denial of benefits to deserving individuals. Section 4 should no longer be considered inasmuch as Public Law 771 of the Eighty-first Congress has dealt fully with the problem of family allowances.

"The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report to your committee.

"Very truly yours,

"E. H. FOLEY,

"Under Secretary of the Treasury."

The junior Senator from Washington is confident that the bill will receive the just and prompt consideration it deserves.

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES AND SERVICES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to assist the provision of housing and community facilities and services required in connection with the national defense, and I ask unanimous consent that a statement and synopsis prepared by the Senator from South Carolina which analyze the bill be printed in the Record for the information of Senators.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the statement and synopsis will be printed in the Record.

The bill (S. 349) to assist the provision of housing and community facilities and services required in connection with the national defense, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

The statement and synopsis by Senator MAYBANK are as follows:

A STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAYBANK ON THE DEFENSE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES AND SERVICES BILL OF 1951

The defense housing and community facilities and services bill of 1951 is intended to equip the Federal Government to plan and develop housing and community facilities concurrently with plans for defense installations, and is sufficiently broad and flexible to meet various conditions, ranging from rapid expansion of activity in defense areas to major installations in nonindustrial areas, such as the Atomic Energy Commission's Savannah River project and others in Kentucky, New Mexico, Idaho, and other States.

The bill carries provisions for special FHA insurance for housing for defense workers, authority for federally financed housing where defense needs cannot otherwise be met, and Federal assistance to communities

to provide community facilities and services for defense installations and workers.

The bill also authorizes Federal acquisition, development, and planning of land for housing, community facilities, and defense installations in relatively isolated areas to prevent land speculation and uneconomic use of land. Such property would then be disposed of to private and public developers for actual construction.

Other provisions of the bill include additional authorization for FHA mortgage insurance programs, extension of FHA's authority to insure loans for military housing and includes also loans for housing for atomic energy installations, authorizes loans for prefabricated housing in the interests of defense, and amends existing law to enable federally aided low-rent public housing to serve defense purposes where needed.

The bill authorizes the FHA to insure up to an additional \$3,000,000,000 in mortgages, principally for housing in defense areas, under its various mortgage insurance programs, including the proposed special defense housing title. The President would determine the maximum amounts to be used for the various FHA mortgage insurance titles under the National Housing Act. The bill also would authorize an appropriation for a revolving fund of \$10,000,000 for acquisition and development of land for defense facilities in isolated areas, and would authorize loans up to \$15,000,000 for the production and marketing of prefabricated housing in order to maintain current housing prefabrication capacity for use in meeting defense needs. Funds for federally financed housing and aid for community facilities and services would be determined by Congress through appropriations.

The bill would place over-all administrative responsibility for the program in the Housing and Home Finance Administrator, subject to the President's determination as to defense requirements. The President could transfer to other agencies certain functions relating to community facilities and services where this would more effectively serve defense needs.

The program will rely primarily on private enterprise in the field of housing and on local communities and agencies for provision and operation of community facilities and services, with direct Federal financing and operation to be used only where defense needs cannot otherwise be adequately served.

The bill would provide for payments in lieu of taxes to local and State taxing jurisdictions for federally owned defense housing and for service payments for community services to defense installations and related housing and other developments.

The bill would also call for federally financed housing, as far as feasible, to be one to four-family permanent structures, available for individual sale to occupants and veterans when defense needs permit, and for any temporary needs to be met with housing that can be moved and reused in other locations.

Hearings on the bill will begin at 10:30 a. m., Tuesday, January 16.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE KEY PROVISIONS OF THE DEFENSE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES AND SERVICES BILL OF 1951

Policy: The bill sets forth a policy of planning concurrently with the planning of defense facilities for necessary housing and community facilities and services to support them; for providing such housing through private enterprise, as far as practical, with Government help if needed, and for provision and operation of community facilities and services by local agencies wherever possible, with Federal aid if needed; for the provision and operation of housing and community facilities and services directly by the Federal Government only where they cannot be

otherwise provided; for permanent construction of one- to four-family units for defense housing, as far as practicable, and for their sale to occupants and veterans as soon as possible consistent with national defense requirements.

The bill contains five titles, as follows:

TITLE I

This provides a new title IX to the National Housing Act, for special FHA mortgage insurance for privately financed defense housing, to be used in addition to existing FHA programs in defense areas.

The President would determine the maximum amount of mortgages that could be insured under this new title out of a total maximum authorization of an additional \$3,000,000,000 authorized in title V of this bill for new commitments on all FHA mortgage insurance programs under the National Housing Act. (See further explanation under title V in this summary.)

The new title IX of the National Housing Act would be available only in areas designated by the President as having or about to have need of housing for defense purposes. The Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency would determine the maximum number of units to be insured under this title in any such area.

Workers in defense activities would have priority in the purchase or rental of such housing.

The FHA Commissioner could require that any housing insured under this title be held for rental so long as he determines that this is necessary to serve defense needs and could prescribe maximum rentals and rate of return on such housing.

Terms for insured mortgages on one- and two-family units (sec. 903): 90 percent of FHA appraised value, maximum maturity 25 years, maximum interest $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent. Maximum mortgage amount, \$8,100 for one-family, \$15,000 for two-family residences, except that the FHA Commissioner could increase these amounts by \$900 each for a third and fourth bedroom where necessary to maintain sound standards for larger units.

Terms for multifamily projects (sec. 908): 90 percent of FHA appraised value, but not more than the FHA estimate of cost, maximum term to be prescribed by FHA, maximum interest, 4 percent; maximum single mortgage, \$5,000,000; maximum mortgage amount per unit, \$8,100, or \$7,200 if the units average less than four rooms.

TITLE II

This title authorizes the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency to provide with Federal funds housing for defense workers and assist in providing or provide community facilities and services required for defense operations where they would not otherwise be provided.

The title authorizes appropriations for this purpose, with the amounts to be determined by the Congress through usual appropriation processes.

Defense housing: Such housing would be available for occupancy by workers and military personnel. To the maximum extent possible, this housing would be one- to four-family structures of permanent construction, suitable for sale as individual structures. Where located in places where the duration of need appears temporary, the housing would be so constructed as to be capable of being moved and reused in other locations.

Cost limit would be \$9,000, with an additional \$1,000 each for a third and fourth bedroom. Such limits could be increased by the President by one-third in the Territories.

Such housing would be sold as soon as possible in the public interest and consistent with defense use, with preference to occupants and veterans, or, in multifamily structures, to cooperatives of veterans and occupants.

Full payments in lieu of taxes would be authorized on such property.

Rents to be charged would be fair rents based on value.

Community facilities and services: The title would authorize the Administrator to make loans, grants, and other payments to communities to provide, operate, and maintain community facilities and provide community services needed for defense purposes. Federal grants and payments would be authorized to the extent that the community's costs result from defense activities and are not recovered through increased tax or service revenues. The Federal Government would be authorized to maintain and operate community facilities only when it is not feasible for this to be done through local agencies.

The President would be authorized to transfer from the Housing Administrator to other agencies certain functions relating to community facilities and services functions if he considered this to be in the interest of the defense effort.

TITLE III*

To prevent land speculation or uneconomic use of land which would impair the defense effort, this title would authorize the Administrator, upon a finding of the President, to acquire and develop land for housing and community facilities needed in connection with a defense installation in a relatively isolated area, and, where the President found it desirable, to acquire land for the defense installation itself.

The use of such land would be planned, necessary site improvements would be provided for, and the land would then be disposed of to private and public agencies for actual construction. No funds under this title could be used to erect any buildings.

Payments in lieu of taxes are authorized, such payments to take into consideration the services rendered by the taxing jurisdictions to the defense installation and related housing and other facilities.

The title authorizes the appropriation of not more than \$10,000,000 to a revolving fund in the Treasury and requires the payment of interest upon any advances from such fund.

TITLE IV

For the purpose of maintaining the operations and the present capacity of housing prefabricators to be available for use in meeting defense housing needs, this title authorizes loans and commitments up to \$15,000,000, outstanding at any time, to be made for the production and distribution of prefabricated housing.

TITLE V

Title V contains the new authorization for FHA mortgage insurance programs and various miscellaneous and technical amendments to existing housing legislation.

FHA authorization: The bill authorizes the FHA to insure a maximum of \$3,000,000,000 in additional mortgages under all its mortgage-insurance programs for defense and regular housing. This includes any additional authorization that may be needed for small homes under section 8, title I, of the National Housing Act; sale, rental, and cooperative housing under title II; military and atomic energy housing under title VIII, and defense housing under the new title IX proposed in the bill. The President would determine the maximum authorization within the \$3,000,000,000 over-all limit that could be used for any of these FHA mortgage-insurance titles.

The miscellaneous amendments in title V of the new bill that are of general interest are:

Perfecting amendments to existing law to permit the use of housing under the federally aided low-rent public-housing program to be more effectively geared to defense needs, where necessary.

Extension of the availability of FHA mortgage insuring authority for loans on military housing under title VIII, National Housing Act, from July 1, 1951, to July 1, 1953. The use of such mortgage insurance would also be made available for housing serving atomic energy installations.

Authority for the President to extend time limits set in the Housing Act of 1950 for applications and actions to be taken in the disposition of federally owned World War II housing.

Designation of an appointee of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Federal National Mortgage Association.

Perfecting amendments to title VII of the National Housing Act to make FHA insurance of yields or direct investments in moderate-priced rental housing more workable in a defense economy.

SALARIES AND EXPENSE ALLOWANCES OF PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SPEAKER, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill relating to the salaries and expense allowances of the President, Vice President, and Speaker and Members of Congress, and I ask unanimous consent that I may speak in explanation of the bill.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the Senator from Delaware may proceed.

The bill (S. 357) relating to the salaries and expense allowances of the President, Vice President, and the Speaker and Members of Congress, introduced by Mr. WILLIAMS, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

Mr. WILLIAMS. President Truman has said that the people of our Nation must be taxed "until it hurts" in order that we might carry out our rearmament program. In the face of the substantial increase in expenditures which will be required, no one will dispute the fact but that taxes in 1951 will be increased substantially. However, when the President made the statement that taxes must be increased until it hurts, I venture to say that there are millions of American taxpayers who think they are already being hurt and that any increased burden will mean great hardship.

In view of the fact that such an increase does seem inevitable, I think the best way in which some of the sting from any prospective tax increase could be diminished would be to first convince the American people that we as Members of Congress, as well as the President of the United States, are willing to pay our proportionate part of the tax increases.

This can only be accomplished by repealing the present unfair special \$50,000 tax exemption to the President, the special \$10,000 tax exemption extended to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House, and the special \$2,500 tax exemption extended to each Member of Congress. These exemptions in each instance are in addition to the usual exemptions which all taxpayers get.

As you all know, the President's special tax exemption has nothing to do with his regular expense allowance which includes such items as the yacht, *The Williamsburg*; the winter home in Florida;

the airplane, *The Independence*; which are at his constant command, plus the expenses of the White House in Washington and any transportation expenses which are interpreted as nonpolitical—which includes all trips.

In addition, another \$40,000 is set aside to cover other expenses.

It is not the amount of revenue involved in this case—it is more a matter of principle. Our country was established on the basis that we would recognize no privileged group, and extension or continuation of these special tax benefits to the top officials might well mark the departure from that principle.

The President of the United States, Members of Congress, and other top officials of the executive branch of our Government are responsible for the fiscal affairs of our country. We as policy makers authorize these large expenditures which necessitate increased tax rates amounting in some instances to near confiscation. I think it is a healthy condition for our own good and particularly for the good of our country that we as officials of the Government suffer along with the other taxpayers.

For this reason I send to the desk a bill which would repeal such special privileges, thereby placing the President, the Vice President, and the Members of Congress on the same basis as all other American taxpayers.

While I recognize that the Senate cannot initiate tax bills, I am introducing this bill as a matter of record and serving notice that it will be reintroduced as a part of any future tax legislation coming from the House.

As the Eighty-second Congress takes control in this critical year 1951, the President of the United States, the Vice President, and all Members of Congress should take this pledge: "We will place upon the American people no heavier burdens than we are willing to carry ourselves."

BIPARTISAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONOR], the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. SCHOEPEL], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], the Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], my colleague from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES], and myself, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to establish a bipartisan National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in which all levels of government are represented to study those problems in our Federal, State, and local governments which make for overlapping services, duplication of effort, and sheer waste in tax dollars, and

I ask unanimous consent to make a brief statement in reference thereto.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the Senator from New Jersey may proceed.

The bill (S. 437) to establish a National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, introduced by Mr. HENDRICKSON (for himself, Mr. O'CONOR, Mrs. SMITH of Maine, Mr. SCHOEPEL, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HUNT, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. AIKEN, Mr. TOBEY, Mr. BRIDGES, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. IVES) was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. This bill represents the views and expresses the considered judgment of many Members of this body who have served in State government. It is a result of their experience at local and State levels of government that it now comes before us for study, consideration, and appropriate action.

The activities and the deep interest shown by the members and the experts of the Council of State Governments in this matter over the past years clearly demonstrates that there is a definite need for the study established by this bill.

This bill, Mr. President, as I have indicated, provides for the establishment of a bipartisan or, better still, a non-partisan Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which will examine all aspects and phases of national, State, and local government with special attention to the serious fiscal problems which threaten to overwhelm us today. While it may be true that there have been many studies in this general field in the past, none of them have had the full participation of our National Government.

Under this bill, the Commission will represent all of the parties in interest, both public and private, Federal, State, and local, legislative and executive, and where necessary, judicial. It will be given the opportunity and the responsibility to report its findings to the people of the Nation.

It is not intended that this group shall lend itself to any criticism of the basic structure of government levels as we know them, or to their general purposes, but it is our intention that we improve the services of government at each level and at the same time, stretch the value of the tax dollar in respect to the rendition of those services.

When the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts introduced the bill to establish the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, he said:

This is not a job which Congress alone, working through congressional committees and using its own staffs, can do. We in Congress have not the time. There is no use deluding ourselves about that. We have not the time to do the job that needs to be done. We would have to leave it to our staffs; and our staffs would not have the standing which the members of this Commission would have in relation to the departments. * * * All sorts of expert knowledge would be required, including the

services of industrial engineers and management experts. It would take time and money.

I most heartily agree that such an undertaking requires full-time work from many experts of proven ability in the several fields we propose to study.

Since this bill envisages a full-scale investigation on all levels of government, it is necessary to include representatives of local and State governments, Members of Congress, administrative officials, and men and women from private life.

The purposes as stated in the bill itself open exciting vistas for tremendous progress in efficient and effective government. To me, they spell new opportunities to employ sound economic and scientific business methods in public operations.

The entire world watches us day by day as we conduct our public affairs. To friends and foes alike, we are the outstanding example of the democratic processes of government. If we are to prosper and be worthy of the hopes of those who trust and rely upon us, we must be eternally vigilant that our system does not become fatally enmeshed in coils of its own construction.

The time is long overdue for an undertaking such as this—indeed, our present situation demands positive and definite action.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the text of the bill (S. 437) introduced by Mr. HENDRICKSON (for himself and other Senators) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That there is hereby established a national bipartisan commission, in which the various levels of government are represented, to be known as the National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). In view of the constantly increasing complexity, during the last century and a half, of a vast network of relationships among the Federal, State, county, and municipal governments in the United States, this Commission is established for the purpose of studying and making recommendations to the President and the Congress, in an effort to bring about—

(1) the finding of ways and means of establishing a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship between the several levels of government. Major aspects of this problem include the overlapping and confused systems of taxation and the increasing demands made upon the Federal Government and the States for tax-sharing and grants-in-aid, without following any consistent over-all pattern;

(2) the elimination of duplication and overlapping services, activities, and functions, and the securing of a better coordination of such services, activities, and functions among the several levels of government;

(3) the attainment of such an allocation of governmental functions among the several levels of government as will contribute to economy in governmental administration on the one hand, and maximum service to the public on the other;

(4) a reduction in the total governmental expenditures to the lowest possible level consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, activities, and functions;

(5) the development, within the existing constitutional framework, of a governmental structure, and such cooperative policies and procedures as will tend to overcome existing

obstacles to efficient governmental administration, and to lay a sound foundation for future development.

SEC. 2. (a) The Commission shall be composed of 14 members, as follows:

(1) Five appointed by the President of the United States, two of whom shall be officers of the executive branch of the Government and three of whom shall be private citizens, all of whom shall have had experience with or knowledge of major problems in the field of intergovernmental relations;

(2) Two appointed by the President of the Senate, who shall be Members of the Senate;

(3) Two appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall be Members of the House;

(4) Two appointed by the President of the United States, who shall be State officials, from a panel of at least four, submitted by the Council of State Governments;

(5) Two appointed by the President of the United States, who shall be municipal officials, from a panel of at least four, submitted jointly by the American Municipal Association, the International City Managers Association, and the United States Conference of Mayors;

(6) One appointed by the President of the United States, who shall be a county official, from a panel of at least two, submitted by the National Association of County Officials.

(b) Of the members enumerated in paragraph (1) of subsection (a), not more than three members shall be from any one political party; of each class of members enumerated in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of subsection (a), not more than one member shall be from any one political party.

(c) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(d) The Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among its members.

(e) Seven members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum.

SEC. 3. It shall be the duty of the Commission—

(1) to make a thorough and comprehensive study of the subjects listed below, and of any related subjects, with a view to determining what changes in existing relationships, in its opinion, are necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in section 1 of this act—

(A) the origin and development, and present status, of the relations and interrelations of the Federal, State, and local governments of the United States;

(B) the allocation of governmental functions among the Federal, State, and local governments of the United States;

(C) the problem of geographical areas as related to governmental functions, field administration, and metropolitan communities;

(D) the gradual encroachment upon our Federal system of current and impending developments in the fiscal relations of the Federal Government with the States, and of the States with their political subdivisions;

(2) to submit its final report and recommendations to the President and the Congress on the subjects indicated above, and suggest plans and procedures for carrying these recommendations into effect, not later than February 1, 1953.

SEC. 4. (a) The Commission may, in carrying out this act, hold such hearings and take such testimony, sit and act at such times and places as it deems advisable. Any member of the Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before the Commission. The Commission may delegate the powers conferred by this subsection to any member or to a group of members of the Commission.

(b) The Commission is authorized to secure from any department, agency, or independent instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government any information

it deems necessary to carry out its functions under this act; and each such department, agency, or instrumentality is authorized and directed to furnish such information to the Commission, upon request made by the Chairman or vice chairman.

(c) The Commission shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of a Director of Research and all other necessary personnel without regard to the civil-service laws, and without reference to political affiliations, solely on the ground of fitness to perform the duties of their office.

SEC. 5. (a) Members of the Commission, other than those to whom subsections (b) and (c) of section 2 are applicable, and within the provisions of subsection (c) of section 5, shall receive compensation at the rate of \$50 per day for each day they are engaged in the performance of their duties as members of the Commission, and shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties as members of the Commission.

(b) Members of the Commission who are Members of Congress shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as Members of Congress; but shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties as members of the Commission.

(c) Each member of the Commission from the executive branch of the Government shall receive, in addition to the compensation for duties performed in the executive branch, \$50 per day for each day he is engaged in the performance of his duties as a member of the Commission: *Provided, however,* That his total aggregate annual salary shall not exceed \$12,500; and shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred in the performance of his duties as a member of the Commission.

SEC. 6. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.

SEC. 7. The Commission shall cease to exist at the end of the fiscal year during which its final report to the President and the Congress is made.

EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR CERTAIN WORK BY CUSTOMS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide for the payment of extra compensation for certain work heretofore performed by customs officers and employees, and for other purposes, and I ask unanimous consent that a statement by me in connection with the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 444) to provide for the payment of extra compensation for certain work heretofore performed by customs officers and employees, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

The statement presented by Mr. MAGNUSON is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON

A gross inequity exists at the present time among men in the Customs Service who have performed inspectional duties at our ports of entry during the past 20 years. Because these men are expected to work long hours and on days when other Federal employees do not work, there are long-standing statutes which provide that they shall be paid at

premium rates for these extra services. In 1920 and 1922 the basic extra pay acts for such customs work were revised to broaden their scope and to fix the rates at which the men were to be paid. But the inspectors did not receive the benefits intended by these changes. It was not until 1944, after 15 years of controversy with the administrative department, followed by 7 years of litigation, that the customs men finally secured a decision by the United States Supreme Court which established their right to be paid for the services at the rates written into the law in the early twenties. This Supreme Court decision in 1944 allowed the inspectors whose cases were before the Court to recover unpaid amounts to which they were entitled back to September 1, 1931.

A few months after the Supreme Court decision in 1944 the Congress passed Public Law 323, which stated that all unpaid services by customs inspectors performed prior to that time were to be paid in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision. Following enactment of the 1944 act, the Treasury Department and Bureau of Customs led the inspectors to believe that all who had performed the same kind of services after September 1, 1931, would be treated alike, even though they did not file formal claims or suits. Many employees relied on this and did not file claims with the General Accounting Office or the Court of Claims.

It later developed that the 1944 act was considered not sufficiently implemented to make it possible for any existing agency actually to make back payments in full. But this view of the act was not made apparent for a number of years. In the interim a great many men lost altogether the right to recover amounts they had earned. Others who filed formal claims have been paid in part.

The over-all result is that, among inspectors who performed identical services, some have been paid back to September 1, 1931, in full, some in part, and some not at all. The purpose of this legislation is to provide for payment to all inspectors with similar claims of amounts which they earned under the law but have never received. To carry out this purpose a committee is created with the authority and duty to direct a determination of the amounts which are payable and certify such amounts back to the Congress. The work of examining and auditing records is left with the Bureau of Customs, which is to perform this function under the guidance of the committee.

JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I submit for appropriate reference a concurrent resolution to establish a joint select committee on the organization of Congress, and I ask unanimous consent that a statement by me, together with a letter addressed to me by the National Committee for Strengthening Congress, Washington, D. C., signed by Robert Heller, chairman, and an editorial from the Washington Post of January 9, 1951, be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the letter and editorial presented by the Senator from Minnesota will be printed in the RECORD.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 3) was referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is here-

by established a Joint Select Committee on the Organization of Congress, to be composed of 14 members, as follows: Seven members who are members of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the Senate, four from the majority party and three from the minority party, to be chosen by such committee; and seven members who are members of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the House of Representatives, four from the majority party and three from the minority party, to be chosen by such committee.

SEC. 2. The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the organization and operation of the Congress of the United States and shall recommend improvements in such organization and operation with a view toward strengthening the Congress, simplifying its operations, improving its relationships with other branches of the United States Government, and enabling it better to meet its responsibilities under the Constitution. These studies shall include, but shall not be limited to, the operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; the organization and operation of each House of the Congress; the relationship between the two Houses, the relationships between the Congress and other branches of the Government; the employment and remuneration of officers and employees of the respective Houses and officers and employees of the committees and Members of Congress; the structure of, and the relationships between the various standing, special, and select committees of the Congress; and the rules, parliamentary procedure, and practices of each House.

SEC. 3. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to changes in the organization or operation of the Congress shall be referred to the joint committee: *Provided,* That the existing jurisdiction of the Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the Committee on Rules, and the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives shall remain unimpaired.

SEC. 4. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall report to the Senate and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall report to the House, not later than July 31, 1952, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (a) referred to the joint committee or (b) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

SEC. 5. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

SEC. 6. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

SEC. 7. The joint committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable.

The statement, letter, and editorial presented by Mr. HUMPHREY are as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUMPHREY

I am today joining Congressman HOLIFIELD, of California, in introducing for appropriate reference a joint resolution to establish a Joint Select Committee on the Organization of Congress. The joint committee would be authorized to continue the work so well begun by the La Follette-Monroney committee during the Seventy-ninth Congress. The work of that former committee, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which it fathered, went far to strengthen the internal organization and operation of our national legislature. But the experiences of the last 3 years, and especially of the past session, have led most of us, I think, on both sides of the aisle and in both Houses, to believe that much remains to be done to increase the efficiency of the legislative branch of the Government.

The current defense emergency makes it all the more crucial that the Congress of the United States examine its internal organization so as to act effectively during times of emergency.

In the procedures of our committees, in the staffing of Congress, in the lightening of our onerous workload, in the performance of the oversight function, in controlling public expenditures, and in the regulation of lobbying, there is much room for improvement.

In these as well as in other respects, the reorganization of Congress to keep it abreast of the requirements of the times is a continuing problem which demands continuous attention. Our resolution, therefore, provides for a select committee which would make continuing studies of the organization and operation of the Congress and recommend improvements therein with a view to strengthening the Congress, simplifying its operations, and improving its relationships with the other branches of the Government. The executive branch of the Government is in process of reorganization after the disruptive influences of the late war. As a coordinate branch of the Government, Congress must also be organized and equipped to perform its vital functions effectively.

The joint committee would be composed of seven Members of the Senate and seven Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed from the Senate and the House Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Not more than four Members of either group could be chosen from the same political party.

The joint committee would not be barred from studying and making recommendations with regard to the rules and parliamentary procedures of either House. Such a prohibition was imposed upon the La Follette-Monroney committee which was thus not at liberty to suggest any changes in floor procedure. The appalling delays of the past session in the Senate and the unprecedented log-jam of appropriation bills, have convinced many of us that the time has come for a reconsideration of our standing rules. The rules of the Senate have not been revised since 1884—66 years ago. Is there any other mechanism in America that is powered by an 1884 motor? Where would American industry be today if it had not been retooled for 66 years?

The joint committee would have jurisdiction over matters relating to the organization and operation of the Congress, but it would not be authorized to trespass upon the existing jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules and Administration of either House. Like the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, it would have legislative authority to report by bill or otherwise.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR
STRENGTHENING CONGRESS, INC.,
Washington, D. C., January 5, 1951.
The Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
The Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SIR: This is our fourth annual letter to the membership of Congress. It is inspired by our deep devotion to representative government and by our earnest desire to strengthen Congress as the chief bulwark of American democracy in a dangerous world. After reviewing the procedural performance of the 1950 session, we find much in its record to praise and some aspects to criticize. We also offer our suggestions of next steps toward a more efficient Congress.

EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION: AN
AUDIT OF ITS PERFORMANCE

The Congress which adjourned on September 23, 1950, revealed signs both of strength and weakness in its internal organization and operation. On the credit side were the following developments:

Credits

1. The streamlined structure of the standing committee system was kept intact without change during the session. The reformed structure of the standing committees has now survived four annual sessions of the Congress without successful attack and apparently has won general acceptance.

2. A new "watchdog subcommittee" of the Senate Armed Services Committee was created last July to determine whether or not the administration of the National Defense Establishment is up to maximum efficiency. Its first two reports have been models of penetrating analysis and nonpartisan inquiry in the public interest.

3. A new Joint Committee on Defense Production was established by the Defense Production Act of 1950 to operate as a watchdog committee in its field. We commend the growing use of joint committees and joint action in the performance by Congress of its supervisory functions.

4. Increasing reliance for research, fact finding, and bill drafting upon its own expert staff aids is enabling Congress to do a better job. We applaud the gradual growth of the nonpartisan professional committee staffs, the Legislative Reference Service, and the Office of Legislative Counsel.

5. Congress has put growing emphasis upon performance of its overseer function. Ten standing committees and five special committees were actively engaged during the session in supervising the operations of the Government. The House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities conducted an especially thorough investigation of lobbying methods, improved the registration forms, and paved the way for needed amendments in the lobby law.

6. Consolidation of 11 separate supply bills into one omnibus appropriation bill, for the first time in modern history, was the outstanding procedural experiment of the session. Hitherto, the supply bills have gone through the legislative process one at a time. This year they were merged into one measure which reduced the executive budget by \$2,000,000,000 and was ready for the President's signature two full months ahead of the budget completion date in 1949.

7. Passage of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 was another noteworthy step taken during the session, toward strengthening control over the purse. This act authorizes the performance budget and certain accounting reforms, thus carrying out earlier recommendations of the La Follette-Monroney committee.

8. In floor procedure, the House of Representatives made use on several occasions of its new 21-day rule to break blockades in the Committee on Rules and bring important

bills to the floor for action by the whole House.

9. We also noted with approval the introduction of a resolution on August 2, 1950, to amend the Senate's cloture rule to provide for majority cloture, and the introduction of a concurrent resolution on April 26 to establish a joint committee on the organization of Congress in order to continue the work begun by the La Follette-Monroney committee during the Seventy-ninth Congress. We renew our endorsement of both of these proposals.

Debits

On the debit side of the congressional performance sheet, we have noted the following items:

1. The spirit if not the letter of the Legislative Reorganization Act was disregarded during the Eighty-first Congress by the creation of nine special committees, six in the House and three in the Senate.

2. Bills to reform procedures before congressional investigating committees, introduced in both Houses by their majority leaders, failed to advance beyond the subcommittee hearing stage, despite widespread public support for the adoption of a code of fair committee conduct.

3. While noteworthy gains have been achieved in the staffing of Congress, some standing committees are still understaffed in terms of their workload, and some professionals have been appointed on a patronage rather than a merit basis.

4. Congress continued to be handicapped during the second session by a heavy workload of private and local legislation. Fifty-four percent of all laws enacted by the session through September 23, 1950, were private bills dealing mostly with private claims and immigration matters. Half of the States of the Union now delegate the settlement of these private questions to appropriate administrative or judicial authorities. Congress might well do likewise and relieve itself of this burden.

5. Although the Senate approved home rule for the District of Columbia in May 1949, without a dissenting vote, the Eighty-first Congress continued to be saddled with the local business of the District, while the home-rule bill rested in a House District Committee pigeonhole.

6. Demands from the folks back home for all manner of personal services continue to convert our national legislators into errand boys and to divert their attention from more important national and international legislative matters. The services of administrative assistants are not being fully utilized to relieve Members of home State business.

7. In the fiscal control field, the chief setback of the session was the failure to enforce the legislative budget provision of the Reorganization Act of 1946. After ineffectual efforts in earlier sessions, the legislative budget this year was ignored. If this condition continues, it may become defunct.

8. The House spent 192 hours during the session on 145 quorum calls and 143 yeas-and-nays votes—the equivalent of 32 legislative days. Most of this time could have been saved by electric voting.

9. In the Senate, the first trial of the new cloture rule, adopted last year, proved that it would be even less effective than the old 1917 rule in breaking filibusters in that body. Efforts to end a filibuster against the FEPC bill failed by a margin of 12 votes, despite claims that the new cloture rule would be more effective in limiting debate than the old rule. Unlimited and irrelevant debate in the Senate was largely responsible for keeping Congress in session for almost 2 months beyond the July 31 dead line set by the Reorganization Act of 1946.

10. Long-standing abuse of the "leave to print" and franking privileges reached new heights during the Eighty-first Congress.

Matter inserted in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD under this privilege during the first session occupied five huge volumes and consumed 6,800 pages. For the second session through October 20, the Appendix ran to 7,734 pages. At the current printing cost of \$82 a page, the extensions and insertions of the Eighty-first Congress through October 20, 1950, thus cost the taxpayers, \$1,191,788. Wholesale use of the franking privilege by private lobbies was disclosed at hearings held in June 1950 by the House Committee on Lobbying Activities.

11. Absenteeism, both in committee and on the floor, was especially conspicuous during the second session. The Senate granted its Members 265 individual leaves of absence, and the House granted 284 leaves of absence through September 8, a total of 549 leaves of absence granted by both Houses up to that time.

Next steps toward strengthening Congress

In the light of the foregoing audit of its recent performance, we strongly recommend that the Eighty-second Congress take the following steps toward strengthening its internal organization and operation:

1. Create machinery for continuing improvement.
2. Further trial of the consolidated appropriation bill procedure and the legislative budget.
3. Adopt majority cloture and a rule of relevancy in the Senate.
4. Keep the 21-day rule in the House and vote by electricity.
5. Plug the loopholes in the lobby law.
6. Increase party responsibility.
7. Reduce the extraneous work load on Congress.

Create Joint Committee on Organization of Congress

We renew our recommendation made last year that a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress be established. The work of the La Follette-Monroney committee and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which it fathered went far to strengthen internal organization and operation. But the experience of the last 4 years, and especially of the past Congress, indicates that the process of improvement should be a continuous one and that much remains to be done to increase efficiency. In controlling public expenditures, in performing the overseer function, in the staffing of Congress, in committee and floor procedures, in the regulation of lobbying, and in the lightening of the extraneous workload, there is much room for improvement.

Keep the big money bill and the legislative budget

The consolidated supply-bill procedure falls short of the objectives of the legislative budget we have advocated in the past in that it does not fix a ceiling on Federal expenditures or give a coordinated view of prospective income and outgo. But it is a step in the right direction, and we urge its further trial. The record of its first trial shows, as Senator BYRD has pointed out, "that enactment of the single appropriation bill this year required less time, promoted fuller participation in debate, and resulted in savings rather than increases." After experience with the new procedure, Chairman CANNON, of the House Appropriations Committee, said that "the single appropriation bill offers the most practical and efficient method of handling the annual budget and the national fiscal program. Judged by our experience, there is no legitimate reason which can be advanced against it." We also urge further trial of the legislative budget.

Limited and relevant Senate debate

The efficiency of the Senate continues to be stymied by its practice of unlimited and irrelevant debate: Two weeks and 500 pages

of the RECORD to repeal the tax on oleomargarine; 3 weeks to pass the Gas Act, which the President promptly vetoed; 27 roll and quorum calls on the displaced-persons bill after it had been pigeonholed for months; a one-man filibuster for 11 hours on the slot-machine bill at the end of the session.

We again urge the Senate to modernize its antiquated procedures, to adopt an effective cloture rule, and to require its debate to be germane to the pending business: In these perilous times, unlimited and irrelevant debate is a luxury that a busy legislature can no longer afford.

Keep the 21-day rule

Before 1949 the House Rules Committee had power to prevent the House from considering bills favorably reported by its other standing committees. This power, frequently exercised, denied the House its constitutional right to legislate according to the majority will. On January 3, 1949, the House adopted the so-called 21-day rule which enables a legislative committee to bring a bill to the floor of the House after the bill has been pigeonholed in the Rules Committee for 21 days. During 1949 the new 21-day rule was twice used: to bring the anti-poll-tax and rivers and harbors bills to the House floor. The threat of its use forced action on the housing and minimum-wage bills. During 1950 an attempt to repeal the 21-day rule was defeated in the House by a vote of 236 to 183. The basic issue at stake here is whether legislative action shall be controlled by a majority of the House or by a coalition of seven members of the Committee on Rules. It is reported that another attempt to repeal this democratic rule will be made early in the Eighty-second Congress. We urge the Members of the House to reject this attempt just as they did a year ago.

Electric roll call systems are now in successful operation in 16 States where they save much legislative time and shorten the sessions. The national House of Representatives spends 1 month each session answering the roll call. We recommend that this time be saved by the installation of a modern electric roll-call system.

Strengthen the lobby law

In 1946, Congress passed a law which requires all persons whose principal paid activity is seeking to influence the passage or defeat of Federal legislation to register with the Clerk of the House and file quarterly statements of their receipts and expenditures. From the effective date of the lobby law down to the end of 1949, 2,878 organizations filed reports showing contributions received of \$55,195,548, and expenditures of \$27,431,517 for lobbying purposes. Four hundred and ninety-five different pressure groups filed at one time or another under the law up to 1950.

During 1950 the House Select Committee To Investigate Lobbying Activities conducted an intensive investigation in this field. The committee found that the lobby law was poorly drafted and contained many loopholes, allowing many lobbyists to avoid registration. They also shed much fresh light on lobbying techniques. We urge the Congress to study the reports of this committee and to act favorably upon its proposals for amending and improving the lobby law of 1946.

Increase party responsibility

There is growing realization in this country of the inadequacy of our existing party system and of the need for a more democratic, responsible, and effective party system. We invite your attention in this connection to the recent report of the committee on political parties of the American Political Science Association entitled "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." We endorse their proposals for strengthening party responsibility, many of which are con-

sistent with our own suggestions on this subject in the 1945 Heller report, Strengthening the Congress.

A higher degree of party responsibility in Congress calls for the consolidation of the various leadership groups in both the Senate and the House into one truly effective and responsible leadership committee for each party. Each of these four leadership committees should be responsible for—

1. Calling more frequent meetings of the party membership in each House.
2. Submitting policy proposals to the party membership.
3. The selection of committee chairmen and ranking members and the assignment of party members to the standing committees.
4. The scheduling and guidance of legislative traffic on the floor.

The gulf between promise and performance on legislation is traceable, we believe, to party irresponsibility in Congress, to the lack of cooperation between the President and his legislative leaders, weaknesses of leadership, and to the subordination of national to sectional and special interests. Unless these conditions are soon corrected, there is grave danger of the disintegration of the two-party system into a three-party system in Congress, of overextending the Presidency, and of the development of unbridgeable political cleavages in the country.

Reduce the workload

Once again we call attention to the urgent need of reducing the extraneous work load on all Members of Congress. In these times, when Congress must concentrate on momentous international issues and act as a board of directors for our vast Federal establishment, we believe that Congress should divest itself of petty private and local business. The time has come to plug the loopholes in the Federal Tort Claims Act; to delegate the settlement of immigration and deportation cases, 5,000 of which clogged the calendars of your Judiciary Committees during the Eighty-first Congress; to get rid of duties as a city council by granting home rule to the people of Washington; and to make fuller use of administrative assistants on district and home-State business.

We respectfully urge the Eighty-second Congress to consider the above recommendations seriously and to act upon them promptly.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT HELLER,
Chairman.

[From the Washington Post of
January 8, 1951]

A LOOK AT CONGRESS

In surveying the work of Congress last year, the National Committee for Strengthening Congress found that nine commendable steps were taken. The overseer function of Congress was further developed. Appropriations were consolidated into one omnibus bill, and a number of other procedures were improved. The emphasis naturally shifts, however, to the pressing reforms yet to be accomplished. Congress is still far from being the efficient and well-managed lawmaking body that the country ought to have—especially in these critical times.

The House, for example, used up 192 hours—the equivalent of 32 legislative days—in quorum calls and yea-and-nay votes. Most of this time might have been saved by means of an electric voting device. The Senate is still at the mercy of any windbag who can claim the privilege of the floor. It required 2 weeks to repeal the tax on oleomargarine and 3 weeks to pass the gas bill which the President vetoed. The easy-going Senate tolerated an 11-hour filibuster against the slot-machine bill. Senators are still free to talk as long as they can about corn liquor, fairy tales, the sex life of frogs

or the craters of the moon, regardless of how urgent prompt action may be. The milk-and-water closure rule adopted last year has thus far proved no more effective than the old rule which gave free rein to filibusters.

In spite of public pressure, the last Congress failed to prescribe rules of fair procedure for its investigating committees. It continued to fritter away an enormous amount of time on private claims and immigration bills and ordinances for the District of Columbia. Some of its committees still lack professional staffs and various positions created for experts are occupied by political hacks. The committee also found that the franking privilege is grossly abused; the Lobbyist Registration Act is in need of amendment; and many legislators still function as errand-boys for their constituents.

The reformers make a compelling argument for establishment of a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. Most of the recent improvements are traceable to the work of the La Follette-Monroney Committee a few years ago. Now it is evident that a continuing effort to keep the organization of Congress abreast of its responsibilities is needed. Perhaps even more important is the plea for consolidation of the various leadership groups in the House and Senate into "one truly effective and responsible leadership committee for each party." We suspect that the performance of Congress could be vastly improved if, as the committee suggests, a unified leadership group in each House selected chairmen and committee members, controlled the legislative program, and arranged frequent meetings for discussion of major questions of policy.

INCREASE IN LIMIT OF EXPENDITURES BY COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. RUSSELL submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 18), which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Resolved, That in carrying out the duties imposed upon it by section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (Public Law 601, 79th Cong.), the Committee on Armed Services, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized during the period ending December 31, 1952, to make such expenditures, and to employ upon a temporary basis such investigators, technical, clerical, and other assistants as it deems advisable.

SEC. 2. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$115,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FOR COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 19), which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Resolved, That in holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as authorized by section 134 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized during the Eighty-second Congress to make such expenditures, and to employ upon a temporary basis such investigators, and such technical, clerical, and other assistants, as it deems advisable.

SEC. 2. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$3,000 (in addition to amounts heretofore made available for such purposes), shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

INVESTIGATION OF EXCESSIVE PROFITS MADE DURING WORLD WAR II

Mr. LANGER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 20), which was referred to the Committee on Finance:

Resolved, That the Committee on Finance, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a full and complete study with respect to the earnings of war contractors and others making excessive profits during World War II, for the purpose of ascertaining the feasibility and desirability, during any future wars in which the United States may be engaged, of limiting annual profits to amounts not in excess of 10 percent of capital investment. The committee shall report to the Senate at the earliest practicable date the results of its study together with such legislation as it may deem necessary to carry out its recommendations.

INVESTIGATION OF FOREIGN OIL CONCESSIONS

Mr. LANGER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 21), which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Resolved, That the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed (1) to conduct a full and complete study and investigation of the granting of oil rights and concessions to United States oil companies by foreign governments and (2) to report its findings, together with its recommendations for such legislation as it may deem advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date.

SHORTAGE OF RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

Mr. LANGER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 22), which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

Resolved, That the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to (1) the causes of the existing shortage of railroad equipment for transportation purposes, and (2) means of relieving such shortage. The committee shall report to the Senate at the earliest practicable date the results of such study and investigation, together with its recommendations for necessary legislation.

For the purposes of this resolution the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings and to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate in the Eighty-second Congress as it deems advisable.

INVESTIGATION OF CONTRACTS WITH RAILROADS FOR CARRYING MAILS

Mr. LANGER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 23), which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Resolved, That the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service is authorized and directed (1) to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to contracts with railroads for carrying United States mail with a view to ascertaining whether, in the light of changes in the volume of mail carried, any change in the rates charged for such service is necessary or advisable, and (2) to report to the Senate at the earliest practicable date the results of

its study and investigation together with such recommendations for necessary legislation as it may deem desirable.

INVESTIGATION OF LEASING OF POST-OFFICE QUARTERS AT DETROIT, MICH.

Mr. LANGER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 24), which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Resolved, That the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to conduct a thorough study and investigation into the leasing of post-office quarters in and around Detroit, Mich., with a view to determining whether any favoritism or other irregularity has occurred. The committee shall report to the Senate at the earliest practicable date the results of its investigation together with such recommendations as it may deem desirable.

SEC. 2. For the purposes of this resolution, the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to employ upon a temporary basis such technical, clerical, and other assistants as it deems advisable. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

HOSPITALIZATION PROGRAM OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT

Mr. LANGER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 25), which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Resolved, That the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete study and investigation with respect to all matters relating to the desirability and feasibility of instituting a hospitalization program for the benefit of civilian employees of the Government of the United States, such program to include provision for prepayment of hospitalization and surgical costs in hospitals to be designated by such employees to be attended by physicians and surgeons also of their choice.

SEC. 2. The committee is directed to complete its studies and submit a report and recommendations for appropriate legislation not later than May 1, 1951.

SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold hearings and to act at such times and places during the Eighty-second Congress, to employ such assistants as may be needed and to request such assistance and information from any departments and agencies of the Government, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths and to take such testimony and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report the educational material and data on such hearings shall not exceed 25 cents per 100 words. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$10,000 for this project, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

INVESTIGATION OF PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE MERCHANT MARINE

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I submit for appropriate reference a resolution calling for an investigation of the problems involving the United States merchant marine, and I ask unanimous

consent that a statement by me in connection therewith be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred, and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The resolution (S. Res. 26), was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, as follows:

Whereas the United States merchant marine, allied industries, and trained personnel therein are indispensable to national security; and

Whereas geographical dispersion and utilization of repair and construction facilities and the skilled manpower related thereto is essential to national defense and economy; and

Whereas the transfer of American ships and those of other countries to flags of certain nations jeopardizes world-wide stability of the maritime industry; undermines seafarers' and safety-at-sea standards; and deprives the United States Treasury of substantial tax revenues; and

Whereas revival of ship construction and operation in occupied countries is of legitimate interest to the United States merchant marine; and

Whereas participation of American bottoms in transporting United States financed cargoes has been threatened first by failure of certain Government agencies to give proper consideration to the importance of maintaining an adequate United States merchant marine, and second, by actual or proposed use, directly or indirectly, of funds and scarce materials to build or acquire ships for foreign nations; and

Whereas Congress, agencies affected, and industry have found no long-range solution to the problems of water transportation to Alaska and coastwise and intercoastal shipping; and

Whereas shipping operations of the armed services bear a definite relationship to the present and future welfare of the United States merchant marine; and

Whereas it is imperative to insure efficient utilization of manpower and shipping resources that the privately owned and operated American merchant marine be properly integrated with the general mobilization effort; and

Whereas it is essential, even in a national emergency, to plan for peacetime operation of the privately owned and operated merchant marine; and

Whereas the administration of our maritime laws and policies by the executive departments is of legitimate concern to the Congress: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete study and investigation of all such matters pertaining to the merchant marine as it may deem proper.

SEC. 2. The committee shall report its findings, together with its recommendations for such legislation as it may deem advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date but not later than March 31, 1952.

SEC. 3. For the purposes of this resolution, the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to employ upon a temporary basis such technical, clerical, and other assistants as it deems advisable, and is authorized, with the consent of the head of the department or agency concerned, to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of any of the departments or agencies of the Government. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$50,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of

the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

The statement presented by Mr. MAGNUSON is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON

A resolution to investigate the problems involving the United States merchant marine was introduced in the United States Senate today by Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Democrat, of Washington, chairman of the Senate subcommittee which conducted an exhaustive study of the merchant marine during 1949-50.

Under the term of the resolution the Senate would establish the subcommittee under the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. In presenting his resolution Senator MAGNUSON pointed out that in any period of national emergency the merchant marine is a strong arm for both the Navy and the Army. He also pointed out that there has been a threat to the American merchant marine by failure of certain governmental agencies to give proper consideration to the importance of maintaining an adequate United States merchant marine and also by actual or proposed use of funds and scarce material to build or acquire ships for foreign nations.

Transfer of American ships to flags of certain nations jeopardize world-wide stability of the merchant marine, undermines seafarers and safety-at-sea standards, and deprives the United States Treasury of income-tax revenues. Such transfers need investigation and study, Senator MAGNUSON said.

Senator MAGNUSON also declared that the subcommittee would investigate the problem of transportation involving Alaska, shipping operations of the armed services, efficient utilization of manpower, and the utilization of repair and construction facilities in all areas of the United States.

The subcommittee in the second session of the Eighty-first Congress advocated a long-range shipping program and helped instigate the reorganization of the Maritime Commission in line with the recommendation of the President's Committee on Governmental Reorganization. Its work was lauded by all segments of the industry and also by organized labor.

The resolution introduced today by Senator MAGNUSON would have the committee report not later than March 31, 1952, and provides that the expenses of the committee shall not exceed \$50,000.

"It is vital for the successful prosecution of the war effort that we have a strong American merchant marine and that we take every possible step to insure having a strong and growing shipping industry. The work of the proposed subcommittee will be of the greatest possible value to the defense program of the Nation and also will help to insure a strong maritime industry for the Nation," Senator MAGNUSON stated.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

FARM PRODUCTION IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY—ADDRESS BY SENATOR ANDERSON

[Mr. O'CONNOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address delivered by Senator ANDERSON before the Maryland Agricultural Society, Maryland Farm Bureau, Inc., and affiliated organizations, on January 9, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

PRINCIPLES FOR FOREIGN POLICY—STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARLSON

[Mr. CARLSON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a statement on foreign policy made by him and broadcast on the Capitol Cloakroom program of the Columbia Broadcasting System, January 9, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

REDUCTION IN NONDEFENSE SPENDING—LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

[Mr. BYRD asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a letter from President Truman on reduction in nondefense spending, which appears in the Appendix.]

HEMISPHERE INTEGRATION NOW—ADDRESS BY HARRY F. GUGGENHEIM

[Mr. BYRD asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address entitled "Hemisphere Integration Now," delivered by Harry F. Guggenheim, at the University of Florida on December 8, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

WEST EUROPE'S MORALE—ARTICLE BY WES GALLAGHER

[Mr. BYRD asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "West Europe's Morale Called Harder Problem Than Arms," written by Wes Gallagher and published in the Washington Star of January 10, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

DECLARATION ON MANPOWER BY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES

[Mr. THYE asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a declaration on manpower adopted by the Association of American Colleges, at their annual meeting in Atlantic City, N. J., January 10, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE UN SHOULD ACT—EDITORIAL FROM THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

[Mr. RUSSELL asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled, "The UN Should Act," published in the Christian Science Monitor of January 9, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

SERMON BY REV. JOHN T. JASPER ON "DE SUN DO MOVE"—ARTICLE BY BETTY FESSLER

[Mr. ROBERTSON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "De Sun Do Move," written by Betty Fessler, and published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch of December 31, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

WASHINGTON FRONT—ARTICLE BY WILFRID PARSONS

[Mr. McMAHON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article dealing with Secretary of State Acheson, entitled "Washington Front," written by Wilfrid Parsons, and published in the December 30, 1950, issue of America, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE ORDEAL OF DEAN ACHESON—ARTICLE BY FRANCIS DOWNING

[Mr. McMAHON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "The Ordeal of Dean Acheson," written by Francis Downing and published in the December 29, 1950, issue of the Commonwealth, which appears in the Appendix.]

A SLAP ON THE WRIST—EDITORIAL FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR

[Mr. HOEY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled, "A Slap on the Wrist," published in the Washington Evening Star of January 10, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

SALES OF SURPLUS COMMODITIES—EDITORIAL FROM THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER

[Mr. BRICKER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "From the Record," published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer of December 28, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

NEO-ISOLATIONISM IS SURRENDER—EDITORIAL FROM THE MIAMI DAILY NEWS

[Mr. SMATHERS asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Neo-Isolationism Is Surrender," published in a recent issue of the Miami Daily News, which appears in the Appendix.]

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY—ARTICLE FROM TIME MAGAZINE

[Mr. BRIDGES asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article dealing with the United States foreign policy entitled "Giant in a Snare," published in the current issue of Time magazine, which appears in the Appendix.]

FATHER LOUIS J. MENDELIS—CITATION FOR MISSION WORK

[Mr. O'CONOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article from the Priest magazine, of Huntington, Ind., citing the mission record of Father Louis J. Mendelis, pastor of St. Alphonsus Catholic Church, of Baltimore, Md., which appears in the Appendix.]

THE CONSTITUTION, GUARDIAN OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS—ADDRESS BY EUGENE BRANTLEY

[Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address on the subject The Constitution, Guardian of People's Rights, delivered by Eugene Brantley at the annual fall rally of the American Legion, Department of South Carolina, in 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE PAY-AS-YOU-GO DEBATE—EDITORIAL FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES

[Mr. HUMPHREY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "The Pay-As-You-Go Debate," published in the New York Times of January 9, 1951, which appears in the Appendix.]

COMMUNISM AND AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS—ADDRESS BY DAVE BECK

[Mr. MAGNUSON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address on the subject Communism and American Labor Unions, delivered by Dave Beck, executive vice president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, before the Commonwealth Club of California, in San Francisco, Calif., August 25, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SHIPPING EVENTS OF 1950

[Mr. MAGNUSON asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Review of Passing United States Shipping Events of 1950," prepared by the National Federation of American Shipping, Inc., for publication in British shipping journals, which appears in the Appendix.]

ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF B'NAI JESHURUN—ADDRESS BY CHARLES H. SILVER

[Mr. LEHMAN asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an address delivered by Charles H. Silver at the jubilee dinner of B'nei Jeshurun in New York City on December 19, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

APPRAISAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the body of the RECORD, as a part of my remarks, an excellent editorial appearing in the Grand Forks Herald, Grand Forks, N. Dak., on December 31, 1950.

This editorial, by Mr. M. M. Opegard, the able editor of the Grand Forks Herald, contains, in my opinion, one of the best appraisals of the international situation I have read to date. It seems to me that this is a sane and sensible approach, and I wish to associate myself with his views.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IT SEEMS TO ME

The word for today is "phantasmagoric," and I'll beat you to Mr. Webster's sparkling tome by telling you it means "a shifting succession of things seen, imagined, or evoked in the imagination, as by a fever."

That's my boy, as the vernacular has it. The fever is real, and it has been whipped up by the frenzied declarations of folks with access to radio and newspapers, but it is not all a cry of "wolf, wolf."

There is such grave fear of war on a big scale that we find the United States and most of the democratic world greeting a somewhat punch-drunk 1951 on a whirligig of preparedness for a war they do not want.

Ever since the ill-fated Korean adventure hit us in the face last June, we have been looking bug-eyed under every bed, peering furtively around every corner, striving to look beyond every horizon, fearful that we will discover the start of a cataclysmic world war III.

Some say we already are in that war, or are treading its blood-soaked fringes, and our hurried best may not be enough to shape our defenses adequately before the world comes tumbling down about our ears.

We are now winding up 5 years of aimless shadow boxing, clever buck passing, jumbled and elusive foreign relations, bitter political partisanship, and a mess of low-grade performances from the sanctity of the White House.

For those 5 years we have heard the spectral beat of war drums in a cold war, now suddenly warmed to a measure of reality that has us scurrying in every direction, physically and mentally, in a frantic endeavor to make up for lost time.

Phantasmagoria may be too mild a word to describe the current scene, but it does pretty well as far as it goes in giving a rather grim picture of the state of the Union.

Certainly no one knows just where we are heading or even where we are at, for our top authorities on the subject apparently have no special information denied the public as to the status of possible world war III.

We have recently heard the utterances of the President of the United States and three top Republicans in picturing our status and the potentialities of the future.

President Truman, in his December 14 speech to the Nation and the world, gave a general outline of our part for 1951, blaming Russia for the "great danger" to our country and its free institutions.

Governor Dewey, twice defeated Republican candidate for President, the night before had called for the United States to drop its defensive mood and begin the greatest mobilization in its history to combat Communist aggression.

Herbert Hoover, our only living ex-President, on December 20, urged the United States to concentrate on preservation of the Western Hemisphere by holding the Atlantic and Pacific oceans with the island outposts

of Britain, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines.

Then, finally, John Foster Dulles, Republican foreign policy adviser to the State Department, last Friday night countered Hoover's plan with a statement that America can never stand alone as a Gibraltar against the world.

Governor Dewey out-Trumaned Truman in his call for preparedness. He would register all men and women over the age of 17 for national service; he wants a 100-division army and an 80-group air force, with the Navy taken out of mothballs and the National Guard federalized immediately.

Dulles would encircle Russia as far as possible with an economic, political, and military ring; then, if all-out war came, the free world will have the capacity to counter-attack.

Hoover's view was called isolationist by President Truman, but even Dulles, who also rejected it, said "it is not necessary to spread our strength all around the world in futile attempts to create everywhere a static defense."

This would seem to raise the question of what constitutes "all around the world" and what description fits Dulles' call for a ring around Russia and the Communist countries. Certainly that is not just our back yard.

We can only judge what Mr. Truman means by what we have done under his immediate direction, without congressional debate, and without any mandate from the people.

We have had a fling at fighting communism "wherever it may rear its ugly head," testing our resources in the sorry affair in Korea. We would have done all right there, of course, if the Chinese hordes had not come flooding into the picture.

But we must plan our defenses on a basis adequate to cope with just such contingencies as the Chinese intervention, even though we would be foolish to take on China now as a diversion from the main focal point of Europe.

Indications are we intend to hold the small beachhead at Pusan, if we have the men and matériel to do it, which seems likely, for it's hardly possible for the Chinese to pour in the men needed to offset our air, naval, and artillery power, and have enough left when they get to Pusan to be fully effective.

Hoover may be right in his measurement of our capacity to withstand any Russian invasion of Europe or countries on the Asiatic mainland. Whether his proposal goes too far in limiting our sphere is something this column will not attempt to decide.

I know, however, we must be tremendously strong at home and in our island redoubts before we can hope to make important contributions in manpower to the defense of Europe's mainland.

It would be purposeless to put an inadequate force in Europe, either our own manpower or that of the democratic countries; that would mean only another Korea should Russia decide to march to the Atlantic.

Naturally, a considerable force in the countries of Europe, backed by our air and sea power, might prove a deterrent to Russian aggression. However, Moscow would not strike without almost certainty of success, and there isn't much we can do psychologically to stop her.

We need, then, to be sure that we are prepared for what would come after the over-running of Europe, for that is when we would be put to the real test. Then, instead of Europe or even Britain, our base of action from the air likely would be north Africa.

One thing is certain: Herbert Hoover's speech has made it apparent that the Eighty-second Congress convening this week will find sharp division over the matter of foreign policy.

There are charges even now that our administration is heading us for another Korea

in proposing to send 200,000 Americans and \$12,000,000,000 to defend Europe.

The "internationalists," it is declared in congressional circles, have controlled the Democratic Party for more than 30 years and have "dominated the Republican Party" for the past decade.

"They have taken this country into three wars in a generation in pursuance of the dogma that it is the mission of America to police the world," as one "nationalist" put it.

Obviously, there will be unanimous support for all measures for our national defense, but there will be warm debate on the proposal to carry that program to the very doors of Russia by sending big armies to Europe.

Truly, 1951 may be a fateful year. The aspect is darker than it has been on any of the five more recent New Year days. But despite it all, I wish for all a happy New Year, with a prayer that we may come through 1951 reasonably unscathed.

M. M. O'PEGARD.

LETTER FROM A SOLDIER IN KOREA

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to read a one-page letter from a constituent.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The letter is as follows:

LEXINGTON, VA., December 29, 1950.
The Honorable A. WILLIS ROBERTSON,
Senate Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR ROBERTSON: I just received a letter from my son in Korea and I want to call to your attention the feelings of one of our boys serving on the front lines. He went into Korea on July 8 and is with the — Division. For two weeks he was reported "missing in action" and to use his own words, "I can thank the good Lord. That is all that brought me out." I realize that my son is just one of our fighting men but I believe his feelings represent that of thousands of our men in Korea.

This is what he says: "I suppose things are changing a little in the States since Truman declared a national emergency. I think he was about six months late. I don't see how they expected us to operate an army over here with what little they gave us. Most of our Division is about half strength from the lack of equipment and replacements. I think they should either do the job or move out. They are letting the Chinese make fools out of us. I'm a radio repairman and when I left our detachment they couldn't give me as much as one screwdriver. If I hadn't gotten a few tools on my own I would be useless in case of an emergency. The jeep they gave me had one end of the front bumper hanging loose (said they couldn't get welding equipment), no battery cover, no radiator cap, and I had to pull it to get it started. From this you can see that the American forces over here are doing an exceptionally good job with what little they have." He goes on to say that if some of our Congressmen could experience for a short time what they are having to endure things might be different. Then he closes with these words: "I don't want to sound bitter, but sometimes I just stop to think. I'm okay myself and I don't mind doing my job."

Senator ROBERTSON, I urge you to use your influence to right this deplorable situation. This is certainly not upholding the democratic way of life for which our men in Korea are fighting and dying.

Sincerely yours,

TRIBUTE TO "DOC" WATKINS

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, at this point I desire to pay a tribute which I think is well deserved. Tomorrow one

of the members of the Press Gallery retires, after 41 years of service with the Associated Press. Twenty-three of those years he has spent here on the Hill. For the last 13 years he has reported events, developments, and legislation affecting the great and growing Pacific Northwest.

I am speaking of Charles D. Watkins, known so well to the Members of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives as "Doc." During his 13 years of reporting Pacific Northwest news, "Doc" has become the trusted and respected friend of all congressional Members from the Pacific Northwest States. We admire his work. We respect his judgment. We enjoy giving him a story.

Between 1937 and 1950, tremendous development has occurred in the Pacific Northwest. Woven through "Doc's" stories are the fascinating tales of the Columbia River power, irrigation and navigation program; the building of the gigantic Hanford plant; the development of the military defense installations at Fort Lewis, Bremerton, and elsewhere. "Doc" Watkins' dispatches constitute a "news man's history of the Pacific Northwest."

I personally am proud of the job Watkins has done. I know the Associated Press and its member newspapers are likewise proud of that job.

"Doc" has prided himself on accurate reporting. He has drawn personal satisfaction from seeing the clue, and then following the track that leads to a scoop. He has thrived under the pressure of deadlines.

We are going to miss "Doc's" daily call to our offices. We hope he misses us sufficiently to drop in when he can. We wish him well in his post-retirement days.

COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I do not wish at this time to ask the majority leader what his plans are in regard to when the Senate shall convene after the recess of today's session, but I wish to advise him that I am satisfied that if the majority will be ready to organize the committees tomorrow noon the minority will be glad to cooperate with the majority and proceed with the organization of the committees of the Senate at that time—at noon on tomorrow, Friday.

THE NEED FOR UNITY AND COOPERATION IN THE PRESENT CRISIS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, the President of the United States has now delivered his State of the Union message. Bills and resolutions have been introduced. The time has come for the Senate to go to work.

My colleagues have paid me the signal honor of electing me leader of the majority. I hope to repay their trust by performing my duty as faithfully, as seriously, and as considerately as it can be done. I am fully conscious of the heavy responsibility imposed upon me. My conception of the leadership is to represent carefully and conscientiously the aggregate viewpoint of a majority of this body. In my judgment, one of the functions of the leadership is to bring into accord, so far as is humanly pos-

sible, varying opinions and judgments, with the purpose of reaching decisions and objectives that have the approval and support of all—legislative and executive alike.

With that in mind, I desire to pass on to the problems ahead of us, the things we must do. The answer is brief—it can be said in one word—unite! We must stand united against our enemies, foreign and domestic.

It is becoming trite to say these are turbulent times. Men whose judgment we respect have told us that we live in the most dangerous days of the Republic; they say we are at a crossroads; that moments of extreme crisis are ahead of us. No sensible, informed person denies this.

There are, of course, differences of opinion here and throughout the Nation as to what we should have done and what we should do to meet these crises. I do not quarrel with such differences of judgment. They are a proper, even a necessary part of our form of government. It is this clash of honest judgment and conviction threshed out publicly in the press, on the air, and in public and political forums which results in sounder policy. It is in this cauldron that the dross is burned off and the pure gold remains.

But there are no differences of opinion between honest and patriotic citizens that our country, our way of life, our people are the first and paramount concern of all of us.

There are no differences of opinion among us that we must give heed to an evil and sinister concept of government which seems bent on engulfing the world.

There are no differences of opinion among us that rational and civilized methods of dealing with its mentally dwarfed leaders are frustrated and ignored.

There are no differences of opinion among us that we seek peace—peace for us and peace for all peoples; that peace in today's closely knit earth is indivisible, since a threat against peace almost anywhere is a direct threat to our own peace; and that, finally, to bring about that peace, our land must become and remain the strongest military force on earth.

If all of us can agree that these concepts are fundamental; if all of us will stand united now and forever for them; and if all of us will evidence that unity and firmness of purpose so clearly and so loudly that it will be heard around the world, and not misunderstood, we may well avoid that which we and all decent peoples everywhere shun and dread—another world war.

Perhaps I can illustrate briefly what I mean. Historians now tell us that the Kaiser and his cohorts interpreted America's public clash of varying viewpoints from 1914 to 1917 as clear evidence that we would not go to war. They mistook the processes of democracy in action for indecision, fear, or something worse. The same historians assert that had Wilhelm known we would enter the lists against him, he would not have permitted the Germans to plunge the world into the First World War. Already, Mr. President, we have evidence that

Hitler possibly, and Mussolini certainly, would have shunned the ruin of the Second World War, had they not misinterpreted the viewpoints of a few of our people to be the judgment of the many. A Japanese admiral, who was that nation's ambassador here, has been quoted as saying that his Government believed our people were soft, not militarily minded, of divided opinion about what our course should be, and that therefore we would not go to war.

Mr. President, I cite these telescoped bits of history merely to emphasize that even though all of us know the facts, and even though all of us agree that we are not going to allow a rampaging communism to push us to the wall, the masters in the Kremlin may not understand; they may, in fact, already have misinterpreted the free expression of views here as an evidence of indecision, weakness, division, and disunity.

My purpose, therefore, is to urge upon my colleagues a constant awareness of this situation in whatever they say and do; to remember that we have been misjudged in the past, and probably are being misjudged today. Always, the war makers have believed we were split, divided, irresolute, and weak. Always, that belief, however erroneous, has either directly or indirectly been responsible for plunging the world into war.

All of us know that we are resolute in our purpose to resist the military or economic threat of the Soviet; that there is a point beyond which we will not be pushed. On this we are united as one. We have taken steps, by majority vote, which should make clear to the blindest that we will not be coerced or intimidated. Perhaps we can make that fact clearer by taking action here which will emphasize our previous affirmation of policy to be followed. Perhaps such legislative action is not necessary if we guard our tongues and our actions with respect to programs already adopted. It has been said that we talk too much; and in times like these loose talk is indeed a danger to all of us.

It seems pertinent to observe that already there have been discussions of our foreign policy. In my view, strained constructions have been placed on certain public utterances. A careful analysis shows that most of these statements have emphasized disagreement with methods rather than with basic policy, and even such disagreement appears to be a matter of degree. It seems to me that a careful consideration of the President's message and of what has been said in this Chamber by responsible people must give all of us a sense of hopefulness for the future. It fortifies the belief that there are no great differences among the majority of us as to our overall policy.

Our Government has made clear that it expects and hopes for a particular degree of cooperation from the western European nations. Our Government has, in fact, proposed that these nations give prompt and clear proof that they are going to raise a minimum number of troops, arm themselves, with our help, and give unmistakable evidence of a will to resist Soviet Russian threats of ag-

gression. We have said that if this is done promptly, effectively, and sincerely we stand ready to send a limited number of American divisions to aid in the defense of those countries.

Mr. President, some have suggested that the time has come for a major debate on American foreign policy. While I have no objection to such a debate, and in fact I would welcome it if it were conducted on a high plane, I am constrained to observe that we must be cautious and prudent in what is said. The interests of our country and the peace of the world will be better served if we weigh our words carefully. I say that, simply because one of this Nation's most trusted and competent citizens, a man whose judgment and ability all of us respect and value, is now in Europe to gather certain pertinent facts which are essential to the carrying on of an intelligent debate on American foreign policy.

General Eisenhower has gone to Europe to learn the facts, to make the evaluation. He is expected to return to this country some time next month with those facts. Is it wise for us to make statements here which would make his great task more difficult? Is it prudent to prejudge the facts he will assemble? Is it sensible to proclaim judgments and assert positions which we may find untenable or improvident later?

All of us know that his report will be complete, honest, and forthright. All of us know that he will call a spade a spade; that there will be no varnish, no double meanings, no evasions in what he tells us. It may be that his report will make meaningless much of what some of us would say now. In any event, it seems to me that prudence and plain common sense would dictate that we ought to know more and, meanwhile, talk less.

I want to emphasize as strongly as I can that I am not suggesting for one moment an end to debate, or even to controversy, on many matters which will come before us in the days ahead. There will be ample opportunity for us to differ, perhaps even sharply. That is a part of our process of government, and I, for one, shall welcome it as a sign that our democracy is healthy. But it must be observed that those differences will be noted and magnified, even distorted; and that such distortion may well be to the grave disadvantage of our country and our people. I should like to suggest that, once a policy is adopted, voted upon and set into motion, we accept the democratic principle of majority rule and stand united and firm for that policy; that all of us stop petty bickering and name-calling and face up shoulder to shoulder to the great task before us.

For it is a great task, Mr. President, the greatest task that free men and women have ever had to face. What kind of people do our adversaries think we are? Is there any doubt that we can and will overcome them? Is there a faint heart among us? What have we to fear? Industrially we are the strongest nation the world has ever seen. When it comes to the waging of modern war—war that involves machines and electronics and the atom—we can have no equal. If the need requires, we can deal death, destruction, and desolation,

measure for measure, and with interest compounded. We are a people made up of the great qualities of all the nations of earth; a sturdy, resolute people who know the benefits of liberty. We have proved time and again that we will shed our blood and spend our substance for that which we believe right. We will do it again and without limit, if need be. The place to demonstrate that we mean this is here in the greatest free legislative assembly in the world; the place where the people's representatives are supreme; the place where, in the final analysis, policy is made.

Mr. President, call these poor words of mine a plea for cooperation or what you will. I am asking frankly that my colleagues in this Chamber remember that there are no aisles separating Republicans and Democrats in the ships at sea, in the aircraft aloft, in the marching regiments; I am asking that my colleagues stand together, unite, make clear by their every action and their every word that all of us have a single overriding objective—the good of the Nation and the peace of the world. Once we have achieved that unity of thought, of purpose, and of action, it will resound throughout the world with such force that many of the problems which now seem unsurmountable will solve themselves.

NECESSITY TO MEET FAIRLY AND SQUARELY THE ISSUES FACING THE UNITED STATES

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, this is a solemn and serious hour when we are to consult each other regarding the paramount interests and security of the people of the United States.

Nearly 175 years ago our forefathers dissolved the political bands that bound the Colonies to England. They did so because their inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were in danger.

As the Eighty-second Congress debates the President's state of the Union message, every American expects to preserve for our Nation, with his life if necessary, those same inalienable rights. Indeed, I am sure we are all agreed that the prime objective of American policy is to maintain the liberty and the security of our people.

We are today engaged in a notable debate. The debate is not on the ends of our foreign policy, but on the means to the end. We bring to this debate a great tradition. That is the tradition of the free exchange of ideas that has taken place on the floor of the Senate since our Government was founded. Our debates here reflect and distill the thinking of our rulers—the American people. Out of this debate will come new ideas, new conclusions, and, I hope, a new unity.

The distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] suggested last week that appeals for unity from administration sources may be attempts to cover past faults and failures. That is not the case. The unity I ask for is the unity that comes in a democracy as the result of our confidence in the ability of the American people to hear all sides of issues, to determine the merits of the proposals, and

then to pull together toward our common goal.

I hope sincerely that we will not spend our time here fighting the battles of the past. There have been times when consultation between the administration and the Congress has been forgotten. There have been times when the American people have not had sufficient information to enable them to pass judgment on the issues before our Government. I think there have also been times when opponents of administration policy have not been willing to discuss issues on their merits, or have cultivated issues for their own purposes. But let us look ahead to the tremendous problems we face.

Thomas Jefferson once remarked that "error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." In these halls we will hear error of opinion, but reason is free. What I ask now is that we meet fairly and squarely the issues that face the United States. Our discussions here can help the people of this great Nation to know and understand the tremendous responsibilities our size and strength and freedom impose upon us.

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING UNITED STATES POLICY
SINCE WORLD WAR II

During the past 5 years, certain basic themes and principles of American foreign policy have emerged on which the programs that express our policy have been built. I review them now because they need frequent restatement so that in the pressure of this crisis we will not lose sight of them.

I want to emphasize in the first place, as strongly as I can, that the primary objective of this Government has always been the security of the United States. Closely linked to this fundamental is our continuing effort to contribute to the world framework for a just and lasting peace. As one means to these ends, we have given, and will continue to give, unflinching support to the United Nations. That is, and must remain, a cornerstone of our international policy.

While the United Nations must remain the cornerstone of our policy, I do believe that its members must take careful and solemn note of the growing concern of the American people that the United Nations is not fulfilling its great promise. I say in all sincerity to each and every Member of the United Nations that if the international community is not willing now as a matter of principle to recognize aggression for what it is, whenever and wherever it occurs, then the United Nations will die as surely as the tree without a tap root.

Mr. President, I say these things because the primary purpose of the organization of the United Nations was to resist aggression and to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

It was aggression in June when the North Korean Communists attacked the Republic of Korea. It is aggression today when Chinese Communists attack our UN forces. If the United Nations wants to retain the confidence and support of our people, it must not run to cover when the going becomes a little rough.

It has been said that "peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it." The League of Nations failed because the great powers, despite the constant urging and pleadings of the small states, would not back up the League. The United States learned that lesson. But now, strange as it seems, we are confronted by the uncertainty and unwillingness of the smaller powers to accept the fundamental principle of the Charter that the United Nations will take effective collective measures to suppress aggression. That means aggression by great powers as well as by small powers.

Our determined adherence to the United Nations demonstrates our flat rejection of the thesis that war is inevitable. We believe that war can be avoided and that the differences between the free world and the Soviet Union which are at the root of every current major problem can be resolved by negotiation and agreement.

But we know now that war can be avoided only if the free nations have the economic and military strength to guarantee such rough handling of acts of aggression that the Communist imperialists will abandon aggression as a tactic. This economic and military power will also enable the free world to make certain that the Soviet Union will live up to its agreements both in letter and in spirit.

This principle has been described as the building of situations of strength. It has been put to the test at various points during the past 5 years, and in each instance where we have led from strength we have always been able to resolve the issue in our favor—whether in Berlin, in connection with the airlift, or Italy, or Greece, or Western Europe. The political, economic, and military programs which have been developed since the end of World War II have all been keyed to the creation of the necessary strength in areas that are threatened by Soviet imperialism.

I believe that the reception given these measures in the Senate—evidenced by votes of approval which, without exception, were overwhelming—is proof of wide support for them on the Senate floor, and that in each instance the measures were a clear expression of the popular will.

The major components of this policy were seven. The first was the United Nations Charter, which was approved in the Senate by a vote of 89 to 2, evidencing the hunger of the American people for some civil agency established to preserve the peace of the world and to settle international quarrels by peaceful means. The treaty of Rio de Janeiro was ratified by 72 to 1, Greek-Turkish aid was passed by 67 to 23, and the Vandenberg resolution was adopted by 64 to 4. The European recovery program, as to which we have had some complaint in recent times because of the foreign policy that is involved, received 69 ayes and 17 nays. The North Atlantic Treaty, which has been attacked in recent times, was ratified by a vote of 82 to 13. On the mutual defense assistance program the vote

was 55 to 24. One year later, shortly after the invasion of Korea, the program was extended by a unanimous vote of 66 to 0.

Is that not evidence by the elected representatives of the people of a firm determination to carry forward and to enact measures which embody the foreign policy of the United States of America?

Step by step, these basic elements of our foreign policy have been considered by the Senate. Their conception has been adjudged sound and their objective consistent with the best interests of the United States.

Mr. President, this is an amazing voting record. It indicates a spirit of unity and determination that should be heartening to freemen everywhere.

THE ISSUES WE MUST DEBATE

I have already commented on our great tradition of debate in this body. I stand for the freedom of debate. That freedom is greater even than the freedom of the press and many of the other freedoms we enjoy. It is free so that the people of the United States may know the issues and may know the attitude of their representatives on the floor of the Senate.

Last Friday the senior Senator from Ohio set forth his views on the foreign policy of the United States. He discussed a number of issues that go to the heart of our foreign policy. His statement has attracted considerable attention in the United States and in foreign countries, some friendly, some unfriendly. As a consequence of this debate I expect there will be reactions that many of us do not expect.

My information regarding the impact of the speech upon the people of Western Europe is that many of them have been stunned in view of the North Atlantic Pact, our signature to the pact, and the suggested repudiation of the pact. I recall vividly, and I know many other Senators will also recall, the ceremony which was held on the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Pact. The high representatives of the nations who were parties to the agreement appeared and with appropriate ceremony affixed their signatures to the great document in behalf of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. No wonder they are stunned, and no wonder many of them feel despair, unless they know that we will remain true to our obligations and to our pledged faith.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I prefer not to yield at this time. However, I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. I only wish to ask the Senator from Texas whether he claims that I advocated any repudiation whatever of the North Atlantic Pact. He is implying that I did. I want to know whether he claims I did, and, if so, in what way he so claims.

Mr. CONNALLY. I did not charge the Senator from Ohio with repudiating the pact.

Mr. TAFT. I thank the Senator from Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, yes.

Mr. TAFT. The Senator states an untruth, because the Senator stated that my speech stunned the people of Western Europe because it involved a repudiation of the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. CONNALLY. I said my information was to that effect. I said my information was that the people were stunned.

Mr. TAFT. By my speech, according to the Senator.

Mr. CONNALLY. I did not say that. I will repeat what I said, if the Senator from Ohio has any doubt about it. My information regarding the impact of the speech upon the people of Western Europe is that many of them have been stunned. Does the Senator deny it?

Mr. TAFT. The speech to which the Senator has referred has already been identified as my speech.

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator deny that the speech has stunned many people in Europe?

Mr. TAFT. The Senator implies that the people in Western Europe are stunned because what I said involved a repudiation of the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. CONNALLY. I did not say that.

Mr. TAFT. The Senator certainly did say it. I leave it to the RECORD to show what he said.

Mr. CONNALLY. I said they did not want to believe that we had repudiated the North Atlantic Pact.

I did not say anything about the Senator from Ohio. I said the people of Europe did not want to believe it, and that they were stunned at the thought that we might repudiate our pledged word. I will emphasize what I said.

Once again the specter of doubt has been raised as to our determination to live up to our international commitments. It has given rare and tragic credence to Soviet propaganda that America is sharply divided on the degree of leadership it will assume in this world crisis, that we are faltering when the chips are down, and that after all the best policy for Europe to follow is neutrality.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield briefly for a question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. With reference to the remarks of the Senator from Ohio, in view of the fact that he voted against the North Atlantic Pact, and because of many statements contained in his speech of last week, I do not think it is at all unreasonable for people to believe that he has a very restricted view of the application of the North Atlantic Pact, and that if interpreted along legalistic lines it could be made ineffective. It would certainly explain why people were disappointed in his speech. It certainly could be interpreted in that way.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator.

I desire to take this occasion to say to our friends in Europe that they must seek to understand the United States. We believe that the destiny of our country is best guided by the people of our country. In the debate that is now un-

derway all points of view will be expressed. Our friends abroad will hear many things they do not like. They will hear many things they do like. I am sure that they will find that the American people will be ready in the future, as they have in the past, to stand with their full strength on the side of the freedom, the tradition, and the culture that is European in origin and ours by adoption.

Let me first speak for a moment about the subject of attaining security for the United States and some of the questionable conclusions which have been advanced from several quarters in recent days.

The charge has been made that the President has violated the Constitution of the United States by sending troops to Korea. The President's power to send additional troops to Europe has also been challenged. The scope of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to send the Armed Forces to any place required by the security interests of the United States has often been questioned, but never denied by authoritative opinion.

Mr. President, the Constitution provides that the President of the United States shall be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. When was the Constitution adopted? It was adopted, of course, after the Revolutionary War and after the experience of the States under the Confederation. Why was it provided that the President should be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy? The founding fathers still had vividly in their recollection the mistakes and troubles of the Continental Congress in trying to conduct the military affairs of the United States. They remembered that General Washington had to overcome many difficulties by reason of the activities of certain Members of the Continental Congress. Under the Confederation the same troubles existed. So the Constitution provided that the President should be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. If our forefathers had wanted Congress to be the Commander in Chief, they would have said so. But they did not. They said that the President of the United States should be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. That principle has never been seriously questioned as a legal proposition. It follows, furthermore, that with such power the President of the United States has the authority to send the Armed Forces to any part of the world if the security and safety of the United States are involved.

Former President, and later Chief Justice Taft expressed the view that the President had the authority to send the Armed Forces to any place where, in his judgment, their presence would contribute to American security. On more than 100 occasions our troops have been sent abroad on the authority of the President including such cases as the dispatch of marines to Nicaragua and other Central or South American states, and troops to help suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China. As for the future, I am confident that the executive branch will consult with Congress on troop commitments to

the integrated European defense force now being mobilized. Indeed it is my understanding that administration leaders are not hostile to such an idea.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator for yielding. I ask this question in the light of his last observation. Does the Senator understand that no commitment has been made by the President to furnish foot soldiers for an integrated army in Europe, and that if and when such commitment is made, it will be brought to the Congress for consideration?

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not think the Senator ought to ask that question, because that is a highly executive question. I really do not know, but I assume that there is some feeling that a commitment of that kind will be made, or we would not have General Eisenhower in Europe now.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the point I wanted to make. I am asking this question in the best of faith, because I think this is the crux of the whole debate.

Mr. CONNALLY. What I have said is simply my view. I am confident that the executive branch will consult with Congress on our commitments with respect to the integrated European defense forces now being mobilized.

Mr. WHERRY. I think that is a very reassuring statement. I ask the question because certainly under the North Atlantic defense treaty the Congress determines the character of the aid to be given, and certainly Congress will carry out the policy. The reason I ask the question is that there have been headlines in the newspapers—I do not say that they are true—wherein the Senator is quoted to the effect that he feels that the Congress should determine whether or not land forces should be committed. I hope that is the Senator's interpretation.

Mr. CONNALLY. I did not say that.

Mr. WHERRY. I was trying to give the Senator from Texas credit for saying it. If he did not say it, very well. But the point I am trying to bring to his attention is that if that is the policy now, the American people should know it. The Senator is chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If the administration is to submit to Congress the question of determining the character of the aid, then I believe that that is fully in keeping with the treaty. The Congress will then determine the policy. If it is the sentiment of the Congress that land soldiers should be committed, very well. I simply asked the Senator whether he knew of any commitments which had been made for foot soldiers to become a part of the integrated army in Western Europe.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have answered the Senator. I am not going to agree with him.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator from Texas often disagrees with me. I am not asking the Senator to agree with me. I am asking a simple, fair question. The Senator from Texas is chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. CONNALLY. I hope I am.

Mr. WHERRY. We all treat him with great respect because he is chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He is the mouthpiece, the spokesman, of the administration on foreign policy, and I treat the Senator with great respect. All I am asking is a simple question in which I think every American is interested. Has the President committed us to the furnishing of foot soldiers in Europe? That is all I am asking.

Mr. CONNALLY. That is a little beyond the scope of these remarks.

Mr. WHERRY. If the Senator declines to answer, very well. I do not wish to ask for any information which is secret. If such information is secret, I withdraw the question. However, the subject has been discussed in the newspapers. It has been said that we have committed five divisions, six divisions, or some other number of divisions. All I am asking, as an American citizen, is this: Does the Senator know whether any commitment has been made? I was about to congratulate the Senator on the statement which he made, which was most reassuring, that before any commitment was made the question would be submitted to the Congress, and the Congress would determine the policy, as to whether we are to commit foot soldiers to an integrated army in Europe.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator stretches what I said. I stated that I felt that the Congress would be advised.

Mr. WHERRY. I hope so.

Mr. CONNALLY. I did not say that it would be.

Let me say to the Senator that I do not agree with him in the idea that the Congress must say exactly how many foot soldiers shall be sent to Europe, just how many airplanes shall be sent there, and just how many battleships shall be sent. I do not agree with that view. That is a military question which must be decided under the guidance of the President of the United States and his military advisers.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield. I hope the Senator will not interrupt too much.

Mr. WHERRY. I do not wish to heckle the Senator. I do not wish to put on a shadow dance or hula dance. All I want to do is to find out from the Senator the answer to one simple question. Have foot soldiers been committed? If they have not been committed, will the administration let the Congress determine the policy? That is a very simple question, but every American wants to know the answer.

Mr. CONNALLY. If the Senator knows it—

Mr. WHERRY. I do not know it. I am trying to find out.

Mr. CONNALLY. If the Senator knows it, it will not take long for the American people to know it.

Mr. WHERRY. I will do my level best, when I get the information, to let them know.

Mr. CONNALLY. If the Senator will remain quiet for a moment, I shall answer the question further.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall keep quiet.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have already answered the question. I have told the Senator that I do not know. I stated that at the outset. But I assume that before any considerable number of troops are sent to Europe the Congress will be advised about it.

The Senator from Nebraska talks about the Foreign Relations Committee. I am a member of that committee. I wish to say to the Senator that there has never been any attempt in that committee to shut off debate or to keep information from any member of the committee, whether he be a Democrat or Republican.

Mr. WHERRY. I am not charging anything of the kind. I have never said anything about shutting off debate. I appreciate the Senator's statement that he wants debate. That is what we are giving him.

I think the American people have the right to an answer to these questions. To me they represent the crux of the entire debate. I hope the debate will center around the questions which I have raised. I say that in all sincerity and with deep respect and affection for the Senator from Texas. The question which I ask is vital. It is a question of policy. All I want to know is whether the Congress will have the right to determine the policy before commitments are made.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have answered the Senator three or four times. The reason I urge him not to interrupt me so much is that other Senators desire to follow me.

Mr. WHERRY. I am sorry. I will not interrupt the Senator again.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am trying to accommodate them. They are Republicans, too.

Mr. WHERRY. Very well. I shall not interrupt.

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall be very glad to hear them speak. Regardless of what party a Senator belongs to, I am glad to hear him speak on the subject.

Mr. WHERRY. I know that.

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say that during my tenure as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate I have never raised a partisan question at any time on any bill before the Foreign Relations Committee. Every member of that committee who has served on it for any considerable period of time will confirm what I have just said. [Manifestations of applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The occupants of the galleries will refrain from any demonstrations.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more observation?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I will say to the Senator that I am not raising any partisan issue.

Mr. CONNALLY. I know the Senator from Nebraska is not. As I have stated, several other Republicans want to speak, and I want them to speak. I want to hear them. The Senator from Nebraska, as minority leader, can get into the debate whenever he wants to.

Reference has been made in recent months to what is described as the administration's resort to the practice of secret negotiation and secret agreements. The Senator from Ohio referred, as an example, to the Marshall plan. I wonder if the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] would agree with him. I am grieved that our distinguished colleague from Michigan has been ill for so long. I pray God that he may speedily recover, and may soon return to the floor of the Senate to lead many of his misguided followers back into the paths of rectitude and knowledge.

I recall clearly the developments which led up to the adoption of the European recovery program during the Republican Eightieth Congress. All Senators remember the speech delivered by Secretary Marshall at Harvard, where he first broke the news as to the plan respecting ERP. The extensive and exhaustive airing given all aspects of the program has no equal in the history of this country. For months prior to the passage of the ERP Act the newspapers, the radios, and the public forums of the Nation devoted millions of words to the discussion of the program. Both Houses of the Congress sent unofficial quorums to Europe during the summer of 1947. The word "quorums" is not perhaps exactly accurate, but what I meant was that large groups from both the House and the Senate went to Europe during the summer of 1947. Lengthy hearings were held on the proposal and after the conclusion of the hearings there was full and open debate on the floor.

Allegations of this nature tend to obstruct the intelligent and constructive debate that is needed in this situation. And I repeat, such debate is necessary if we are to arrive at an international policy which will command the full confidence of the people and draw the essential support of the leadership of both parties. It is up to the Members of the Senate to make sure that debate is kept strictly within the limits of fact and reality.

Let us turn now to certain assumptions which have been made and which could lead this Nation into tragic error if they were widely accepted.

It has been said that there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviets expect to start a war with the United States. That is a dangerous delusion. Millions of people the world over signed the Stockholm peace petition, and then the Communists launched their attack in Korea. The distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], while serving as United States representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, offered a quotation from Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky which is highly pertinent and which could properly be considered as evidence on this point. Mr. Vishinsky was distinguishing between the Communist version of "just" and "unjust" wars. He said:

Lenin said that just wars are those which are designed to liberate people from capitalist slavery. * * * According to Lenin a just war is not an aggressive war but a liberating war which is designed either to defend people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave it, or the liberation of

people from capitalistic slavery, or else the liberation of colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialists.

From all I have heard, I believe America meets the Soviet definition of a capitalist country.

There is another bit of evidence which ought also to be considered. There is no doubt in any Senator's mind that the Chinese Communists, who are currently attacking the United Nations Army in Korea, receive not only encouragement but extensive military aid and equipment from the Soviet Union. This equipment from the Soviet is being used to kill boys from many United Nations.

This is conclusive evidence to me that the Soviet masters are ready to have their people or their puppets shoot American troops, or UN troops, or any other free people who stand in their way. We are strongly of the opinion that when one person shoots at another, he is being unfriendly. The same reasoning leads me to regard Moscow's present policy as hostile. If we must take time arguing over the extent and the precise expression of that hostility, we are quibbling over words.

There were among us in 1941 some who scoffed at the possibility that any nation would dare attack the United States. This attitude did not prevent the dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor. No American wants a war. But let us beware that we do not let our desires color our view of the realities of the day.

Some of my colleagues have opposed, in principle at least, the sending of additional American troops to Europe on the ground that the Soviet will regard the construction of an effective defense for Europe as preparation for aggression. They fear that the Soviet may attack before the defenses reach effective size and would overrun the Continent—destroying such forces as we have sent there. Why should we "feather the bed for Stalin," cry the critics.

It is clear that without steps of a defensive nature, the Soviet Union has the military strength—as it has had for the past 5 years—to overrun Europe any time it desires. Consequently, proponents of this view must believe that Europe is lost, and that nothing can be done to defend it. Or perhaps that is not a fair construction to put on this argument. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that those who advance this idea believe that an attempt to strengthen Europe will invite attack. The logical extension of that premise is that it is safer to leave Europe weak. So we arrive at the curious conclusion that if we want to avoid attack, we should make no preparation for it. It is a sort of strength-through-weakness philosophy.

The Senator from Ohio recommended last week that we aid in European defense with a naval and air force of Gargantuan power. We could, he believes, protect Europe as it has been protected now for 5 years through fear of what sea and air power can accomplish against Russia. Such a view is based on the presumption that the Soviet Government would not react to the establishment of such a force, although it would react to strengthening the

ground forces of the European countries. Mr. President, I do not understand this line of reasoning. The leaders of the Soviet are not fools. If they are going to launch an assault because we try to build what is obviously a defensive force in Europe, then why would they not also strike back if we mount a sea and air force which is a serious threat to them?

There is a second factor involved. A combined sea and air force, such as ex-President Hoover and others have proposed, would commit us to weapons that have, so far, shown themselves incapable of executing the mission which they would assign to them. I do not profess to be an expert on the military actualities and potentialities of air power. However, I have been informed that the action in Korea has been conducted under circumstances highly favorable to the optimum use of aircraft. The distance from base to target is relatively short, and we enjoy absolute air supremacy. Despite these highly advantageous conditions and a vigorous and skillfully pressed air strategy, air power was unable to halt the North Korean offensive, and it has been unable to stop the onrush of the Chinese Reds.

This comment is in no way intended to detract from the magnificent job our flyers have done in Korea. They have scored heavily there. But this experience does raise grave doubts that an air force is capable of stopping the westward advance of a huge, well-equipped Soviet force.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question at this point?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; very briefly.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is it not fair to say, in defense of the Air Force and its work in Korea, that it has been handicapped by very uncertain, foggy, rainy, icy weather; and also, insofar as helping the Ground Forces is concerned, that the Air Force has been very much handicapped by the mountainous country?

Mr. CONNALLY. That is true.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. So it would not be a fair statement to say that the Air Force has fallen down in Korea.

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, no.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Even though our Air Force had no opposition from hostile forces, it is operating there under the most difficult and most severe conditions which could be found in almost any part of the world. Is not that true?

Mr. CONNALLY. That is correct. I was not criticizing the Air Force. I think it has done a magnificent job in Korea. However, I was pointing out that an air force alone cannot stop an overwhelming mass of foot soldiers as they sweep in. An air force can kill or disable many of them; but what are left will sweep on. So, according to my view, air power alone would not be sufficient.

There are those who suggest that an attempt to construct effective defenses for the North Atlantic community is certain to fail because the Soviets would strike before the job was half done. Therefore, they oppose the sending of our ground units to participate in that defense. But, Mr. President, if this reasoning is correct, why do not these same

people urge the withdrawal of our troops from Germany? Surely no greater provocation, according to this faint-hearted philosophy, could exist than United States troops so close to the iron curtain. Realizing that such a view is untenable, the senior Senator from Ohio has declared that when the nations of Western Europe see the need of, and demand, a coordinated defense, and if it appears that the defense has a reasonable chance of success, he would not object to the commitment of a limited number of American divisions to work with them in the general spirit of the Atlantic Pact.

But where does that leave us? Do the proponents of this point of view expect that our allies will see the need for and demand something that they know is bound to fail? Are they willing to spend even a limited number of American divisions to partake of the disaster they fear? Peace cannot come so long as there remains a critical unbalance of military power between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. We must move with speed and determination to strengthen our own forces and those of our allies. Only thus can we adjust the unbalance which exists and erase any temptation on the part of the Soviet Union to launch an aggressive war.

In considering the question of a European defense, we must not gloss over the Franco-German dilemma. It has taken our representatives nearly 2 years of painstaking labor to lay the foundations for the resolution of this century-old problem and to reach a point where they are in sight of a working accord between these two major nations of Western Europe. The compromises that France has made, which go counter to all her bitter experience with her neighbor to the east, rely for the most part on assurance from the United States that the Prussians will not be again permitted to gain military dominance in Europe.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point for another question?

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well; I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to ask the Senator this question: Is not there one more underlying factor which the Senator has not fully stated—although perhaps he will do so later in his speech—namely, that we must take the initiative for our own defense? Can we assume that we can defend ourselves if Europe falls?

I disagree with the premise of the Senator from Ohio, as set forth in his speech in the Senate the other day, when he said that the Europeans must take the initiative for building up the armies in Europe. I believe they must supply most of the men, a great proportion of them; but it seems to me that we also have a responsibility, in safeguarding our own defense, to provide some of the initiative, perhaps the stimulating initiative. Is not that another point which the Senator from Texas believes is important in connection with the subject he is now discussing?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for the interruption and for his question.

All along, the United States has been the leader in the idea of the Atlantic

Pact; that is the reason why General Eisenhower is now in Europe, where he is trying to rally the nations of Western Europe to carry out the program we have in mind.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is not that a part of the initiative which is definitely connected with the defense of the United States and with the maintenance of the security and safety of our own people?

Mr. CONNALLY. I expect to discuss that point a little later. However, if I do not, I shall say now that I regard our safety as being dependent upon the safety of Western Europe; and if Western Europe can be made safe, we shall be made safe.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. The question which has bothered me, and to which I have not been able to obtain an answer—perhaps the Senator from Texas can answer it—is this: If the Russians are able to conquer Europe today, why should they wait for us to complete, after 3 years, an international army? Why will not the Russians attack the moment it becomes a threat to them? Assuming, as the Senator says, that they intend to be a threat to the rest of the world, why will they wait until we are able to stand up against them?

Mr. CONNALLY. One reason may be that they may not be ready for war. Another reason may be that they fear the atomic bomb, and fear that we could make greater use of it than they could.

I am not in contact with the Russians; I cannot state their reasons. However, I have simply stated my reaction.

Mr. TAFT. Would not it be obvious to them that we would double and quadruple our production of atomic bombs, and would produce many more of them than they would, and that, therefore, in regard to the production of atomic bombs, we would have a constantly increasing superiority, rather than a falling off?

Mr. CONNALLY. Much guesswork is involved in that assumption. We are producing atomic bombs, but we do not know the rate of the production of such bombs by the Russians. At one time we did not think the Russians had the atomic bomb, but we found out that they did.

There are among us many who approve the idea of internationalism if the price is right. They will accept internationalism if it can be bought at the bargain counter.

Mr. President, this is one of the supreme fallacies of our time. You simply cannot put a price tag on world peace. The price of peace, like the price of liberty, is eternal vigilance, coupled with a readiness to make whatever sacrifices are necessary, to pay whatever the price may be.

Of course, it would be splendid if we did not have to support a large ground army. It would be encouraging if we found it unnecessary to spend huge sums on our defense program or to impose controls upon our domestic economy. It would be comforting if we could act as if there were no real threat to our national

security. But that kind of reasoning is not in conformity with the brutal facts of international life which we confront.

Mr. President, I bow to no man in the strength of my feeling that America must maintain its economic power and that we must take fast and decisive action to check inflationary trends before they have a chance to gain impetus. However, I refuse to place a price tag on the security of the United States. I am not a devotee of the school that believes in keeping and strengthening our allies—only if it does not cost too much. I do not believe in shopping for security at the bargain counter.

A POSITIVE POLICY

Mr. President, the underlying fallacy of the suggestions I have been considering derives from the failure to assign appropriate weight to the actual components that make up American security.

There are three major factors which have been dominant in keeping the uneasy peace which has prevailed since the Japanese surrendered. They are the three main elements which have deterred the Soviet Union from all-out aggression. The existence of the first has given us an interval of time that is all too brief to develop the second and the third.

The first great deterrent, of course, is American supremacy in atomic weapons. Beyond doubt, our possession of a quantity of atomic bombs combined with the operation of bombers capable of delivering them has held the Soviet in check. This deterrent will be effective until such time as the Soviet is able to build up a stockpile of bombs sufficient to challenge American superiority.

The second great deterrent is the tremendous productive capacity represented by the combination of our own industrial might plus that of Western Europe and the Ruhr.

The third is the fact that in this struggle for survival the vast majority of the nations of the world stand with us against the forces of evil and tyranny.

Some people lose sight of the fact, for example, that Western Europe is the second greatest industrial complex in the world, second only to the United States. If the capacity and the technical skills of the workers of the area were allowed by super caution on our part, or timidity as regards our commitments, to fall into Soviet hands, we would have suffered a decisive loss. One of the great points of our strength is our industrial power. But if the Soviet should conquer Western Europe and take over all its manufacturing, it would be a very serious blow. With the Ruhr and the factories of Western Europe under Russian control, the primacy of the United States would be seriously challenged. Industry under Soviet control would then exceed that available to us by an uncomfortable margin. They would add enormously to their technical resources and to the raw materials available to them. Correspondingly, this country would find itself cut off from many strategic materials required by our production. For example, it is well known that our main source of uranium comes from an area under the control of a country of Western Europe.

I could go into this phase of our interest in Europe in far greater detail if time permitted. But I feel that what I have said is sufficient to document my point that we need Western Europe as much as Western Europe needs us. The security of the United States is inseparably coupled with that of our allies in the North Atlantic community. Consequently, we cannot seriously entertain a policy of limited, half-hearted participation in the defense of that area, even though it has the appeal of being economical. It would be a cosmic example of being penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Mr. John Foster Dulles recently observed that—

Any nation which at a moment of supreme danger sheds those of its allies who are most endangered, and to whom it is bound by solemn treaty, is scarcely in a position thereafter to do much picking and choosing for its own account. It elects a dangerous course, for solitary defense is never impregnable. It is possible to plan, on paper, and describe in words, what it seems should be an impregnable defense, a China Wall, a Maginot line, a Rock of Gibraltar, an Atlantic and Pacific moat. But the mood that plans such a defense carries within itself the seeds of its own collapse. A defense that accepts encirclement quickly decomposes. That has been proved a thousand times.

We must have allies to realize our full potential of strength. At the moment, both our strength and that of Western Europe is only partly realized, partially organized. The atom bomb has given us time to work with our friends there, to help them achieve their full strength. As I have pointed out, the probable interval of time allotted to us for this task has been alarmingly shortened. But, if we buckle down to the job, and if they buckle down to the job, it can still be done.

Let me emphasize that self-help and mutual aid have always been the basis of the whole North Atlantic defense effort. This will continue to be the condition of our participation in the build-up of the pact nations. They have already made extreme sacrifices, and they have promised to do more. The French Parliament recently passed a military budget double that of last year—and we should never forget that France has maintained a force of 150,000 of her front-line troops in Indochina. For France, this has been an extraordinarily costly operation. Her losses of officers exceed the number graduated in the same period from the French West Point.

Britain, too, has been fighting Communist guerrillas in Malaya for more than a year. These actions have placed an additional burden on economies already severely strained.

What has been done thus far under the pact organization can be taken as a concrete manifestation of the serious intent of our European partners. Although they have accomplished considerable, we do not think it enough. We will require more. I must remind you, however, that the additional effort put forth will, in large measure, be conditioned by our action.

We may be unable to see why the peoples of the continent doubt that we are serious. But, remember, we do not live in

the shadow of the iron curtain. We have not suffered invasion twice in a generation. Our homes are not within a few days' march of a hundred Russian divisions. Their exposed situation makes them cautious. It is understandable that they should be extremely sensitive to signs that might be interpreted as weakened American intent.

Thus, in practical terms the initiative rests with us. It has been said that an increase in the American forces in Europe would put a sudden end to these hesitations and fears. The indications are that this statement is well-founded in fact.

The boost in morale and popular spirit resulting from a troop commitment of that nature would probably be more than sufficient to support the parallel effort which we should demand from them in return. That, in practical terms, is probably the manner in which the effective defense that we are determined to build will be fashioned. It will be a joint effort; and the point on which we and our partners must make up our minds is that nothing short of an all-out effort will do. That is the minimum.

There is no time to waste. The appointment of General Eisenhower is a long step forward. If any commander can achieve the maximum possible participation in the shortest possible time, he is that man. His appearance in Europe has had an electrifying effect.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield for a question.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator has confined his argument in this paragraph of his statement to manpower on land, ground troops. He intends to say, does he not, that it is equally as important that the United States shall increase and improve its air power and sea power?

Mr. CONNALLY. Oh, yes. The reason I paid attention to manpower was because there was so much stress on that subject by the opposition.

The United States today bears a tremendous responsibility. I believe that never before has one nation had the destiny of mankind so within its control. True, we say that the Soviet Union can decide whether there will be war or peace in our time. But it is the United States that can decide whether life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or death, tyranny, and misery are to be the fate of mankind.

This responsibility is upon the people of the United States and upon us, their elected representatives.

We have a great people, a people peculiarly adapted to leadership of the free world. We draw our heritage from more races and creeds than any other nation on earth. We have banded ourselves together in a union based on the dignity of the individual. Our people have created a productive system that is stronger and more efficient and better for the common man than is any other on earth. We have created a government able to express the will of the people and incorporate that will in our national policy.

My friends in the United States Senate, we have at this time a high duty to do all we can to thrash out the divergent points of view of our people and help them determine the path we are to follow in the years ahead. The responsibilities we have discharged in the past few years, the unanimity we have been able to achieve in program after program, speak well for our system.

Democrats and Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee have always exercised their right, and, indeed, viewed it as their duty to examine administration proposals, test them against the public mandate, criticize, and amend. We have exercised our judgment on behalf of the American people, trying at all times to reflect their will. Our record of bipartisan unanimity on all matters of major importance since the war is one of which I am extremely proud.

We bear a heavy responsibility today in the United States Senate. What we say here, what we do here, can give the people of the world hope, or turn them away in despair from the citadel of freedom.

While this is a terrible responsibility which our country bears, it is also a rare opportunity.

The President of the United States asked that we stand together as Americans and that we stand together with all men everywhere who believe in human liberty. We will do no less. We can do no more. Let the unfair critics sheathe their swords. Let us not employ our weapons against each other. Let us face the enemy together in defense of our security and our liberty.

With the unity of purpose that comes from the justice of our cause, and with firm belief in the divine guidance that has made our country great, we face the future with courage and determination.

SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I shall take approximately half an hour, at the end of which time I shall welcome questions, but I should like to make this statement without interruptions.

There is no doubt whatever that throughout our history free debate has added greatly to the strength of our national decisions. It is one of the greatest services rendered by an institution such as the Senate. If all we had now to consider was American opinion, we could unhesitatingly say that the freest debate on foreign policy would without any doubt be good.

But we cannot build a wall around the United States and confine this discussion solely to the ears and eyes of the American people. What we say here is heard and read—and misinterpreted—all over the world—and the reaction of the world closely affects American welfare. While there is undoubtedly a legitimate area for public discussion, we help our enemies if we here discuss details of strategy and tactics, talking about the places we will hold or abandon. Such discussion will lose us the support of peoples who otherwise think we might some day be able to help them. Senators have

recently calmly discussed what places we might have to bomb—places whose inhabitants we still hope might someday have a common cause with us. This does not make friends for us abroad, however much it may reassure people at home. If we do not discuss these matters our debate may lack realism and may not give reassurance, but at least it will not mean the loss of potential partners should a future conflict occur. Let us never forget that up to June 1949 our two divisions in Korea, which were 6,000 miles from home, close to the Soviet border, and overwhelmingly outnumbered, had been unmolested either by the Soviets or their satellites. Then we withdrew the troops and announcement was made that the United States defense line ran from the Aleutians through Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, and that the area bounded by the thirty-eighth parallel was not essential to our defense. We know what happened after that. Let us not make another error of this type insofar as other parts of the world are concerned.

It is good that to date this debate has been conducted without personalities. May it so continue, and may there be no political motivation in anything that is said. These few remarks are not a rebuttal to or a defense of any individual. It is hard for me to side consistently with any individual or party as regards foreign policy. I honor and respect the motives and objectives of the Senators who may differ with me. Insofar as this particular administration is concerned, I have held consistently that its lack of foresight and its tragic miscalculations clearly deserve censure; its belated efforts to meet the challenge of communism deserve support; and its present efforts toward building military strength should be both bigger and faster. That is my stand.

The aim of foreign policy is to preserve peace and, if the struggle against communism should turn to war, to have made it possible for other peoples in the world to have a common cause with us, so that, having effective partners, we will not have to bear the full load of combat alone. This means that the United States must not only be strong, but that it is highly desirable that our allies in the Atlantic Pact, the former neutral nations, the former enemy nations, and all stateless anti-Communist men, whether they be Slavs in Europe or Nationalist Chinese in the Far East, be able and willing and ready to make their military contribution. This was the purpose of legislation which would have made it possible for the United States actually to organize military units of stateless men—not just mercenaries or Hessians, but what is far better: volunteers for freedom who have a common cause with us. I believe that if such legislation had been passed in 1947, there would now be dependable military forces in many places where we must either employ Americans or do nothing.

The yardstick by which the success of foreign policy must be measured is thus basically the extent to which it provides resolute and effective partners so that the whole load will not be carried by our

American military manpower. That manpower is our most precious resources.

We doubtless have more dollars per capita than any other nation, of which fact I used to be reminded in the United Nations, but obviously we have no more manpower per capita. In this respect all nations are alike and all alike should share the burden. It is for that reason, Mr. President, I say that those nations who have shared with us the burden of fighting in Korea are entitled to our very special consideration and appreciation.

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The public announcement that a "great debate" is to be held in the Senate instinctively seems to invite a division of everyone into two groups. Apparently one must either be a "globalist" or a "retreatist." This creates a false impression. Actually a careful reading of the Senate discussion in the past few days, notably the speech of the able Senator from Ohio [Mr. Taft], shows substantial agreement on many fundamentals of future foreign policy, however much we may differ on what has happened in the past. To dispel the artificial idea that we here in the Senate are more divided than is actually the case, I should like to list 16 points of basic agreement:

First. We agree that constructive criticism is essential, that it adds strength to a nation's foreign policy and that the only unity which is worth having is the unity which comes after and not before such criticism has been urged. While we must not recriminate, call names, or pervert this awesome moment for political purposes, Monday-morning quarterbacking fills a useful purpose if it enables us to win next week's game. Bipartisanship emphatically does not oblige the minority to support the majority when it thinks the majority is wrong, just as bipartisanship does require the minority to support the majority when the majority is right. It is as simple as that. For the minority to prod the majority into making a greater effort to win this struggle is a solemn duty and a valuable characteristic of the two-party system. The minority can rightly contend that the struggle against communism did not start soon enough.

To this I add my own belief that it was with the help of minority leadership that the much maligned Eightieth Congress, by overwhelming votes, set up the Marshall plan, without which the fight against communism would be largely lost in Europe today, selective service legislation, and the Vandenberg resolution, which, if we rapidly take full advantage of the common action to which it pointed the way, can be a vital factor in saving the day for the free world. Incidentally, it was in connection with the Vandenberg resolution that I said in June 1948:

The purpose of the Vandenberg resolution is to show that we are in sympathy with the broad trend of strengthening the freedom-loving countries, but it does not commit us to anything definite. They must make the showing. If they make a good showing and if it is advantageous to our national security to help them, we shall help them. If the showing is not good enough, we shall not help them. It is the most perfect arrangement from the standpoint of American interest that could possibly be imagined.

Second. We agree that the United States made a mistake in dissipating its Armed Forces in 1945, in failing correctly to estimate the aims of the Soviet Union, and in secretly agreeing at Yalta to decisions from which so much tragedy has flowed.

Third. We agree that we have an interest in the military strength of other nations and in their economic welfare. A revolution is under way in the world, and we cannot expect less favored nations to stand still and be content with the low living standards which they have always had. It is often stressed in the Senate that aid to other nations must only be undertaken to the extent that it benefits us. Of course, that is true, but I should like to point out that, while we have a selfish interest, it is obviously to our advantage by our words in Congress to avoid stressing as much as possible, and as often as we get the opportunity, a selfish attitude on our part.

Fourth. We agree that war is not inevitable and that it must be avoided.

Fifth. We agree that there is a determined plan to communize the world but that there is also no cause for panic.

Sixth. We certainly agree that we unfortunately cannot place our full reliance on the United Nations as a practical device to protect this country from aggression. The UN Charter sweepingly promises to repel aggression without there being the force which is able to do it. We put the cart before the horse. We do not wish to withdraw from the United Nations, certainly, and while we hope to build it up as time goes on, we must depend on our own strength and that of our partners to protect our security. May our partners be strong, and may they be numerous.

Seventh. We agree, too, that our first consideration must be the defense of America, that America can often be defended outside of America, but that if we undertake to respond, with military force, to every call for help in every part of the world we shall be bled white.

Eighth. Equally we agree that our major effort must be through our Air Force and our Navy. It has been clear since the end of World War II that if we were to maintain a proper Air Force and Navy, it would be far more difficult than in the past simultaneously to raise more than 35 or 40 American divisions. The World War I and II visions of a 100-division army are over. We now appreciate that if it becomes necessary, in the struggle against communism, for a major effort to be made on land—and that could happen—the United States cannot possibly make it alone. We need allies, either in the uniform of their country or in the uniform of the United States. There seems to be general agreement on that point both here and abroad.

Ninth. We also agree that a limited number of American divisions could be used in Europe as part of an Atlantic Pact force with advantageous results for us, provided that our military authorities favor their use.

Tenth. We agree with the idea expressed here in the Senate that the United States cannot abandon the rest of the world and rely solely on the defense of this continent and that we must do

what we can so that Communist influence may not spread.

Eleventh. We agree that it would be obviously a colossal error to seek a decision by pitting our manpower and that of our partners against the teeming millions of Russia and China. Indeed, I know of no qualified student of the problem who wants to do this.

Twelfth. We can agree with the proposition that we should not force our decisions on nations who have no desire to arm themselves. To go further, we should not commit one single additional soldier to Europe without an iron-clad agreement that the dispatch of that soldier means the automatic commitment of a very much larger number of European soldiers. Such a commitment is not unfair to Europe since we will do so much in other ways. In truth, as I will try to demonstrate later, such a commitment could be highly advantageous both to Europe and to the United States.

Thirteenth. We also agree with the statement made here that we need a far more effective intelligence force and a great improvement in measures to help those who yearn for liberty in the satellite countries. In this connection, incidentally, the proposal for enlisting alien soldiers can be most helpful.

Fourteenth. We agree that our allies should make the greatest effort of which they are capable. Their stake is as great as ours.

I certainly agree with the statement, which may be more widely challenged, but which I have heard made on the other side of the aisle, that the dragging of feet of the nations of Western Europe has been much exaggerated. When a country like France, for example, votes conscription, increases its military budget by 75 percent in 1 year, substantially diminishes its entire program for the rebuilding of the areas which were devastated in World War II, undertakes to set up 10 modern divisions in 1 year in addition to the very large force of more than seven divisions which it maintains in Indochina, agrees to the rearmament of its traditional German enemy—and does all this after it has been bled white in two world wars—candidly, it seems to me that that compares favorably with what we have been doing over here. We, too, have been dragging our feet a good deal insofar as preparedness is concerned, and while part of the inadequacy of the effort in Europe is doubtless their own fault, part of it is also due to the fact that they were requested by the United States to put all their energies into economic production and not into national defense.

I know that there are those in all free nations who are "neutralists." I need hardly tell Senators that that sentiment exists here. There are tremendous separatist forces constantly trying to pull us and our partners apart and away from each other. There are forces in America seeking division for its own sake—not just honest disagreement over matters of judgment. It is not remarkable that separatist forces exist. What is remarkable and what gives hope for the future is the extent to which they have been and are being overcome. There is probably not a Senator here who does not think in his heart of hearts

that it is better to fight abroad with the help of partners than to fight alone in the United States in the midst of the ruins of our great factories. Admittedly, the fighting of a land battle on American soil is not an immediate threat. But are we in the Senate concerned only with this year and next year? Have we no thought at all for our children and grandchildren? Unless we exercise some foresight and statesmanship they—and we—could confront conditions here which would make the dreadful overseas battles of World War II seem like the good old days. It is worth a great deal for a country with our limited and precious manpower resources not to have to stand alone, and we are justified in making sacrifices and in running risks to avoid such an outcome—to keep what partners we have and to add new ones.

Fifteenth. Then we can agree completely with the idea that we must have complete freedom to fight a war, if it comes, as we want to fight it. That goes for all the questions which war raises—Who? What? Where? When? and How?

Sixteenth. Finally, there is no doubt that Congress has the right and duty to determine the size of the Armed Forces, increasing or reducing them as it sees fit above or below the figure desired by the Executive.

Those are 16 points of substantial—though not unanimous—agreement. They seem to me to be numerous and overwhelmingly important. They certainly do not justify the impression either here or abroad that the Senate is split right down the middle with globalists on the one side and retreatists on the other.

In all truth—and I am very happy to say this—there are no fundamental principles which divide us. There are questions of degree and questions of method—but nothing which really goes to the heart of the matter. The most contentious question which a reading of the record discloses is the idea that American Armed Forces cannot be sent overseas without consent of Congress. But this is not an issue of principle; it is entirely an issue of degree and of method. Let me discuss it for a moment.

III

I share the great and legitimate concern which so sincerely animates Senators who make this proposal. Their sincerity is in the highest degree praiseworthy and it is to be hoped that some procedure can be devised to satisfy the legitimate worry which we all feel.

But it is hard to understand, Mr. President, how Members of the House and Senate, even making due allowances for their fine qualities, can possibly attempt to function as the operations section of a general staff and decide where and how and in what amount troops, ships, and planes should be sent to foreign lands. Assuming that we in Congress have the ability, how can we, with all our many other duties, possibly possess professional strategic knowledge? How can we preserve the secrecy and conduct the tactics of deception and surprise which are so essential if we are to debate troop movements?

Imagine a situation in which there are already two divisions overseas. If three more are sent, the total of five divisions might be successful, whereas if the two remained they might be lost.

In these considerations, two and two do not always make four. If we doubled the number of divisions, we may increase our power by more than twice. If we cut the number of divisions in half, we may decrease the power of our forces by much more than half.

To determine whether or not these three additional divisions should be sent requires knowledge of logistics, terrain, enemy capabilities, and a host of other factors which men go to West Point, to the Command and General Staff School, and to the Regular Army in order to learn. Are we to start making such decisions here?

If we require congressional approval for sending troops abroad, how can the President carry out his oath of office and take the steps which are required by the Constitution to "preserve, protect, and defend" the United States if a crisis should come when Congress is not in session? If we undertake to decide such questions in Congress, we shall defeat ourselves probably more quickly than an enemy could do it. We would be putting ourselves on the spot when we did not have to do so. In the language of the prize ring we would be "telegraphing our punches." Ship, plane, and troop movements must be decided by the Executive. Read the history of the War Between the States and the unhappy experiences of the congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. Under the Constitution of the United States, in time of war I take it the Commander in Chief has unquestioned authority over the Army, and may conduct the war in any way he sees fit. I would question even the constitutional right of the Congress to attempt to stop him from doing so.

Mr. LODGE. The Senator is correct.

Mr. TAFT. However, in the case at hand, it seems to me that we have a question of foreign policy rather than of arms. We have a question of whether or not we are going to commit the United States. Certainly there is a tremendous difference between sending an army of 30 divisions to Europe and occupying Germany with two divisions as a force of occupation. Those are basic questions, which it seems to me are well within the authority of Congress to determine in time of peace.

Is it not true also that for many years the law provided that the President could send no troops outside of continental United States in time of peace?

Mr. LODGE. The Senator from Ohio was not in the Chamber when I made the earlier reference to that point. I stated that there is substantial agreement here—and I base that on a reading of the speech of the Senator from Ohio—that it would be a proper thing to send a limited number of divisions to Europe if our military authorities thought it would be advantageous to do so.

Mr. TAFT. No; if it would accord with the general policy which Congress might think desirable—not because our generals might think so. I do not think the generals have anything to do with the question.

Mr. LODGE. I will find the quotation.

Mr. TAFT. "In the general spirit of the Atlantic Pact," I said.

Mr. LODGE. This is what the Senator from Ohio said:

I should not object to committing some limited number of American divisions to work with them in the general spirit of the Atlantic Pact.

Mr. TAFT. Yes; but I did not say that that was to be determined by any generals or necessarily on any military basis. It is a question of foreign policy, as I see it, which is wholly within the jurisdiction of Congress.

Mr. LODGE. I presume the Senator would not want to send them to Europe if the generals thought it was unwise to do so from a military standpoint.

Mr. TAFT. No. My objection to sending them to Europe at all is based on the fact that I cannot see the safety of any such movement. I cannot see that it would not rather in the first place induce war as a question of foreign policy, and, in the second place, that it would not induce a war which would be most disastrous to the United States.

Mr. LODGE. I am going to come to that point of whether it is a provocation or not.

Mr. TAFT. I am here only raising the question as to whether the nature of the commitment for Europe is not primarily now a question of foreign policy and not a question of military policy. That is the point.

Mr. LODGE. I have been endeavoring to say that to try to draw a line between foreign policy and military policy today is like trying to cut a pail of water in two. They are absolutely merged together and we cannot have the one without the other.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. Not now. Before I yield to the Senator from Louisiana I wish further to respond to the Senator from Ohio. The Senator from Ohio is quite right in saying that there is a great difference between sending a limited number of divisions in the spirit of the Atlantic Pact, which is one thing and to which, I gather, there is no objection, and sending a huge land force, which is another thing. I will agree at once that those two points are entirely different. If we are going to go beyond sending a limited number of divisions in the spirit of the Atlantic Pact, then certainly that calls for a major policy decision in which Congress should participate. I do not think there is any occasion to send a major land force to Europe. In the first place we have not a major land force to send even if we wanted to. It would be absolutely out of the question to do it. All that is involved here is a question of sending a limited number of troops to Europe. We already have two divisions in Europe, and I have not heard anyone suggest that we withdraw those two divisions,

Certainly, I said when the Senator from Ohio was not here, when we withdrew the two divisions from Korea in 1949 it turned out to be a colossal mistake, and I do not think I have heard anyone on the floor suggest that we withdraw the two divisions from Germany.

Mr. TAFT. I do not think there are many troops to withdraw at the moment, but I do not think that changes the question, because the President has now proposed to Congress that we create a great land army of many divisions. In his request for 3,500,000 troops Monday I would say that at least 2,000,000 of those certainly are to be in the land army, and consequently whatever is determined now will be applied when those divisions are created. I said that that is a consideration we should dismiss for the moment from our consideration.

Mr. LODGE. What the administration wants in the way of an army is 18 divisions. I do not think by any stretch of the imagination that would be called a vast army. If 18 is vast then what is 61, which is what we had in Europe alone in World War II? We have got to get another adjective. We have seven divisions in Korea, and we are starting to build a total of 11 more to be ready by the end of this year some time. That is not a vast land army.

Mr. TAFT. Is it the Senator's understanding that to get 18 divisions we have to have 2,000,000 men in the Army in uniform, besides another million civilians?

Mr. LODGE. I cannot answer that question. I do not know offhand how many civilians it takes in the War Department to have 18 divisions in the field.

Mr. TAFT. Roughly speaking one civilian to two men in uniform seems to be the general rule.

Mr. LODGE. If the Senator is trying to get me to admit that the military are great wasters of manpower, I will hurriedly and enthusiastically agree with him. I think there is no question about that. I should like to see our military department utilize manpower very efficiently.

Mr. TAFT. The Senator does not agree legally with the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] that the President has power to send troops anywhere in the world in any quantity where the security of the United States is involved? I think those are the words the Senator from Texas used.

Mr. LODGE. The Senator from Massachusetts has spent his time in the Senate trying to say what he, as the Senator from Massachusetts believes; and not to say whether he disagrees with paragraph 8 of a statement made by the Senator from Texas, or paragraph 3 of a statement made by the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. This is the main subject of debate. What does the Senator from Massachusetts think of the President's power, in time of peace, to send troops anywhere in the world where the security of the United States is involved?

Mr. LODGE. Before the Senator from Ohio came into the Chamber I said that I would much prefer to discuss the question on the basis of common sense and wisdom, and what is involved in this

question, rather than to get into a legal question. I am not a lawyer, for one thing. I think if we could all agree on what was wise and what was practical and what was advantageous we would not find any legal obstacles in the way.

The President takes the oath of office—I believe I am quoting correctly—"to preserve, protect, and defend" the United States. That is a pretty big commitment. I think one of the things that is confusing us in this country so much, and confusing the free world so much, and helping the Soviet so much, is that we here are used to thinking that we are either at peace or war. This means that if we are at war the President can do this—a certain thing. If we are not, he cannot. Of course, the Soviet are not tied down by any legalistic principles of that kind. I do not know whether they have any law schools, and if they have, whether any of the members of the Politburo attended them. I believe they operate without them. They operate equally well whether it is good weather or foggy weather. In fact, they work better in the fog.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts as one who has had a large amount of experience in World War II as a combat officer of the United States, whether it might not be entirely possible that some of the factors that determine how many troops would be needed in Europe might depend largely on secret matters which could not be safely trusted to 96 United States Senators and four-hundred-and-thirty-some-odd Representatives for debate on the floor of the Senate and the House?

Mr. LODGE. I think that is true. I tried to make that point a moment ago. The question of deciding the matter of troop movements and ship movements and plane movements is highly technical. Persons who must make such decisions ought not to have to do anything else. They ought not to be obliged to study a multiplicity of domestic legislation, or make speeches, or answer mail, as Senators do. What such men should decide ought to be in the interest of the young men who are engaged in combat. Men who have to make such decisions ought not to have to make decisions on other questions.

Mr. LONG. Would there not also be the question of time involved? The executive must be able to decide in a relatively short period of time what, in the executive opinion, should be done. However, if an attempt were made to make a decision respecting the sending of one or two more divisions to Europe, the question of whether to send not two but three and so forth, and that had to be debated on the floor of the Senate and the House, an interminable time might expire before a decision could finally be reached by a majority of 96 Senators and 435 Representatives respecting the number of divisions that should be sent.

Mr. LODGE. I think that is correct.

IV

Let us now consider the question of "who" will bear the brunt and "where"

the effort is to be made and of "how" it is to be done.

In response to the question of who, my conviction is that, in addition to the United States, there must be the help of our allies in the Atlantic Pact, of the former enemy nations, of the former neutrals, and of the stateless anti-Communist men.

When it comes to how, it is obvious that, if there should be war, the American main effort must be by air and sea but that the allied main effort can also have a substantial army. The statement that the Air Force is the one weapon which can damage those bases from which air attack can be made upon us is not completely accurate. Strong, effective army occupation of a hostile base is another weapon which can achieve a result not merely by damaging the enemy but by neutralizing him completely. Sea and air power cannot at all times and under all conditions, particularly in a struggle with a tremendous land power, achieve complete protection.

To answer the question where, we must first of all make up our minds that if the Ruhr and Japan were to fall, the whole strategic picture would become almost inconceivably serious. These are the two great industrial potentials which are still in the free world. If the Ruhr and the great shipyards of Western Europe were taken by a hostile aggressor, it would not be long before our present ascendancy in air and naval power would be neutralized. Anyone who is a strong advocate of American air and naval supremacy should realize that a prime requisite for maintaining that supremacy is to prevent the aggressors from intervening in the Ruhr and Japan. This is not interventionism by America; it is simply an attempt to hold what we already have.

This raises clearly the question of the defense of Western Europe against aggression. The word "defense" is to be stressed. There is no question here of our adopting aggressive tactics based on Western Europe and aimed at the Soviet Union. It is hard to understand how anyone can contend that the development of a defensive holding force in Europe without serious offensive capabilities could look like aggression to such realistic men as the rulers of the Kremlin. The same Senators say, almost in the same breath, that the building of an army in Europe would be regarded as aggression by the Soviets and that undoubtedly the Soviets would destroy that army within a few months after it was begun. If the army would be so easy to destroy, how could the Soviets seriously believe that it had a serious aggressive potential?

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. The Senator seems to pass over the element of time; he seems to wipe time off the books. Of course, in time it is possible to build an army. However, the only suggestion which has been made is that until an army is built, it is at the mercy of the Soviets. An army in the process of being built might reach the point where it was easy to

wipe out when the Soviets moved in—which is the basis of the whole thesis.

Mr. LODGE. No; the basis of the thesis is not that the Soviets have that intention in regard to all forms of armed force development at all.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. Furthermore, how is it possible to have an army which is absolutely able to defend Europe but does not have all the offensive potentialities capable of taking from the Russians a large part of their possessions?

Mr. LODGE. I shall be glad to try to give an opinion on that point. I think one of the ways in which Switzerland maintained its neutrality—to give a small example—was by maintaining a strong army which had very great defensive power, but relatively small offensive power. If we give a man a rifle, he has some offensive power, of course. But obviously the Atlantic Pact force, even if it lived up to the highest expectations of its supporters, could never outnumber the 175 divisions the Soviet Union is supposed to have. If we read the history of the campaigns of the Third Army, for instance—General Patton's army—I think it will be found that before that army, which certainly was one of the best armies in World War II, took the offensive against the Germans, it had built up a superiority of almost 3 to 1, as I recall the figures. That is one reason why I think the Atlantic Pact force can never develop offensive possibilities.

Moreover, as I understand, it is not even believed that the relatively small Atlantic Pact force will have very serious defensive capabilities, unless it has strong tactical aviation support. That is why I say I am sure the Soviets have no worries about ever having that force become an offensive threat to them.

Of course, the potential American offensive threat arises from the capacity of our Air Force to drop atomic bombs; and, of course, that is a very strong offensive potential.

Mr. TAFT. Is it not true that a tactical air force is just as effective for offense as for defense?

Mr. LODGE. No; not necessarily, in all cases.

Mr. TAFT. Why not?

Mr. LODGE. A tactical air force is not necessarily always as effective for offense as for defense, because it often must go farther when it engages in offense.

Mr. TAFT. It simply goes from just behind the lines, in either case.

Mr. LODGE. However, by means of a succession of strong points we try to canalize the enemy's advance—well, we should not be talking about these things in public, so there is no use in going into these matters at this time. I see that I am about to begin to violate the precept I suggested when I began to speak, namely, that in these debates we should not discuss detailed tactics. However, I shall be glad to go to the Senator's office at any time and explain to him why I think this defensive army can never develop offensive potentialities against a Russian force.

Mr. TAFT. Did I correctly understand the Senator to say that we can build up such a defensive army which can have no offensive capabilities?

Mr. LODGE. No serious offensive capabilities.

Mr. TAFT. Is not that just the Maginot-line complex?

Mr. LODGE. No.

Mr. TAFT. Is it not true that, regardless of whether a force moves forward or moves backward, there is a war in either case?

Mr. LODGE. It would be the Maginot-line complex if we were to envision a third world war as being fought entirely in Western Europe. But, of course, we do not visualize it in that way, because it will be a triphibious war, if it comes. If we hold at one point and attack at another, that is not a Maginot line, if we proceed everywhere in accordance with a triphibious concept—

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Is it not also true that an army representing not only the United States, but also France, Belgium, Holland, and other smaller nations, would not be an army which the powers in control of it would agree to use to attack any great power? That army could be used only for defense, because the smaller powers never would agree that their forces should be used to attack Soviet Russia. Does not the Senator agree?

Mr. LODGE. Yes. I think it is simply incredible to think that the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, and other nations, could possibly get themselves into a condition to march on Moscow. I think it is the most fantastic dream one could imagine.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. Does the Senator understand that the army which will be built up there will never be able to defeat the Russians if they attack?

Mr. LODGE. No; that is not the point. I am sorry the Senator was not here earlier.

Mr. CAPEHART. But a moment ago I understood the Senator to say that the army would be a defensive army and never could be an offensive army against the Russians.

Mr. LODGE. No; I said it could have no serious offensive capabilities.

Mr. CAPEHART. No serious offensive capabilities?

Mr. LODGE. That is what I said.

Mr. CAPEHART. Those are strong terms.

Mr. LODGE. I say it has no serious offensive capabilities.

Mr. CAPEHART. If Russia were to attack the United States from some place other than through Western Europe, what good would we get from the Western European army we are talking about?

Mr. LODGE. It would be good as a holding force, as a dam. Recently we heard ex-President Hoover talk about such a dam.

Mr. CAPEHART. Suppose the Russians should decide to attack us from South America, from Alaska, or from some point other than Western Europe. What good would the Western European army be in that case?

Mr. LODGE. That question requires a long answer; but a quick answer is that such an army would keep the Russians from obtaining the Western European shipyards and other industrial plants. That is at least one good reason for maintaining such an army.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LODGE. I should like first to answer the question asked by the Senator from Indiana, and then I shall yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts declines to yield.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I shall yield to the Senator from Minnesota as soon as I have answered the Senator from Indiana.

I should like to say to the Senator from Indiana that of course he is correct that all these things should be ready. If they are not ready, of course, they are not any good. That is true.

Now I yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, at the time the able Senator from Indiana asked his question of the Senator from Massachusetts, this question occurred to me: If the Soviets should attack the United States, what should we do? If the Soviets should attack us, if the sirens were to scream the announcement of the attack this very afternoon, I think we would want bases all over the European Continent, in order that we could make a speedy and effective strike, because we would have to strike fast, or else all our centers of communication and centers and hearts of production on this continent would be shattered. Therefore, the possession of bases on the Continent is, in my opinion, absolutely essential to our safety.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield, so that I may answer the suggestion of the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. LODGE. I yield to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. CAPEHART. Of course, the able Senator from Minnesota misses the point of the debate. The able Senator from Massachusetts said that the army which is being built up is for defensive purposes and could never be, or might not be effective offensively against Russia. That was the point in the debate, not what the able Senator from Minnesota is talking about.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield further?

Mr. LODGE. I am trying to give what I said before the Senator from Ohio came in. I quoted from his very able and interesting speech a good deal, to show that we are not very far apart, and I am very happy about it. I suppose there are some people who wish that we here in the Senate would divide up into globalists on one side and retreatists on

the other, but when we can find a common ground on any matter I think it is a fine thing. I agree with those who are filled with horror at the idea of a huge allied army marching through the snows into the middle of Russia. I am just as much opposed to that as is any other Member of the Senate, and that is why I am so happy to find that everybody agrees with me about that, in the first place; and I am so happy to find that nobody contemplates doing such a thing, in the second place.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. TAFT. I have one question. The Senator has emphasized the value of the Ruhr. Is it not true that even with an army in Europe it is very uncertain whether we could do anything but defend the Rhine anyway? And is it not most likely that that would involve a surrender of the Ruhr?

Mr. LODGE. We are now getting into the topics which I said at the beginning we should not discuss, because if in the United States Senate we start talking about the places we are going to leave and the places we are going to hold, it is all going to be cabled by the able ladies and gentlemen of the press all over the world, and the people who are living in the countries that we say we are not going to hold will read about it, and we will lose some partners whom we might otherwise have.

Mr. TAFT. Is it not true—

Mr. LODGE. Let me answer.

Mr. TAFT. Let me put it in this way—

Mr. LODGE. Let me answer the Senator. I am trying to answer him, and to answer him in my own way. I cannot answer the Senator from Ohio in his way; I must answer him in my way. So I say that, if it is desired to hold line B, it is a good thing to say that we will hold line A. If we propose to hold line A, and to try to hold line A, then we may be able to hold line B. Does that answer the question?

Mr. TAFT. Is it not also true that the chief reliance in World War II was the bombing of the Ruhr, and cannot the production there be very substantially reduced at least by bombing?

Mr. LODGE. The idea of bombing the Ruhr and destroying all the people in the Ruhr is one that does not appeal to me. I do not think it is a good solution for the problem which we face.

Mr. TAFT. The Essen plant was never taken by the Allies in the late World War.

Mr. LODGE. I am not talking about what was done. I thought the Senator was advocating it for the future. I think it is unfortunate for us publicly to advocate the bombing of this area, and that. I think it is a mistake.

Mr. TAFT. With due respect, I may say to the Senator from Massachusetts I am not advocating anything.

Mr. LODGE. I am sorry if I misinterpreted the Senator's suggestions.

Mr. TAFT. I am only trying to answer the Senator's argument that we must retain the Ruhr because of its industrial potentialities to Russia and the possible occupation of the Ruhr; and I was sug-

gesting that bombing is one method of meeting that particular problem, as well as a land army in Europe. That is all I wanted to bring out.

Mr. LODGE. There is no doubt that bombing is a weapon we can use if we have to; but I think it is a last resort. As I have said, I think we ought to try to keep the free world as big as we can, where we think we have a good chance of being successful.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I have been very much interested in the Senator's remarks, and I think he has made a very fine contribution to this debate. I believe he has left some unfortunate implications as to his theory of the military purpose of forces in Western Europe. Early in his debate he spoke of the necessity, in substance, of our selling our goods to our western allies. I doubt very much whether we would sell a case to the western allies, if we ask them to become a completely garrisoned state, and to do nothing but sit on the defensive while they are bombed out by the enemy. If that is good tactics for Western Europe, it is good tactics for the United States. I think the Senator has left some bad implications, which perhaps he did not intend to convey.

Mr. LODGE. I do not follow the Senator. What is there wrong—

Mr. MILLIKIN. Did I understand the Senator correctly to say, in substance, that the purpose of the Western European armies is defensive?

Mr. LODGE. Yes. That is correct.

Mr. MILLIKIN. That means that they stand still. It means that they take the blows of the enemy. The Ruhr would be blown up, everything else blown up, no movement. They would take the enemy's attacks. Is that a constructive piece of salesmanship for Western Europe?

Mr. LODGE. I doubt whether anybody even—

Mr. MILLIKIN. I put the complementary question: If that is the proper tactics for Western Europe, why not for the United States?

Mr. LODGE. I can answer that.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I think that both are bad.

Mr. LODGE. I can answer that. I do not think that even so persuasive a gentleman as my friend from Colorado could sell the idea to anyone that war is attractive. I think the idea of fighting a defensive war in Europe is not going to be attractive. I grant that to be so. I think the idea of an offensive war into the cold wastes of Siberia is not very attractive either, and I do not think the Senator from Colorado means seriously to advocate such a course.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I would not, sir.

Mr. LODGE. Wait a minute. Let me answer. The Senator has raised both points. I should like to answer them both. The second argument was that if a defensive war is the proper course for Europe, why is it not the proper course for the United States? There is a very simple answer to that, which is, of course, that our situation is far stronger; we are in a far more advantageous posi-

tion strategically. We are not nearly so weak or so divided and so up against the gun as are the people of Europe, and therefore we have a good chance to regain the initiative, so that the arrow of pressure will be pointing from west to east. One of the first things that must be done in order to regain the basic strategic initiative is that there be a dam in Europe insofar as the offensive threat of the Red Army is concerned. But that is just a small part of the whole strategic picture.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am in entire agreement that we should pick up effective allies in Western Europe. Let there be no question about that. I am opposed to falling back on the United States and adopting a cornered-rat defense policy.

Mr. LODGE. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Very well. But I do not like the implications of the Senator's argument that we should sell our allies by giving them help, merely to reduce them to the complete inertia of a defensive status, which is the Maginot line business, as has been pointed out.

Mr. LODGE. Oh, no; I do not think that is what happens at all. I think either the Army is going to have a defensive role or an offensive role. If it is going to have an offensive role, then there are Senators who are opposed to that, because they say it takes us into a highly dangerous adventure into Russia; and, of course, I agree with them. Then, if we say it is going to be a defensive army, that idea is opposed by the Senator from Colorado. If both arguments are good, then the only army which is any good is one which merely stands still in one place and does not move at all.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I do not accept either of the alternatives as exclusive. I believe in an offensive and defensive program, according to the task before us. I think we make a big mistake when we consign Western Europe to being solely a defensive military area.

Mr. LODGE. We shall be very lucky, I may say to the Senator, if we can be defensive in the next 2 or 3 years. We can thank our stars if that can be achieved. I am not urging that Europe be turned into a garrison state; far from it. I think that the army in any country has got to rest on a sound political and economic basis, and I do not think Europe can arm itself faster than at a certain rate. That is one of the reasons why I think the Marshall plan has been such an excellent thing, because it has provided the economic basis on which an army can now be built. There is nothing I have said, I may say to my able friend from Colorado, which justifies the inference that I want to turn Europe into a garrison state. I want to do no such thing.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I believe that when the Senator studies the RECORD there will be a number of remarks which he has made which lead to that conclusion, and I think that would be a very unfortunate conclusion, if we are out to pick up allies.

Mr. LODGE. I am not for turning any country into a garrison state, and I am not for engaging in a wild adventure in which we commit a huge land army to an invasion of the wasteland of

Siberia. I am not in favor of pitting our precious and limited store of manpower against the teeming millions of Russia or China. I am not in favor of doing those things.

Mr. MILLIKIN. But—

Mr. LODGE. Just a moment. Let me finish. The Senator raises big questions, and he is entitled to an adequate answer. I believe the principal effort must be made through air and through naval power, but that the allied main effort in certain parts of the world can be advantageously made by land. If that be true, then we can put in our percentage there. I am coming to what I think that percentage might be, but there is nothing in what I have said this afternoon which justifies any inference that I am doing anything other than seeking to regain the initiative—to regain the initiative for permanent peace, which we threw away in 1945 and 1946, when we allowed our Armed Forces to disintegrate, when we failed to estimate correctly the aims and aspirations of the Soviet Union, and when we lost the initiative. That has been the whole trouble.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am not quarreling with any of the general objectives of the Senator from Massachusetts. I am merely suggesting, and I repeat my suggestion, that if he will study the remarks he has made this afternoon perhaps he will see that that may be fairly argued that the net effect is that we would turn Western Europe into a garrison state. I am also interested in having effective allies in Western Europe.

Mr. LODGE. Will the Senator permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. MILLIKIN. Certainly.

Mr. LODGE. What kind of an army does the Senator want to build in Western Europe?

Mr. MILLIKIN. An army that can go forward, that would have whatever mobility is necessary to win the war.

Mr. LODGE. There are 175 Soviet divisions and there are 8 Allied divisions. How can we have such a mobile army in the near future?

Mr. MILLIKIN. The Senator is arguing that there is no point in doing anything.

Mr. LODGE. Oh, no; I am not. The Senator from Colorado is trying to "lawyer" me around to taking an extreme position. It is not a question of globalism or retreatism. It is a question of common sense, and not of legalism.

Mr. MILLIKIN. The Senator has indicated that there is a sensible ground somewhere between, and that is where I place myself. I do not want the Senator to render rigid half of his problem—

Mr. LODGE. I am not rigid at all. I am mentally mobile, and I think that most of us are.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I want the Senator to be mentally mobile, and I want him to keep our military forces mobile—not always moving backward.

Mr. LODGE. This has come about because of the statement made here that to build up this force in Europe will be an aggressive threat and cause the Soviet to rush into war.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am not taking issue on that. I was merely hoping I was making a friendly suggestion to the Senator that in the interest of those who are not retreatists or not globalists that he not jeopardize a good, sound, mobile position by making half of it rigidly defensive.

I want to make one more suggestion. I think the Senator is quite correct when he shrinks from discussing what points should be bombed and what points should not be bombed, but I do not think there is any secret about certain points that would be inevitably bombed. I am not talking about them or urging the Senator to talk about them, but I would suggest that if the Senator would discuss his strong-point theory it would be an interesting addition to the argument. There is no secrecy about it. War has operated on strong-point theories since the beginning of warfare.

Mr. LODGE. We have not operated on strong-point theories with tactical aviation since the beginning of warfare. I should be glad to discuss any of these things with the Senator off the record, but I do not think we should point out on the floor of the Senate places and areas when it would be reported all over the world.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am partially agreeing with the Senator, but I am saying that it would be a valuable adjunct to his argument if he would go into his strong-point theory and let us see what it has to offer. Maybe it will make the curse of the garrison state part of the subject.

Mr. LODGE. I think the Senator has conjured up something which is not really involved.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Let us call it static warfare or semiretreatism.

Mr. LODGE. I should like to join issue with the Senator now, but I do not think we should do so.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I do not shrink from that. I wish the Senator to know that I do not shrink from it. Does the Senator from Massachusetts shrink from it?

Mr. LODGE. I do not think we should discuss in public tactics and places and methods of fighting.

Mr. MILLIKIN. The routes of forward and backward moving of armies in Europe are no more secret than that the two of us are on the Senate floor this afternoon.

Mr. LODGE. That is true.

Mr. MILLIKIN. The study of strategy and tactics deals with well known routes of advance and retreat; and to say we should not discuss it—

Mr. LODGE. That is not what I said we should not discuss. The Senator is a very able man, but he cannot possibly know what it is that I do not want to discuss now. [Laughter.]

Mr. MILLIKIN. I should certainly hate to base a debate on something that I do not want to discuss.

Mr. LODGE. I am not basing my debate on it at all.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have listened with interest to my colleague from Mas-

sachusetts. In what I am about to say do I not state his concept correctly? As it lies in my mind, what the Senator wants to do and what I want to do is to keep Europe in a sufficiently strong position so that it can help us to defend ourselves here, and if they have the willingness and the strength, we will help them to defend themselves over there. Our position is that we want to help to keep Europe intact so that we can develop an offensive warfare in the air, if necessary, and warfare on the sea, if necessary, and keep Europe, as such, strong, and keep her as our ally for our own security. Is not that the Senator's position?

Mr. LODGE. I think that is just about it. We want to be able to conduct this struggle, which is a military, political, and economic struggle, all three. It is like a three-pronged spear. We should like to conduct the struggle in an offensive, aggressive, forward-looking manner. We should like to, but we cannot do that now. Let us consider an army corps in battle. It is not attacking with everything all the time. It is going to be quiet at some places. At some places the bridges are out, or there is snow in the mountain passes. I have never heard of a military commander who said we should go on the offensive in everything. The fact is that we have a great advantage on the sea and in the air, but we are weak on the land. It seems to me it would be insane to say that we are going to take the offensive on the land, where we are weak, and go on the defensive in the air and on the sea, where we are strong.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is my understanding of what the Senator meant. Let us compare it with a football team. We may compare the land army with the line back, and the Navy and the Air Force with the forward pass. If we can maintain our strength so that we can forward pass, we may win the battle in that way, even though we cannot win it by line backs.

Mr. LODGE. That is true. Moreover, there may not be a war at all if we speedily regain the initiative.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I recognize the great study which the Senator from Massachusetts has given to military activities. Is it not an axiom of modern warfare that each side seeks to destroy the industrial potential of the enemy?

Mr. LODGE. I do not know what the axioms are. We try to damage the enemy as much as is possible.

Mr. BREWSTER. Was it not the entire strategy in the last war to destroy the industrial potential of the enemy?

Mr. LODGE. It was certainly an objective.

Mr. BREWSTER. It is a major objective, is it not? That is the mission of air power, is it not?

Mr. LODGE. Not entirely, no.

Mr. BREWSTER. Not entirely; but one of the primary objects is the destruction of the enemy's industrial potential. I ask that question only in connection with the Senator's comment that he wanted to keep secret what we might

do. I have been in Germany, as has the Senator from Massachusetts, and no German is under any illusion with reference to the Ruhr. Russia may well think she can keep that potential without destroying it. Is there anyone of the simplest mind who does not recognize that fact?

Mr. LODGE. I do not know who recognizes it and who does not recognize it, but I think we have a very delicate problem in Europe—many problems, in fact. Our problem involves the rearmament of Germany.

Mr. BREWSTER. I have one other question.

Mr. LODGE. Let me first answer the Senator's question. The rearmament of Germany is an extremely difficult political question. A great many Germans are very much against rearmament. I do not think it is a very good idea, when the question is up in Europe and General Eisenhower has his mind full of these things, to go into a great detailed discussion of where we would bomb in case things got bad. I may be wrong, but that is my judgment.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I have one other question.

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. As a matter of Yankee salesmanship, does the Senator think it would be more persuasive to tell Europe that since Europe is vital to our own defense we will defend it whether the European nations do anything themselves, or to tell them that there are some powerful conservative groups in this country who would help out those countries who are willing to help themselves, and that therefore they should help those forces who agree with them? I say that because the President used some unfortunate language in intimating that without Europe we are lost. It may be true, but is it wise for us to inculcate that theory, when General Eisenhower is in Europe trying to persuade European countries to cooperate with us in a united defense?

Mr. LODGE. I have never used that phrase. That is not my language. I went to Europe on my own early in December, in response to an invitation, to address a group of politicians over there. I spoke to them very much along the line of the statement of the Senator from Maine, that they carried a great responsibility for the success of an American foreign policy of alliances, and that they should make their full effort, because there are elements in our country which want to go alone and do not want to have any alliances at all. Before the Senator from Maine came into the Chamber I cited France, as an example. I cited what the French people had done as an indication of the fact that they took that fact to heart. Also, before the Senator came into the Chamber, I stated that the nations of Europe must make the utmost effort of which they were capable. Of course, we cannot demand that they make an effort of which they are not capable. I do think that they ought to make the utmost effort of which they are capable. We should not send one additional man to Europe without an iron-clad agreement that Europe would put up many more men.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me to refer to his prepared speech at page 5, and to read from it his point No. 12?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Mr. CAPEHART. I read:

12. We can agree with the proposition that we should not force our decisions on nations who have no desire to arm themselves. To go further, we should not commit one single additional soldier to Europe without an iron-clad agreement that the dispatch of that soldier means the automatic commitment of a very much larger number of European soldiers. Such a commitment is not unfair to Europe since we will do so much in other ways.

I am certain the Senator from Massachusetts had in mind the furnishing of materials to the Army, Navy, and Air Corps.

In truth, as I will try to demonstrate later, such a commitment could be highly advantageous both to Europe and to the United States.

Is that not in substance exactly what ex-President Hoover advocated in his speech some 3 weeks ago?

Mr. LODGE. I do not know. I would have to reread the speech to be certain.

Mr. CAPEHART. I think the able Senator will find that it is exactly what former President Hoover advocated in his speech some 3 weeks ago. I congratulate the Senator from Massachusetts for placing it in his speech. I agree with him 100 percent. The Senator keeps talking about retreatists. I stand foursquare with what I have read from the Senator's speech, namely, point 12. I believe in it 100 percent. I would not go an inch farther than the Senator has advocated in paragraph 12. However, does that mean I am a retreatist? Why does the Senator use the word "retreatist" in referring to those of us who think there may be a better way of doing things?

Mr. LODGE. I have not applied the term to anyone. There are those in this country who would seek to divide us. The whole burden of my song has been that we are not very far apart, that we are not divided right down the middle, and that there is a basis of agreement in this country. I am very happy to see that there is such a basis of agreement. It may not be so interesting to the galleries, for example, to find that we are rather close to agreement, but I think it is a very good thing for the country, including the people in the galleries, that we are close to agreement. I am not calling anyone any names. I never do that.

Mr. CAPEHART. I agree 100 percent with the Senator that we all have the same desire for peace, and that we all want to help stop the threat of communism. However, why should those of us who have alternate proposals to make be singled out and called such names?

Mr. LODGE. I am called names, too, I will say to the Senator.

Mr. CAPEHART. I understand. Why cannot we have open debate on the floor of the Senate and recognize the fact that an alternative plan could be better, particularly in the light of the fact that the plans which we have been following for the past 20 years certainly have failed

to accomplish the purposes for which they were intended? Therefore, is it not time that we take a look at some alternative plans?

Mr. LODGE. I think we ought to look at everything. That is what I want to do. I believe we should keep reexamining everything and keep an open mind. I think it is very proper indeed.

Mr. President, I should now like to continue with my prepared address.

If the Soviets have 175 divisions, and if 30 of those divisions are poised in Europe ready for attack, and if there are 8 Allied divisions in Western Europe, as I believe is the case, it is obvious that an almost astronomical rate of growth has to be achieved for the west to develop any serious offensive capabilities by land of a serious nature. In fact, it will be a very arduous undertaking even to develop a strong defensive force.

Certainly no American troops, planes, or ships should be sent anywhere in the world unless the responsible American military authorities think that their mission has a good prospect of success. That is basic. It must be the law and the prophets insofar as we in the Senate are concerned. If the military authorities think that it is profitable to take a certain course—even though that course may be politically unattractive to us in the United States—we must not let the political factors deter us from giving our support. We here in the Senate cannot possibly tell whether ships, planes, or troops should or should not profitably be sent to any particular area.

If our military leaders decide that limited numbers of American troops could be advantageously sent to Europe the question certainly arises as to how many and how soon. To be realistic let it be noted that it is impossible for us now to send a large land force to Europe because we have not got a large land force. We still have a goal of only 18 divisions by the end of the fiscal year, and the commitments which we have in Korea, plus the training requirements of the new divisions, make it utterly impossible for a large land force to go to Europe. The idea that we can in any near future send a million and a half men to Europe—which is the figure which I have heard—seems to me fanciful.

I do not like to burden the Senate with figures, but I think these are interesting figures. In discussing last September this question of manpower in Europe I pointed out that in World War II the allies had a total of 90 divisions on the western front. Of this number, 61 were American divisions, 18 were from the British Empire, 10 were French, and 1 was Polish. This makes a ratio of 61 United States divisions to 29 foreign divisions, or slightly more than 2 to 1, or about 70 percent.

It is commonly stated in the press that 60 divisions actually on station and in good locations in the eastern portion of the non-Communist part of Europe, supported by adequate tactical aviation and backed by still more divisions which could be in action within 6 weeks, could decisively stand off an aggressor. If the United States were to contribute 10 of these initial divisions, the ratio of United

States troops to European troops would be far more favorable to us than was the case in World War II. It would be the difference between a ratio of 1 to 6 as compared with the ratio of 2 to 1, which existed in World War II. In percentage terms, the percentage would be 16½ percent instead of 70 percent.

At the present time, with eight divisions in Western Europe, of which two are American, our percentage is 25 percent. That percentage seems high.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. In the percentage figures which the Senator has stated with respect to World War II, the Senator left out the Russians.

Mr. LODGE. I said "on the western front."

Mr. TAFT. The Senator omitted the Russians, who were a vital factor in the result.

Mr. LODGE. I am talking about the western front.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. The Senator talks about 90 divisions on the western front. Our allies in Western Europe had more than 90 divisions. Does the Senator mean those actually on the front at any one time, and actually fighting?

Mr. LODGE. In combat.

Mr. CAPEHART. Our allies had a total of 260 divisions.

Mr. LODGE. These figures come from the War Department.

Mr. CAPEHART. Evidently the figures mean divisions on the front actually fighting at any given time.

Mr. LODGE. Divisions in the line.

Mr. CAPEHART. In World War II our allies had a total of 260 divisions.

Mr. LODGE. Counting the Russians.

Mr. CAPEHART. No; the western Allies.

Mr. LODGE. My figures come from the Pentagon.

Mr. CAPEHART. I am certain that they mean divisions fighting at any one given time.

Mr. LODGE. At the present time, with eight divisions in Western Europe, of which two are American, our percentage is 25 percent. That percentage seems high. I hope that this percentage may be reduced with the passage of time and that it will be around 15 percent at the very most—of which a significant number would be stateless volunteers for freedom fighting in our uniform.

There are those who ask: "Why have any American troops in Europe at all? There are 200,000,000 Europeans and only 150,000,000 Americans. Let them carry the load."

This question ignores the fact that the 200,000,000 peoples of Europe are divided into a series of watertight compartments and both literally and figuratively do not even speak the same language. Moreover, every man fights better when he thinks he has a good chance to win, and every man knows that his chance of winning is greater if he is part of a large unified allied force instead of merely being part of a small national army.

To say that we will not extend any help to the nations of Europe until they are completely strong and do not need our help is like telling a sick man that we will not give him his medicine until he has recovered. The test should not be that they are able to carry the load alone; it should be that they are making the greatest effort which they are capable of making.

It was proven in combat in World War II, notably in the Colmar pocket, that the presence of United States troops in the same sector noticeably increased the will to win of European armies. The greater the fighting stamina of the European soldier, the more of the load of combat he will carry, and the lighter becomes the load of combat which is carried by the American soldier. When the presence of our soldiers increases the fighting qualities of our European allies, we actually do ourselves a favor—all other things being equal—by having limited numbers of our troops in Europe where they will do the most good.

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I now come to my few concluding remarks. It is said that if we mobilize now we shall have a difficult morale problem. This is only true if our leadership cannot rise to the occasion. To say that the American people will not support a real mobilization is to take counsel of one's fears. It is like saying that the nations of Europe will not fight. It is like saying that a bank is insolvent. If enough people say it, it will start a run on the bank. We must not allow ourselves to get into the state of mind of the man who is always trying to guess right and to win his bet even though he bets that a disaster is going to happen. Instead of trying to guess what is going to happen, we ought to be trying to make the right thing happen.

We in the Senate—and we in America—and that goes for all of us—must act like leaders. We should not take counsel of our fears. There is no course which America can take today which is without risk. We can, by timid talk here in the Senate and by refusing to move until every unknown factor is accounted for, until every last chinstrap is in place and every last button polished, lose this struggle for existence just as surely as it could be lost on the battlefield. While prudently realizing the dangers, we should also be impressed with the tremendous elements of strength on our side. We must have the faith and the confidence in ourselves to take the lead. We must then regain the initiative as soon as we are strong enough to do it.

Mr. President, this is the testing time for Europe, surely. But it is also the testing time for the United States, which will show whether we are able to lead and, thus, whether we are able to survive. Facing us is another of a long series of attempts, which have been made throughout history, either by strength or by guile, or by both, to enslave mankind. These attempts have always failed in the end. We on the other hand, are dedicated to the ideal of the free man—free to worship and free to develop himself. Those who follow this ideal have had their dark days and dangers; they have

often been clumsy and lacking in foresight. But in the end, this is an ideal which has never let humanity down.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I deeply appreciate the observations of the distinguished Senator, and also the knowledge which he has of the subject. Of course, he is a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. LODGE. No; I am not a member of the Committee on Armed Services. I should like to be, but I am not.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator would like to be a member?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator's wide experience in the Army is sufficient background. Let me ask the Senator a question. I am asking it in all seriousness, and I am asking it constructively. Does the Senator feel that under the North Atlantic defense treaty the President can commit foot soldiers to be assigned as a part of an international army before the Congress has determined the character of the aid which the United States shall give?

Mr. LODGE. Of course he can do it.

Mr. WHERRY. Under the North Atlantic Treaty provisions?

Mr. LODGE. He can do it anyway. He can order them to go anywhere. He has that power.

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator feel that he can do it under the North Atlantic defense treaty?

Mr. LODGE. The North Atlantic Treaty does not stop him.

Mr. WHERRY. So the Senator's answer is that under the North Atlantic Treaty the President does have the right to commit—

Mr. LODGE. No; I did not say that. I said that the North Atlantic defense treaty did not stop him from doing it. I do not believe that the North Atlantic defense treaty commits him to do it.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator follow up with the rest of the answer? The determination as to whether we shall or shall not send foot soldiers is another question. Leaving the merits or demerits of that question out of consideration, all I am asking now is this: Does not the Senator feel that before a commitment is made which assigns soldiers as an integrated part of a land force in Western Europe, under the North Atlantic Treaty, at least, the Congress should first determine the policy? If the Senator would agree with that, then a point which the Senator made in his speech would follow, that is, the point with respect to the size of the Army. The Senator was outlining 16 points with respect to which there was agreement.

Could we not agree on the point that before a commitment is made, under the North Atlantic Treaty, as to troops as a part of an integrated army, the President must come to the Congress for a determination of the policy?

Mr. LODGE. I hope very much that some system can be devised which will call for congressional understanding and approval of whatever is done. I am

hopeful that something can be worked out. I do not believe that we ought to undertake to determine troop and plane and ship movements here in the Capitol.

Mr. WHERRY. I agree with the Senator. I am not talking about tactics. I am not discussing now whether the forces to be sent should be land forces, air forces, or naval forces. All I am asking is that before any commitment is made under the North Atlantic defense treaty, the Congress should determine the policy. I think we should start from the same premise. Although I voted against the North Atlantic treaty, I am convinced that we are now absolutely bound by its provisions. We are bound to give mutual aid.

Mr. LODGE. We are bound to give it only if they do their part. We are not bound to give aid unless they do their part.

Mr. WHERRY. As I recall the answer of the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] to the junior Senator from Nebraska, he said that if Senators voted for that proposal we would be voting definitely to commit ourselves to give some form of aid. He stated that the thing left for determination was the kind of aid to be given. That is the one thing which he said would be left to the Congress in the event that, under section 9 of the act, an advisory board program were submitted to us. We would determine what the character of the aid should be.

Mr. LODGE. I will say to the Senator from Nebraska that an important factor is that they must make a showing. The North Atlantic Pact deals with "effective self-help and mutual aid." The word "effective" is very important. If they fizzle out and lie down on the job, I do not think we are under obligation to do much.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I agree that they must produce. I think that was the burden of former President Hoover's speech. But after that is done, after the program has been talked over by the Executive, what is to be the situation? The reason I am asking the question is that the newspapers have been filled with statements with respect to commitments of certain numbers of soldiers, so many divisions, and so forth. All I am asking is this: After there has been a determination by the Advisory Board, and after negotiations are conducted by the executive department, which it has a perfect right to do, does not the Senator feel that after that step has been taken, and before the aid is given, the Congress of the United States ought to determine the character of the aid?

Mr. LODGE. I agree with the Senator that the Congress has a responsibility with regard to this subject, and that we are held responsible by the American people. We also have a personal concern as American citizens, and we cannot ignore that or brush it to one side. I am looking for some way to reconcile that with the realities of the situation. Of course, we have a great

deal of power in determining the size of the Armed Forces, through our power of appropriation, and if we know there are going to be 7 divisions in Korea, and 3 divisions here, and all we are going to have is 18 divisions, we have a very strong limitation right there.

I should like to see some procedure worked out to take care of the very legitimate and sincere anxiety which the Senator from Nebraska has, but I do not think we ought to require congressional approval as a condition precedent before we send American military personnel overseas, because that is bad for them.

Mr. WHERRY. I hoped that would not be the position of the Senator from Massachusetts, and that he would not say that, because, as I understood the debate in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty correctly—and I believe I did, because I was present when it took place—I was led to believe by the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] that when the pact was ratified we had definitely committed ourselves, along with the other signatory powers, to do certain things. I agree with the Senator from Massachusetts that other nations have to show their inclination to act for their mutual aid. But under section 9 the advisory board could submit to us a program, let us say, calling for three divisions before a signatory power is attacked, and five divisions afterward.

What was promised over and over again by the managers of the bill on both sides of the aisle was "If you vote for this pact and Congress is favorable to this treaty, then we are definitely committed to mutual aid under all the conditions."

Mr. LODGE. Yes, but not to send troops.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the point I am making.

Mr. LODGE. We are not committed to send troops.

Mr. WHERRY. We are not committed to send troops, and Congress should determine that. Is that not true?

Mr. LODGE. We are not committed to send troops.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LODGE. I have not been arguing this on the basis of any legal commitment. I have been trying to consider it from the standpoint of what is good judgment, what is common sense, and if we agree on that basis we will have no trouble with legalisms.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. Do I correctly understand the Senator to say that Congress should not expressly limit the number of American divisions to be sent to this international army?

Mr. LODGE. I think Congress can limit the total number of divisions we can have in the total army. I myself would not be willing to vote on how many divisions we ought to send to Europe.

Mr. TAFT. What I suggest to the Senator is that in this European adventure we are committing these troops to a commander selected by the United Na-

tions, not by us. General Eisenhower is not an American officer in his present capacity.

Mr. LODGE. Not by the United Nations.

Mr. TAFT. Of the North Atlantic Pact nations. It seems to me that Congress should very definitely limit by number the troops that can be committed to the command of an officer who is not an officer of the United States Army or under the Commander in Chief of the United States Army. Does not the Senator think that Congress should limit the number of the men of the American Army that may be committed to the command of such a commander?

Mr. LODGE. I think an argument can be made for that. I should like to see exactly how the provision was phrased, how it was worded. I think there is a theoretical argument for doing it. Whether it can be done practically without doing more harm than good is something I should like to study first.

Mr. TAFT. I suggest to the Senator the precedent of the United Nations where we did exactly that. The statute dealing with the United Nations provided for a special agreement defining the character and number of the Armed Forces that were to be committed to the United Nations, and that statute reads:

The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the Armed Forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose Armed Forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements.

So in the case of the United Nations, where we were committing a certain American army under certain circumstances to the control of the United Nations commander we provided that Congress itself should pass on the over-all commitment that might be made. I do not quite see why that is not a precedent, if we do the same thing in the case of the Atlantic Pact nations.

Mr. LODGE. I think, undoubtedly, there are many things about it which do constitute precedents. Of course, when we did that we were doing it more or less in the abstract, and now we have a very real situation confronting us in which it might weaken General Eisenhower's hand for bargaining purposes or something else if everything was spelled out that much in public. That I do not know.

Mr. TAFT. As the Senator pointed out, the North Atlantic treaty does not provide for any force. It provides simply, I take it, that the Council shall set up a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of articles 3 and 5.

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Mr. TAFT. So when those recommendations come in, they may well contain provisions for a specific number of troops we are expected to provide in case

there should be a call for troops. There might be some such provision which might then be passed on. I maintain only that such an agreement must sooner or later be made, and that Congress ought to approve it, and it ought to be understood in advance by the European nations that it is subject to the approval of Congress. That is the only suggestion I have in that field.

Mr. LODGE. I can see what the Senator from Ohio is trying to do, and I respect it.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I should like to ask unanimous consent that I may address a question to the Senator from Ohio by reason of something which came up during the colloquy between the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Nebraska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to ask the Senator from Ohio, regardless of the right of Congress to determine the limit of the armed forces, does not the Senator from Ohio feel that before even that is done, no commitment should be made to assign soldiers to an international army in western Europe?

Mr. TAFT. I do not think the President had authority to assign soldiers to the command of an international commander chosen by the United Nations. No, I do not think he has such authority.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. I do not like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts to go back again as I did a moment ago, but I wonder if he would be so kind as to return to page 11 of his speech, the second paragraph, where he says:

We in the Senate—and we in America—must act like leaders. We should not take counsel of our fears. There is no course which America can take today which is without risk. We can, by timid talk here in the Senate and by refusing to move until every unknown factor is accounted for, until every last chin strap is in place and every button polished, lose this struggle for existence just as surely as it could be lost on the battlefield.

I wonder if the able Senator would not believe that we can likewise lose this struggle by adopting a wrong kind of general over-all policy?

Mr. LODGE. Oh, yes.

Mr. CAPEHART. In other words, let us put some of the blame on those who might be making the over-all policy rather than on the United States Senate.

Mr. LODGE. There are many ways in which we can lose. I do not think we ought to think about that as much as we ought to be thinking about the ways we can win, as a matter of psychology.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, one last point. I think the Senator from Massachusetts has made a most valuable contribution. There is no reason why the solution of the problem cannot be worked out in an amicable way. Whether we can finally agree I do not know.

Mr. CAPEHART. I, likewise, want to congratulate the Senator from Massachusetts. I think we can very easily get together provided those who are dealing

with existing policies and those who have advocated them in the past will accept the theory and the fact that we are as much interested in solving this problem as they are, and that we are just as sincere in our alternative proposals as they are in those which they continually force down our throats and the throats of the American people.

Mr. LODGE. There has got to be partnership and mutuality. I agree with that.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to ask my colleague a question and also perhaps preface it just a little bit.

As I listened to the colloquy between the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Ohio, it seemed to me that it was based on the United Nations and the requirement that the Congress determine the number of troops the United States would furnish to a United Nations security force. I do not say that I do not think the President should not come to Congress and tell Congress what he is going to do in Europe. I heartily believe he should do so. However, I ask the Senator this question: In his opinion, is there not a great distinction between the furnishing of troops to the United Nations, for police action, or to put down an international strife in a case in which our own security might not be particularly endangered, and the sending of troops under the North Atlantic Pact with its mutual-assistance program, if we are to send them, with the approval of Congress, for our own security and safety, in the defense of our own country?

Mr. LODGE. Of course, there are shadings of distinction and differentiation. First of all, there is the question of the sending of troops for occupation purposes. No one questions the right of the President to do that. He has been sending troops for occupation to Germany and Japan ever since the end of the war, and no one has raised any question about that.

At the other extreme there is the sending of an expeditionary force, once war has been declared. Those are at the two extremes on the spectrum.

Then there is the question of the force we have been discussing today, which I agree is more than the question of an occupation force.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LEHMAN in the chair). Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to his colleague?

Mr. LODGE. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As a member of this body, I do not wish to place myself in the position of admitting that the establishment of a police force for the United Nations would constitute a precedent in regard to our doing what we should do for our own safety if we are in danger.

Mr. LODGE. I do not think it is a precedent at all. It is somewhat analogous, but it is not a precedent, because one relates to our ability to continue our

existence as a nation and the other was adopted as an abstraction. One is a generality, in connection with a theory; and the other is taken to meet a condition confronting us under specific conditions.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is it not important for Congress to have information in regard to such matters, in connection with our control of appropriations and the number of American troops that are sent? However, certainly we wish to be careful about saying that the President should receive the complete approval of the Congress before such action is taken.

Mr. LODGE. I think Congress should have all the information which can be given to it. However, in connection with a subject of this sort, sooner or later we get into a discussion of things which should not be discussed in public. It is too bad, but it is true because of the nature of the subject and the complexities involved.

Mr. President, I now yield the floor.

THE ISSUES WHICH CONFRONT THE NATION

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, this Nation, in the age of the airplane and the atomic weapon, can no more return to isolationism than an adult can return to childhood, regardless of how pleasant the recollection may be.

The debate now going on in Congress and throughout the country is necessary for a clarification of the issues. In a free society the people and their elected representatives must know the facts in order to make sound judgments. If they are treated as adults they will respond as such. What all men of good will who believe in a free world of free men should be striving for is to find areas of agreement upon which we can find a high degree of unity in meeting the challenge which threatens our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

Most Americans and an overwhelming majority of congressional Democrats and Republicans alike would agree that communism is a threat to our way of life and has clearly demonstrated by its actions during the past 5 years that it is a godless aggressive tyranny determined to destroy the free way of life. Previously in our history we have understood that we must hang together or be hanged separately. Free men everywhere had better understand that now, without delay.

The divisions amongst us, then, are not on the danger, which is apparent, but on the means of best combating it.

There are certain basic facts which all responsible Government officials and private citizens must keep in mind.

Under our constitutional system the present administration will control the executive branch of the Government until January, 1953. The present Eighty-second Congress will be in control of the legislative branch during the same period of time. No effective foreign or national defense policy can be formulated or executed without the cooperative effort of the President and the Congress.

The most critical period in the life of western civilization will be the years 1951 and 1952. We dare not wait until 1953,

when the American people might select a different President or a different Congress, in order to compose the fundamental differences that confront us. As President Grover Cleveland pointed out, "A condition, not a theory, confronts us."

In the period since VJ-day, in 1945, Congress has provided all the defense funds the President has requested in his budget. The controversy has been over the desire of Congress to appropriate a larger amount, as in the case of the 70-group air program, than the President was willing to spend. As a member of both the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, I am convinced that whatever the defense needs of this Nation are, the necessary legislation and appropriations will be forthcoming.

The differences between the executive and legislative branches of the Government will be not over the necessity of having an adequate defense, but over how such forces will be distributed prior to the outbreak of hostilities brought about by the aggression of the Soviet Union or its satellites.

A large majority in the Senate voted to ratify the North Atlantic treaty. I was among that number. There were some who opposed it. It was ratified by more than a two-thirds vote, as provided for under our Constitution. The vote was 82 to 13—see CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 95, part 8, page 9916.

Even most of those who opposed the ratification of the treaty recognize that with its approval we assumed definite obligations in the event of aggression against the other signatories, and that we must, of course, promptly meet all of those obligations without debate or delay.

In meeting our North Atlantic Treaty obligations, I do not believe that the hands of the President, as Commander in Chief, should or could be tied.

If the Senate debated, under its liberal rules of debate, the wisdom of sending armed forces to meet our treaty obligations as long as the United Nations has debated for 2½ months whether or not to name the Chinese Communists aggressors, most of Europe, at least to the English Channel and the Pyrenees, would be overrun, and we would be faced with a Soviet fait accompli.

The basic question then arises as to what extent prior to the occurrence of *causa belli* under the treaty should American forces be disposed on the European continent.

Here, then, is the crux of the problem, and one on which patriotic Americans may and do differ. It is here we must find an area of agreement if our foreign and military policy is not to be paralyzed.

Our European allies should realize that Americans have been disappointed and disillusioned by the fact that in the United Nations' effort to arrest aggression in Korea, after a lapse of 6 months, this Nation has supplied 90 percent of the troops furnished by United Nations members and has had 90 percent of the casualties suffered by United Nations members. In fact, our casualties alone outnumber the total armed

forces supplied by all of the rest of the United Nations members combined.

This particular experience is still fresh in our minds. The United Nations activities have largely concentrated on how to word an instrument of surrender that would not make a Chinese Communist aggressor's victory seem quite so humiliating to this Nation which up to now has not lost a war. It would have been better if the other members had shown the same energy in getting land, sea, and air power to Korea to meet this first overt aggression head-on and to stop it in its tracks.

Peace we could always buy, as at Munich, by surrendering the rights of small countries until there were no such assets left. We did not and we do not need the "red tape" of the United Nations to prepare for us a surrender instrument to sign. We are seeking, not peace at any price, but peace with honor. Appeasement of aggressors as at Munich is but surrender on the installment plan. On no such basis can the moral forces of the free world be rallied.

It seems to me that we, our North Atlantic allies, and our fellow United Nations members must determine now whether or not a collective security system against aggression is desired. If such a system is desired, it must not be limited in its application by any geographic or color line. The freedom of the people of the Republics of Korea, China, or the Philippines, of Japan, or of the other Asiatic nations from Communist aggression is not less important to them than is the freedom from aggression to the Europeans. It was Lenin who made the sound observation that the road to Paris is through Peiping.

It is, of course, true that in some areas of the world aggression can be better met than in others. Indeed in some remote areas it may not be strategically possible to mobilize sufficient power to uphold international law and order against aggression, but even in those cases aggression should be labeled as such and the aggressor designated the international outlaw that he is.

Rewarding Chinese Communist aggression because it has had a measure of success to date is bowing to the doctrine of might makes right. Such an abject surrender to force will be fatal to the United Nations and make it unworthy of further support by freemen anywhere. Already the military value of the United Nations has been demonstrated as being inconsequential to meet the needs of the hour. With the self-destruction of its moral standing and leadership the United Nations would become an empty shell of a debating society with a large payroll of bureaucrats interested in preserving their jobs.

I speak more in sorrow than in anger, for I have supported the United Nations in the 5½ years I have been a Member of the United States Senate.

Our British allies must recognize that it is more essential to stop aggression than it is to temporarily hold Hong Kong.

American, French, and British businessmen must realize that it is more important to stop aggression than it is to

make blood-money profits growing out of shipments to the Communist aggressor in Red China. Anything that is shipped to or from Communist China strengthens the economy of that country and makes it better able to make war against the United Nations as it is doing today in Korea. Are Great Britain, France, and India going to be as free and easy in sacrificing Hong Kong, Malaya, Indochina, or the border area of India to Red China when their turn comes as some United Nations members appear to be when the 30,000,000 non-Communist people of the Republic of Korea or the 9,000,000 free people of the Republic of China now on the Island of Formosa are the victims?

If communism is a global menace—which it is—it must be met on a global basis. If the false doctrine is sold to the free people of the world that everything must be concentrated on the defense of Europe and no risks taken in Asia, how far is the retreat expected to go? If Korea and Formosa are the sacrificial lambs to this policy, how do you rally world public opinion 6 months or a year from now to hold Japan, the Philippines, Southeast Asia, India, or Pakistan? Or is the free world willing that these also be the tokens of appeasement when the Communist timetable calls for future payments, as it inevitably will, either this year or next? Where do you draw the line?

One year ago, on January 5, 1950, in opening the debate on American far-eastern policy, I stated:

Within the last 90 days two catastrophic events have taken place. These are the Soviet success in atomic development, as announced by the President of the United States on September 23, 1949, and the establishment of a Soviet-recognized Communist regime in China. Only in retrospect will we be able to finally determine which event will have the most far-reaching influence. Both have set off chain reactions that have not yet run their full course.

In Europe we have had a foreign policy in which the Republicans and the Democrats have contributed to the initiation and formulation of doctrines that are understandable. In the Far East there has been no bipartisan foreign policy. The Republicans in Congress have not been consulted in the moves leading up to the bankrupt policy which now stands revealed in all its sorry detail. The administration, and it alone, has the full responsibility for the debacle which has taken place on the continent of Asia and which day by day and hour by hour is endangering the future peace of the world and the security of this country. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 96, part 1, pp. 79-98.)

This was 6 months before the invasion by North Korean Communists across the thirty-eighth parallel. Had a firm stand been taken even as late as a year ago and a line drawn in Asia as it was in Europe, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union and its satellites would have risked aggression in Korea on June 24, 1950. International communism knew that aggression against the North Atlantic countries would bring us into the conflict at a time when we still had and have a superiority in atomic weapons. However, they had reason to believe—as the result of the President's statement of January 5, 1950, that no additional aid would be given to

Formosa and the subsequent speech of the Secretary of State at the National Press Club on January 12 of the same year, wherein he left Korea and Formosa outside of the American defense line—that here were two areas where the chances were reasonably good that Communist gains could be made without involving the United States or the other free nations of the world.

On April 3, 1950, the Secretary of State handed to the Korean Ambassador a note insisting, among other things, that the Korean Government take effective measures to balance the budget which, of course, would require them to proportionately decrease their defense expenditures. One week later, on April 10, in the course of my remarks of that day, which appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 96, part 4, on pages 4983-4987, I called to the attention of the Senate the following facts:

The Government of Korea has been constantly faced with the overt acts of aggression across the thirty-eighth parallel by Communist irregulars from north of the line. At the time I was in Korea last November (i. e., 1949) there had already been 360 violations of the thirty-eighth parallel by Communist groups from North Korea ranging in size from a squad to a battalion. Many additional violations of the border have taken place since last November, the latest being a few days ago. President Syngman Rhee recently pointed out that there had been substantial casualties on the part of the forces of the Republic of Korea, and there have been considerably greater casualties on the part of the invading forces. Needless to say in that part of the world the cold war is quite warm.

There are a number of responsible people in the Republic of Korea who believe that once the Chinese Communists have liquidated the remaining resistance by the forces of the Republic of China to their regime that they will then move both Communist troops and equipment back into Manchuria and make them available to the North Korean Communists for an invasion against the Republic of Korea.

These remarks were made on the floor of the Senate 3 months before the North Korean Communist aggressors invaded across the thirty-eighth parallel.

Again, over a month ago, on December 4, 1950, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 16049, I stated:

All of Asia hangs in the balance. If the manpower and the natural resources of Asia fall into the orbit of international communism there will exist the greatest aggregation of power the world has ever known. With its Asiatic flank fully protected, the Soviet Union will be able to concentrate its strong far eastern armed forces with those it now has in Eastern Europe and greatly offset any new planned build-up in armed forces of the Western World. Therein rests the fallacy of those who would abandon Asia and concentrate on Europe alone.

Nine years ago this week we were caught with our defenses down at Pearl Harbor. A heavy blow which precipitated us into World War II came out of the Pacific, and the invasion by an Asiatic foe of some of the Alaskan Aleutian Islands took place soon after. This was done by a nation of 80,000,000 people. A billion and a half is the population of Asia, a large part of which today is either still outside the iron curtain or not yet fully digested.

During this same debate I urged that steps be taken to immediately help equip the more than 500,000 non-Communist

forces of the Republic of China on Formosa. A start on this program is now apparently under way. I hope and pray that it will not be another case of too little and too late.

If the British and our other allies will recognize the global menace and help draw the line against communism in Asia, with India, if possible, but without that nation if necessary, it is my personal opinion that an area of agreement can be found in Congress and throughout the country that will give substantial support to the steps that must be taken to build the defenses of the free world against further Communist aggression.

The President of the United States is to be commended for the tone and content of his State of the Union message of Monday, January 8, 1951, relative to foreign policy. In it he invites constructive debate, and the spirit of the message should make it possible to find an area of agreement on our foreign and military policy so that this Nation will not be paralyzed in carrying out its commitments or in meeting new challenges which may unexpectedly confront us at almost any hour of any day.

Certainly it is vital that Europe not fall into the orbit of international communism. If Europe is lost to the free world, the strategic bases and materials of Africa would be difficult to hold. The bulk of the uranium for the American atomic development comes from Africa. We would be severely handicapped without it.

Yet our European allies and friends must fully realize that they have the primary responsibility and interest in keeping outside the Communist iron curtain. Our contributions in sea and air power will be much greater than theirs. With a larger population in the nations allied with us than we possess, the bulk of the land forces to garrison Western Europe and to discourage Communist aggression should be furnished by the European partners of the North Atlantic Treaty.

If war comes, we must then do with our air, sea, and land forces what the strategic necessities require in support of our commitments. We will not let our allies down nor must they let us down.

We cannot, however, expect them to build any army that would make Europe impregnable to Communist aggression before we place an additional man or dollar on the Continent. As an alternative I suggest as the approximate basis on which we should be willing to expand the forces we now have in Europe the following formula:

For every six divisions raised and put into the field by our North Atlantic allies we will send an additional division to Europe until we have a total of 10 divisions there and they have 60. As long as peace is maintained we would rotate our divisions so that none of them would be stuck with prolonged occupation duties which tend to soften or undermine the morale of the troops thus engaged.

In the meantime we should not delay in calling up and training within the confines of the United States the full number of divisions to meet our ultimate

commitments in Europe for the continental security of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and our occupation forces in Japan.

While our additional divisions are being equipped and are in training in this country we should continue, under the arms implementation legislation, to assist the North Atlantic signatories in equipping the divisions that they should forthwith call up and train.

In the meantime, every effort should be exerted by ourselves and our allies forthwith to bring Spain and Western Germany into the collective security system.

As a practical matter, defense must start at the line of the Elbe or as close thereto as the strategic situation will permit. In no other way could Western Germany be expected to make a full contribution to the common defense.

It is my belief that Winston Churchill has been correct in his view that the reason the Soviet armies have not yet overrun Europe is because of the American superiority in the atomic weapon. We must see to it that no effort is spared to maintain this superiority of the weapon in quality and quantity and the means of delivering it to the heartland of any aggressor. Nor will any outside agency exercise a veto over our use of this weapon when the chips are down.

Our friends as well as any potential aggressor should understand this fact. We are not going again to be subject to an aggressor's blackmail—direct or indirect.

The term "again" is used advisedly:

First. When the North Koreans invaded South Korea the United Nations called on all members to resist the aggression. A limited number offered military aid. One of the most generous offers came from the Republic of China which agreed to send 33,000 of their best troops from Formosa and have them in Korea in 5 days. This was turned down for fear it would incite the Chinese Communists to invade Korea.

Second. The hands of our commanders in Korea have been tied by restrictions against the use of our Air Force against military targets in Manchuria for fear the war might spread in the Far East.

Third. The desire of the Republic of China to raid the coast of China and supply non-Communist forces on the mainland has been restrained because it might make the Chinese Communists more difficult in their dealings with the United Nations appeasement committees.

The free people can lose their liberty if we are blackmailed into restricting our areas of strength and meeting them on unequal terms in their areas and elements of strength.

The critical period upon which we now enter will call for great sacrifice by the people of the United States and the other free people of the world. The men in the Kremlin should thoroughly understand that the free world does not intend to be on the defensive once they have thrown down the challenge.

We have, I hope, learned much in World War II and in the present Korean fighting on guerrilla tactics. We should be prepared to enlist men who

love freedom in Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in the Soviet Union itself, to strike behind the armies of the Soviet aggressor and in conjunction with our air power to make difficult the maintenance of his supply lines to supply his aggressive forces. If the Soviet Union is prepared to challenge the free world this year or next, it will be because of their determination to see to it that the free part is destroyed. Ninety years ago Abraham Lincoln pointed out that this Nation could not remain half slave and half free. In this twentieth century we may have reached the point where now the world cannot remain half slave and half free.

It was Lincoln who also said:

Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation. * * * We, even we here, have the power and bear the responsibility. * * * In giving freedom to the slave we assure freedom to the free. * * * We shall nobly save or we shall meanly lose this last best hope of earth.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator be willing to elaborate a little with relation to the situation in Europe? I have not been present throughout his speech, but I understand that the Senator would favor sending over one of our divisions for every six of their divisions. If that be correct, does it mean that the Senator has no feelings about our taking the leadership, so to speak, by sending a man like General Eisenhower to Europe in order to stimulate the undertaking and to work it out; or does the Senator think that the leadership should be left primarily with the Europeans themselves?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; I think the selection of General Eisenhower was a desirable one. It might have been better had there been some consultation with Congress before the selection was made and perhaps after some more basic understandings had been reached with respect to the proportion of troops to be furnished. However, that is all water over the dam. It cannot now be changed. I believe there were some valid reasons for the selection of General Eisenhower. Not only is he one of the great military leaders of the world, but he has had experience in working with allied groups during World War II. It is quite possible that had a national of any of the other North Atlantic Pact countries come into the picture certain stresses and strains might have developed which will not be developed under the leadership of General Eisenhower. I think he is an outstanding man. I believe he can contribute greatly to the solution of the problems which confront us. At the same time I think it is extremely important that our friends in Europe clearly recognize that the people and the Government of the United States have no intention, in view of the conditions which face us in Korea today, of getting into a situation again where in a collective security action we furnish 90 percent of the troops and they furnish 10 percent of the troops. I am not even in favor of

furnishing 50 percent of the troops. I think that Europe, which has a large manpower, has the primary responsibility of furnishing the bulk of the land forces in Western Europe at this time. I think it should be understood that we would supply a large percentage of the air and naval forces. I do not go to the extent of saying that we should supply no land forces.

I believe the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Lodge] was correct when he said that there is a certain moral effect involved. I believe it should be on a definite quid pro quo basis. In other words, there ought to be an incentive plan, if I may use the term. It should be understood that if we provide one division they will provide six divisions. Finally it should be understood that we are not going to place in Europe a number of divisions which could not be withdrawn, in case of an emergency situation, unless the European countries have demonstrated that they are willing to carry their full share of the load.

If I may elaborate briefly, I think the situation today requires Western Germany to be brought into the defense picture. I believe it requires Spain to be brought into the defense picture. If the countries of Europe do not know that they are facing the overwhelming force of the Soviet Union, and if they carry their bickerings to the extent of not permitting the Germans or the Spanish to come into the defense plan, I do not think they are taking a very realistic view of the situation which confronts the world today.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. Would the Senator care to elaborate on his remarks about removing the shackles from Chiang Kai-shek, so to speak, in order that he could operate at least as a diverting force against the Chinese Communist armies?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall be glad to comment on that point. I was in Formosa a year ago, in November 1949 and I was there again last November. I talked to a great many competent observers, both American and others, and there is no question about the fact that the morale of the Chinese forces on Formosa and the morale of the Chinese people on Formosa have greatly increased in the intervening 12-month period. Because of the security situation I am not at liberty to go into specific figures, but I can say to the Senator from Ohio that there are more than 500,000 non-Communist troops of the Republic of China on Formosa. Of these troops I should say at least half are first-class troops. The others are in training, or in what might be called the militia, which would be helpful in the defense of the island, perhaps, but not effective as a commando force. The troops have very able leadership in General Sun Li-jen, who is a graduate of Virginia Military Institute. I am satisfied that the Chinese would be prepared and would be anxious, as a matter of fact, to have the restrictions of neutrality removed so that they could resume their commando raids on the coast of China.

That is what they were doing prior to the 26th day of June.

In addition to creating a diversion, which I believe would cause the Chinese Communists to begin pulling troops out of Korea, rather than concentrating them there in order to try to throw us into the sea if they can, they would have to pull some of their best divisions out of Korea in order to protect their coast against the commando-type raids.

As important as the 500,000 Chinese Nationalist troops are what I term the approximately 1,000,000 guerrillas, who are operating behind the lines of the Chinese Communists on the mainland of China. A coordinated effort on the part of the air force of the Republic of China and its navy—and perhaps with the aid of some additional equipment from us—could resupply with arms, ammunition, and food these guerrilla elements consisting of approximately 1,000,000 men. I think they could create so many disturbances behind the lines of the Chinese Communists that the Communists would not dare concentrate their best armies in Korea for the purpose of trying to throw our troops into the sea.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to conclude with my thought on this point. Here we have a situation in which over half a million Chinese Communist troops have crossed the international frontier of the Yalu River, have crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, and are trying to destroy the American Eighth Army and the UN forces in Korea. Yet we restrain the Republic of China from carrying on an operation which would relieve the pressure against our hard-pressed troops.

It is even worse than that. Under the United Nations directive our commanders over there are restrained from attacking military targets—and I am not talking about general-area bombing—in Manchuria, such as depots, ammunition dumps, arsenals, railroad marshaling yards, and troop-concentration points. Therefore the Chinese Communist aggressor has all the cards in his hand. He has a line of communication coming down from Manchuria by which he is sending literally hundreds of tanks into Korea for the purpose of destroying the American Eighth Army and the United Nations forces in Korea. Yet our commanders are restrained from even chasing an aggressive airplane north of the Yalu River. In other words, when our planes get to the Yalu River there is an off-limits sign before them. That simply does not make sense to me.

The third point is that for a period of more than a year, as the able Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'Connor], has so ably pointed out in his committee hearings, there has been a constant supplying by ship of the Communist aggressors in Red China from Hong Kong and from other places in the world—and I regretfully say from the United States as well, which has enabled them to build their war machine and to build the economy upon which their war machine rests. It simply does not make sense to me that

we should not free the navy of the Republic of China, which for a small navy was doing a very effective job of blockading before our neutrality policy was put into effect, and on top of it augmenting it with the American Navy, to see to it that not a single ship of any size or character would get in or out of a Communist port, whether it flew the American, British, or any other flag. I believe it is time that we stopped this trade in blood money in supplying the people who today are destroying American troops.

If we carried out that type of policy, I believe we would bring so many pressures upon the Communist regime in China that they could not devote all their time and energy to being aggressors in Korea.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I was curious to know whether we have reasonably accurate information on the activities of the guerrillas within China.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes; I think we have substantially accurate information on the activities of the guerrillas.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Are they operating spontaneously, or are they operating under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek or someone representing him?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have some material in my office which I think the Senator might be interested in reading, but I can say this, very briefly: The guerrillas are not all of one type.

First, there were certain guerrilla forces which the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China deliberately left on the mainland when they were forced to retreat from the continent.

Secondly, there are a large number of forces which were cut off in some of the battles, and went up into the mountains and developed support from local populations. They generally take their leadership from the island of Formosa, as does the first group.

In addition, there were certain other forces. When the opportunists, the band-wagon jumpers, and the traitors among some of the Chinese generals deserted to the Chinese Communist forces, they marched their armies over with them, without telling the soldiers where they were going. When the soldiers found out about it, they mutinied. The Communists themselves have admitted that they have had several serious mutinies. Those soldiers took to the hills. They generally look to the leadership in Formosa.

Furthermore, there are less well-organized bands of farmers oppressed by tax payments, and of students who have in the past welcomed communism and who now see how oppressive it is.

There are certain people who have never had close ties with Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China. I refer to some of the Mongols and some of the others who are in the far interior of China, who are more or less operating on their own. But all of them furnish a substantial body which could be used to create great disturbances behind Communist lines.

The Senator should know—though some claims are made to the contrary—that most of this guerrilla activity is south of the Yangtze River—certainly south of Manchuria—because in those areas where the Chinese Communists have had their power established the longest period of time they have gradually been able to eliminate most of the dissident elements; but they have not yet had time to digest their conquests in south China, and as a result we find the bulk of the incipient rebellion in that area of the country.

Mr. MILLIKIN. May I ask the distinguished Senator whether there is any authentic history of important accomplishments by those guerrillas?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes. As a matter of fact, today they hold considerable areas. A little earlier mention was made of islands of resistance. I think we violate no security at this point when we say that they have established islands of resistance behind the Communist lines in south and central China.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. We have read a great deal in the newspapers to the effect that when the Communist army is finished with Korea—or perhaps does not finish with Korea—it is likely to move down into Indochina to help the Communists in Indochina and on down the peninsula. Does not the Senator feel that if Chiang Kai-shek were released, there would be a substantial barrier in the way of such future aggression?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the Senator from Ohio has put his finger on a very vital point. So long as the Chinese Communist forces are kept involved with the forces of the Republic of China, guerrilla or regular forces, and while they have a considerable number of their people involved with the United States in Korea, they are not in a position to concentrate their whole force for an invasion of southeast Asia. But once they liquidate all of Korea, and once they have had an opportunity to move the very well-trained and well-disciplined Communist forces, particularly the Fourth Army under General Lin-piao, out of Korea and leave to the North Korean Communists the job of liquidating all non-Communists in Korea, which will be the inevitable result if they get control of the whole peninsula, they will move those highly trained, disciplined Chinese forces down to guard their coast line, and we may even miss the opportunity of creating a diversion. The Chinese Nationalist forces, together with their guerrillas, cannot only help us by diverting the concentration of power against us in Korea, but in addition they can prevent the concentration of power against southeast Asia.

We are faced with a very practical problem. If we continue to restrain the forces of the Republic of China, we are going to miss the boat entirely. It is going to be another case of too little and too late. Perhaps the next 90 days will be the most crucial days in terms of ability to accomplish anything in that area.

Once we permit the Chinese Communists, without any interference from the non-Communist Chinese on Formosa and within the country, to go down and take all of southeast Asia, they will take the bread basket of Asia—I should say the rice basket of Asia. Food is a powerful weapon. The Chinese Communists, being ruthless, as Communists are all over the world, will use the weapon of food, along with their military power, to subjugate the rest of Asia.

They have already started through Tibet. If they get Tibet and southeast Asia, it is my personal opinion—no one can document it as yet—that the people of India, who have been obstructing action by the United Nations in declaring Red China an aggressor, and who have offered not a single soldier, airplane, or ship in defense of the free world and in defense of the Republic of Korea against aggressors, will be looking to the rest of the world for some help against the aggression which will inevitably be leveled against them. I think it may be very difficult to encourage and instill with enthusiasm the free people of the world to come to the aid of India at that late date, when the people of India have obstructed, by every means at their disposal, the resistance by the free people of the world to the Communist aggression.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I can see why we did not accept Chinese Nationalist aid so long as we were fighting the North Koreans. I can see why it was not wise to incite the Chinese Communists into war with us. But now that we are in such a war, now that they are killing American boys, now that they are threatening the security of the entire Eighth Army, I cannot understand the foreign policy or the military policy which refuses to loose Chiang Kai-shek from the restraints which we alone have imposed on him, in order to enable him to join the war against the Chinese Communists.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will say to the Senator that I do not understand it either.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks an article entitled "United States Policy: To Bar Red China in UN and Hold Out in Korea," written by David Lawrence, and published in the New York Herald Tribune of January 11.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNITED STATES POLICY: TO BAR RED CHINA IN UNITED NATIONS AND HOLD OUT IN KOREA

(By David Lawrence)

WASHINGTON, January 10.—The United States Government has determined definitely that admission of Red China to the United Nations is not only out of the question so far as American approval is concerned, but that such action would be to reward aggression.

This basic policy is buttressed also by a determination not to withdraw our troops from Korea, but to fight it out there as long as the UN forces are capable of resistance.

What this means is that the United States considers the Far East to be a definite battleground not only for the prestige of the UN, but also for the future morale of all the non-

Communist elements within China, Japan, and the Philippines.

To withdraw voluntarily from Korea is regarded by the American Government as virtually tantamount to abandoning the security of Japan and as an invitation to an attack on Japan and perhaps on Alaska.

MAC ARTHUR'S ATTITUDE

The pros and cons of staying in Korea or withdrawing have been debated here for a long time. The decision is to stay and to inflict as much punishment as possible on the Communist forces. Rumors that General MacArthur wanted to withdraw not only are without foundation, but his attitude is the exact opposite—he wants more troops to assist in holding Korea.

If the Chinese Communists are to be checkmated by any force, it will be by counter-revolutionaries who are expected to be welded together, not necessarily under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek or his lieutenants. The American program is to fight it out in Korea and to afford time for the non-Communist forces in Asia to consolidate.

The intimations from London that the ministers of the British Commonwealth are actually considering a program which would recommend recognition of Communist China and admission to the United Nations produced the comment here that this can hardly be a unanimous attitude and that the viewpoint of countries like India has been well known for some time.

DANGER TO UN

While it is too extreme a statement to say that the UN will die if the dissension within its councils continues on such a matter as admitting Red China, the fact is that the prestige of the international organization will fade away and attention will then have to be focused on the attitude of individual member governments and groups.

The United States at the moment is engaged in a canvass of all free nations to obtain their approval for the branding of Communist China as an aggressor. The exchanges are secret now, but some day they will be published. The American people then will have an opportunity to judge for themselves which countries stood up and were willing to brand the aggressor and which countries flinched with the idea of appeasing the enemy. The list may determine America's attitude toward such nations for generations to come.

It can be stated positively that the United States Government has for some time now been in touch, directly and indirectly, with the Communist authorities and has come to the conclusion that there is no sincerity of purpose in Peking and that to concede anything now would only whet the appetite of the Red Chinese leaders for more concessions.

RESPONSIBILITY OF UNITED STATES

The truth is the policy of the United States is growing firmer every day even as the policy of some other governments is growing weaker. The United States recognizes that it must bear the largest responsibility for what is happening in the Pacific because it cannot permit encroachments which, if unchecked at the start, could lead perhaps to the seizure of Alaska. European nations need have no fear that America considers the Far East a primary theater. The Far East will remain a secondary area and Europe will always be the first consideration. American naval and air forces, however, will operate in the Pacific and a land force big enough to carry on a holding operation there will be continued. The European countries are expected to furnish the bulk of the land forces for the European front, supplemented by American land forces.

American policy is clear and thoroughly understood by those who must express it to other governments. The time is not yet ripe for a public avowal of the American view-

points. This waits on the evolution of the military situation in Korea and the responses to our note to member governments seeking support for the UN move to brand Red China as the aggressor.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. How does the Senator, or how does the administration, or how does anyone else figure that we can win against the Chinese Communists if we are to be able to fight them only in Southern Korea? How can we ever possibly defeat them? If we are to be confined to an area about 100 miles square, how are we ever going to defeat them? What is the plan for winning the so-called Korean War?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am a member of the Committee on Armed Services. I cannot go into a detailed discussion of the strategy which may have been revealed to the committee. However, I think the principal situation with which we are now faced is that we must recognize that neither we nor the rest of the free world have the defensive forces properly to meet the challenge of the Soviet world. The responsibility for that condition rests on many people, including the Executive, the Congress, and the general public. The administration must take a large share of the responsibility, because aggression was not something which came up overnight. We were put on notice, as long ago as the time when the President came to a joint session of Congress and requested the Greek-Turkish aid program, that international communism was seeking soft spots. At the time of the Berlin blockade it was indicated that they were testing us out to see whether they could seize a free area without too much resistance.

The President of the United States had ample warning from his Air Policy Board that with the critical situation in the world, with the possibility of our opponents developing an atomic stockpile, the minimum number of airplanes we should have was 70 groups. Yet what happened? The President insisted that only 48 groups be provided. Even when the Congress of the United States in 1949 provided for 52 groups the President refused to use the funds, and kept the force at 48 groups. So I will say to the Senator that it may be a holding operation in Korea and in other areas of the world until we can start operating from strength rather than from weakness.

Mr. CAPEHART. Holding against whom? We have an army there in a small area, with no possible chance of that army winning so long as they are confined to fight within a 100-mile area. Why do we permit American boys to remain there and fight and be killed when there is no possibility of their winning?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am not authorized to speak, nor could I speak, for the administration, but I would say that some other factors are involved in this situation which fit into the holding idea. I have just mentioned to the Senate. In the first place, the Republic of Korea was created under the auspices of the United Nations. We have a considerable

responsibility for the maintenance of the Republic of Korea because we consented to the division of the country at the thirty-eighth parallel. That was an unnatural division. Two-thirds of the people lived in the free part of Korea and one-third lived in the Communist part of Korea.

The United Nations held in Korea a full and free election. It was testified to be such by the UN Commissioners. As a result, if at this point the United States and the United Nations should pull out of Korea, not only would there be the greatest blood bath in that area the world has ever seen, and sacrifice of the non-Communist believers in democracy who are in Korea to a ruthless extermination by the Communists, but it would have a tremendous psychological impact upon the people of Japan, upon the people of Formosa, upon the people of the Philippines, of India, and, I believe, upon the people all around that periphery, because they would say that "if when pressure comes the United States and the United Nations runs out and abandons us and leaves us to the tender mercies of the Communists, we had better make our deal with the Kremlin now." I do not think that the free world should get the reputation of running out on their friends while the Communist world gets the reputation of standing by theirs, as Stalin has stood by Mao Tse Tung and as Mao Tse Tung has stood by the Korean Communists.

Mr. CAPEHART. The Senator's argument does not ring well with me, because it is the free world, England and the United Nations, which is denying our Army or the United Nations army its right to flank the Communist army and to bomb China and to battle. The Senator suggests that the United Nations are saying that our boys should remain in Korea and be killed like sitting ducks for God knows how long, waiting for somebody to do what? To make up their minds that we are going to bomb China. To make up their minds that we are going to send Chiang Kai-shek into battle? To make up their minds that we are going to do what? How long are we going to let our American boys stay there and be killed? Shall it be 10 more days, 10 months, or 10 years? Everyone knows that an army cannot possibly win if it is forced to fight 300,000,000 Chinese in an area of 100 square miles, and when it cannot move up to attack beyond that limited area.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would say to the Senator from Indiana that he is no more critical about this policy which has tied our hands than I have been.

Mr. CAPEHART. I know that.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have spoken frequently on the subject. When I came back from Korea I spoke on the subject. I talked with some of our pilots there. They told me that they saw Communist planes rise up from the airfields north of the Yalu River, fire on them, and that when our planes went out to chase them, they returned to the sanctuary behind the Yalu, and our men were not permitted to chase them there. The Senator does not have to sell me on the importance of doing something affirmative.

But I say that, even if in the borders of other members of the United Nations there are a number of people who want a far eastern Munich—and I think there are a number of them in the United Nations today who are trying to work out a far eastern Munich—I believe that that would be a futile policy. I think that it would lead to a billion and a quarter people of Asia coming into the Communist orbit, and if a billion and a quarter people come into the Communist orbit, I believe the chances of even restraining communism in Western Europe are almost nil. In my opinion, we have waited 2½ months too long to declare Communist China an aggressor. I think that should be done with or without the United Nations.

I have never favored sending a United Nations land army into Manchuria or into China. I have never favored sending an American Army into Manchuria or into China. I think that would be a futile policy. It would be the same mistake that Napoleon made in Russia, and that others have made in invasions of Russia. I would not operate in an area of terrain in which the enemy is superior to us by 10 to 1. I would operate in areas where we are superior to them by many times that number to one. I would exercise the use of a naval blockade. We have the greatest Navy in the world today and we can bring more of our ships out of "mothballs." We can put a tight blockade on the coast of China. I would operate with air power to strike at the military targets that are in Manchuria, and serve notice on the Chinese Communists that so long as they have a single soldier as an invader and aggressor in Korea, we will continue to bomb these military targets. I think if we use a little intestinal fortitude rather than yielding to blackmail, we will be less likely to be pushed off the globe.

Mr. CAPEHART. I am fully aware that the Senator has taken the same position that I have taken and that many others have taken. I was not questioning him on the ground that he was not taking that position. I am fully aware of the fact that the Senator's answer to me was the answer that others gave to the Senator. But the fact still remains that there is not a living military man who will say that we can win against the Chinese if we are going to be forced to fight within a 100-square-mile area in southern Korea. It cannot be done. It never will be done. Yet the United Nations is denying, and our own Government is denying our military men the right to protect their own lives.

Delegates to the United Nations sit in New York, in a new building, in plush seats, trying to make up their minds as to whether we will be permitted to go into China and defend our Army in Korea. It is ridiculous, it is silly. It is a blight on the intelligence of the United States Government and the United Nations. They ought to make up their minds. I say we ought to get our Army out of Korea or we ought to be given permission to go into China proper and fight the enemy with every weapon we have at our command. If we do not do

it pretty soon, I cannot see how we are going to keep faith with the American boys who are giving their lives in Korea.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will say to the Senator from Indiana that I do not believe we can fight a big war or a little war—sometimes called a police action—with one or both hands tied behind our backs. I think that is precisely what we are asking our commanders to do in that area of the world.

Mr. CAPEHART. Of course it is.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have talked with innumerable GI's in Korea, junior officers as well as senior officers, airmen, Navy men, and land forces, and I do not think that what is happening makes sense to them any more than it does to the Senator from Indiana or the Senator from California.

Mr. CAPEHART. Within the last 48 hours the British Foreign Minister said that his country would not stand for any interference by the Chinese Communists, at the very time when the Chinese Communist Army was killing American boys and possibly British boys, because the British boys are fighting now in South Korea. What sort of statesmanship encourages that? Is it any wonder that many of us have no confidence in the leadership of the United States, the leadership of our own Government, and the leadership of the British Government?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Although I cannot say that I had the same opportunity of discussing matters with the British Commonwealth contingent which is in Korea that I had in discussions with American soldiers there, yet knowing something of the British soldier, and having seen in World War II the fine soldier that he is, I have no doubt in my own mind that if a Gallup poll were conducted among the British soldiers now in Korea, we would find that they would take, as the Senator has said, the same dim view of the collaborating activities that many of us have taken in connection with the activities of the members of the United Nations, since it was organized in my State of California, in the city of San Francisco.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Long in the chair). Does the Senator from California yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Assuming that the Nationalist Chinese were permitted to leave Formosa and to go on to the mainland of China, what would necessarily have to be our contribution to that effort in the way of munitions, supplies, and transport; and after they got into the mainland of China what would be our further obligations?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would say that they need additional supplies. Again I would question the wisdom of stating on the floor of the Senate exactly what I think would be needed in that connection, because they threw open to me complete information about their training schools, shipping, and other matters, and I cannot betray that confidence. I can say to the Senator from Colorado that they need certain items to supply their

forces. In my judgment—and, in addition, I have talked about this matter with some responsible Americans—the things the Nationalist Chinese need are not, for the most part, competitive with the equipment the western European armies most urgently need. I do not think that by giving the limited amount of equipment which is needed in Formosa we would in any sense be jeopardizing the arms-implementation program in Europe, because the types of equipment needed by the Nationalist Chinese are more in the nature, let us say, of small arms and ammunition, perhaps some amphibious craft, and items of that kind, which I do not think constitute the main requirements in connection with the arms-implementation program in Europe.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Would that help have to come from us?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think it would.

Mr. MILLIKIN. How about transports?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think we have a considerable surplus of landing craft which we could make available to them. They have the navy which could operate them. They would need some airplanes. I shall not detail the types now; but I would say it is no secret, and I betray no confidence when I say it, that today the Chinese Nationalist forces have far more competent pilots than they have planes to be flown. With some help—as we are giving help to Indochina and to Europe—I think they would get along very well.

Mr. MILLIKIN. After the Nationalist Chinese landed on the mainland, what would be our further commitment?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Probably that would depend considerably upon the nature of their operations. I would not feel qualified to answer the question in detail, because I have always felt that such aid should not be given unless we had there a man who would serve in the way that General Van Fleet served in Greece. Time after time I have offered the suggestion that a man of the caliber of General Wedemeyer, who thoroughly knows the country and knows what is feasible and what is not feasible, should be sent there. I would not think that at the beginning, at least, they would be likely to do more than make commando-type raids on the coast of China, and perhaps regain some of the southernmost provinces of that country, so as to drive a wedge between the Ho Chi-minh forces operating in Indochina and the forces of Mao Tse-tung, operating in China. If a wedge could be driven between them, that would certainly greatly improve the situation in southeastern Asia.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Would there be any moral commitment on our part to support such Nationalist Chinese forces, once they got there, with American troops or American-manned airplanes or other equipment?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No. The Nationalist forces do not need American manpower. All their officials with whom I have talked—and I have talked with practically all of them—state that they do not need American manpower. They do need equipment.

In the second place, I do not think it would be necessary for American Air Force pilots to operate in the civil war which would be involved on the mainland of China, although I believe there would be a need for military pilots to strike at targets in Manchuria. However, I would say we would not use our Air Force as an air force in support of the Nationalist Chinese armies in southern China.

On the other hand, I would say there are a large number of Americans and British and men of other nationalities—I have talked with a great many of them personally—who, in my judgment, would be glad to volunteer, as in the case of General Chennault, who had his Flying Tigers over there prior to our becoming involved with the Japanese—men who would be glad to strike a blow for freedom in that area of the world, and men who have had air experience. However, that would not be the United States Air Force per se.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Is there any doubt that once we embarked, on our part, upon the steps the Senator has advocated, we would be morally obligated then to underwrite the venture?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would say to the Senator that is a difficult question to answer. I do not think we would be morally bound to underwrite the venture. However, I would say that with the unsettled condition of the world, where the Communists are poised perhaps to take over Western Europe, in the over-all world strategy it is extremely important that communism not be able to concentrate all its power for the purpose of overwhelming Europe. I think they will not be likely to concentrate that power so long as they have a far eastern flank which is exposed; and I should like to keep that flank exposed.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I am not arguing the wisdom of such a course.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I understand.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Neither am I arguing as to what should be the strategy. I am trying to ascertain where we would come out, once we embarked upon such a course. In that event, what would we have to do? What would be our obligations, particularly our moral obligations and commitments, once such a step were taken? Must we follow it up, in good honor, with our military forces, to salvage it if it runs into disaster?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think not. However, in the world situation existing today, I think we should be free to exercise our own strategic judgment.

Mr. MILLIKIN. That is what I wanted to get at. Would we be completely free at all times to exercise our own choice as to going in or staying out?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think we would be. I would make it very clear that it would be on that basis that the aid would be given.

Mr. MILLIKIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I have been very much interested in the Senator's remarks. I happen to agree with him in regard to many of the positions he takes

in relation to the Orient. I should like to ask him about the specific situation in Korea, and I should like to obtain his views on that subject, if he cares to express them at this time.

I wonder whether the Senator agrees that, regardless of how it is done, the question of Formosa is going to have to be resolved within a comparatively short time. In other words, it seems that as soon as the Korean situation has been settled, the Chinese Reds will then inevitably point one of their next actions toward the reduction of the Island of Formosa. So, getting down to reality, whether Chiang Kai-shek or the Chinese Nationalists move, or whether they merely remain passive in Formosa, the question of Formosa and of an assault upon it in conflict with Nationalist China, will arise almost inevitably in the future.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I agree with the Senator, whether they remain passive or whether they move, that in the not-too-distant future the Formosa situation is going to be clearly before us. Of course, no one has a crystal ball enabling him to know what the next move of the Chinese Communists will be, if they should be able to liquidate the Korean situation. I think they will move in one of two places; they will either move on southeast Asia or on Formosa. I think from their point of view it is an easier move for them to make against southeast Asia, because there they can transport their land armies with no salt-water barrier. There are 100 miles of salt-water between the Island of Formosa and the mainland of China; and to surmount that obstacle represents quite an undertaking for a nation which is not a naval power; and Red China is not a naval power. Therefore, while I think it is entirely possible that the order of priority may be altered slightly until they can take over Indochina and the rest of southeast Asia, I think that ultimately and in the not-too-distant future they will try to take Formosa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. But I call to the attention of the Senator the fact of which he is well aware, I am sure, that there is more than one method of crossing 100 miles of salt water, and that ships alone do not constitute the only method.

Mr. KNOWLAND. That is correct.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I saw in the press today, as I recall the rather significant statement, that 40 airborne Communist groups of Communist Russia are poised at various points in Manchuria and in southern Siberia, if not clear down in China proper at various places. I suggest that modern warfare has devised the air-transport assault, which, if in sufficient size and sufficiently manned, may eliminate the necessity of ships to go across the water in the original phases of the assault.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I quite agree with the Senator from Iowa, and I was making my statement based on the premise that the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union, did not itself want to become involved in an assault on the island. I think that in due time they may have sufficient Chinese pilots and planes and soldiers equipped for an airborne operation, so that they could move by air. Of

course, if the Soviet Union comes in and supplies their navy and their air force and their troops to help in the assault, there is no question that the problem of the Formosans and of the Chinese Republic in defending their island will become greatly complicated.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield once more, I want to say that among other statements of the Senator's and other positions he has taken, with which I agree, the incomprehensible position which the State Department of this country has taken in forbidding our American troops, fighting in Korea, to use air power in a strategic way, by going into the enemy country and cutting off his source of supply, happens to be one of the premises of the Senator from California with which I wholeheartedly agree.

Mr. KNOWLAND. If the Senator will permit, I should like to ask him at that point whether he does not agree with me that the policy which has been followed by the United Nations and the Government of the United States, in tying the hands of the commanders so that they could not properly use strategic air power, has not only had an adverse repercussion on the fighting in Korea, but has also tended to destroy the confidence of Europeans in the ability of American air power to defend them against aggression from Russia; so that it has had a chain-reaction effect which is unfair to air power? I am not one of those who believe that it is possible to win a war with air power alone. I think it is necessary to have balanced forces. But I also believe that in the very nature of things, Europeans are counting, and have the right to count, and in my judgment still should count on American air power and the job it is able to do; but tying the hands of the air power in Korea has tended to undermine confidence in that arm of American power.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I may say to the Senator from California that the vacillation and refusal of nations of power and authority in the world, who hope to be free, together with their refusal realistically and honestly to approach and admit the facts of aggression, have shaken the United Nations more than any other action since its creation. I think time is running out. I think time is running out on the question of creating a diversion south of the Yangtze River by aiding the Chinese Nationalists. I join the Senator in saying that no American troops should be sent there, but I think time is running out.

The great fear I have in my mind is that it has been personalities in the administrative and diplomatic control of this situation within our own country which have led us down this road, rather than any shortcomings in military judgment or military planning, which otherwise might have brought us closer to victory.

Mr. KNOWLAND. In other words, there has been more interest in saving face than in saving freedom.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I think diplomacy has stepped into a field of action

wherein the military judgment and military authority should have been pre-eminent. I hope that this country will change the policies of its leadership before we are brought completely to the precipice of disaster internationally.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I was listening last night to a report to the people of Canada from the United Nations, over one of the Canadian broadcasting stations, in the course of which the commentator stated that, while Canada would, of course, go along with the United States in its proposal to declare the Chinese Reds aggressors in Korea, Canada would not go along very enthusiastically, and that the reception given the American proposal by the other countries varied all the way from lukewarm to ice cold. It becomes apparent that we do not have in the United Nations the strength to declare the Chinese Reds aggressors in North Korea, and that, so long as we continue to fight in North Korea, we shall have to fight, as the Senator from California said, with one hand tied behind our back.

What solution does the Senator from California have for extricating ourselves from the unhappy situation into which we have been precipitated through United Nations action? It was, indeed, action of which I think most of the American people approved at the time it was taken. The United Nations could not wait until daylight to declare the North Koreans aggressors; but, when Chinese Reds do the same thing, it is impossible to get a vote to declare them aggressors. How would the Senator from California extricate our troops from the position they are in? Should we merely get out of Korea, and stay out, and say we are not going to embark on any more United Nations ventures; or what should we do?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I say to the Senator from Vermont that, in the first place, I think this country should take a very strong stand, as I believe we are now doing. I would say to the Senator, if he will let me complete the answer to his question, I would take a very strong stand in pointing out to the other members of the United Nations the grave danger which faces them when they themselves may, sooner than they think, have to rely on that organization for collective security in the event of Soviet aggression.

I commend the State Department and the Government of the United States for forcefully, within recent times, bringing home to the other members of the United Nations the fact that the chips are now down. If the United Nations is not prepared to assume its place of moral leadership in stopping aggression now, the whole United Nations organization may be destroyed. That is No. 1.

Then, in my judgment, we should very realistically talk to our British friends and point out to them that the position they are taking today is a dog-in-the-manger position, because they have no intention of abandoning Hong Kong or Malaya or the other areas in which they

have an interest, and they are getting themselves into a very untenable position if they think that by throwing Korea and Formosa to the wolves they can arouse world public opinion 6 months from now to stand with them at Hong Kong and Malaya. I would spell it out in language which a 10-year-old child could understand. I think they are under some misconception even yet on that subject.

Mr. AIKEN. Many persons fail to see by what right England endeavors to hold Hong Kong at this time. But assuming that any United Nations act fails, then I understand the Senator from California to say that he would act unilaterally from then on, so far as the Asiatic problem is concerned.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would say to the Senator from Vermont that, of course, I think we have to depend on our responsible commanders. General MacArthur is over there, and we have an able Eighth Army commander. I do not know whether from hour to hour and from day to day it may be their judgment that it involves too great a sacrifice on our part to hold some area in Korea which might prevent a large population of non-Communists being sacrificed to Communist liquidation. It may not be possible to hold it, or it may be possible to do so. If it can be held in conjunction with our naval power and our air power, without putting additional forces into Korea, there are some reasons for doing that. But that is a strategic decision which will have to be determined.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator probably refers to the Pusan beachhead.

Mr. KNOWLAND. That might be as large a beachhead as could strategically be held or it might be larger or smaller.

Mr. AIKEN. It would be held by United Nations forces.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes. The British, as I understand, have committed themselves to stay in Korea with us, and I think the other forces of the United Nations, small as they are, are also committed to do that.

The second thing is that I think the time is rapidly coming when we cannot afford to take further casualties in Korea, by reason of the fact that the Chinese are resupplying, reinforcing, and bringing down tanks, guns, and planes from Manchuria to attack our forces. The time is rapidly coming, and I think it is long past due, when we cannot await the palaverings of the United Nations in determining whether China is an aggressor in Korea. She obviously is an aggressor, and in that case I think we should strike unilaterally at the military target in Manchuria from which the supplies are coming.

The next thing, in answer to the Senator's question, is that I have talked with many persons, and I do not know of a single American military, naval, or air commander in the Far East or elsewhere who does not believe that the loss of Formosa into unfriendly hands will jeopardize the entire defense position in the Far East and drive a wedge in the defense line which runs from Japan to Okinawa to the Philippines. They do not advocate that we even ask

bases on it, because we have bases elsewhere. The loss of Formosa would ultimately lead to the fall of Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. If that happens, we shall have to move back to the Pacific Coast States of Oregon, Washington, and California. I do not believe the American people want their defenses moved back to that area in the present unsettled world condition.

So I say, in specific answer to the Senator, that, regardless of what happens in Korea, I think we must make every effort to hold Japan, to permit Japan to rearm so she can help to defend herself and not be a sitting duck for Communist aggression, because, as the Senator from Massachusetts pointed out, if the Communists get the 80,000,000 people of Japan and the industrial resources of Japan, it is only second to getting the Ruhr, so far as the war-making potential is concerned.

In order to be sure that we hold Japan and Okinawa, I think it is necessary that our friends hold the island of Formosa. Unless the island of Formosa is held by our friends there is doubt the Philippines can be held. The Philippine Republic and Australia are the southernmost anchors of our defense line. So I think we must take a stand, and take whatever risks are involved in doing so.

Mr. AIKEN. I think the Senator is entirely correct in his position on the military importance of Formosa. It might also apply to the maintenance of a beachhead in South Korea. I think he is also correct in saying that the time is running out when action can be taken by the United Nations, if it has not already run out. But what I was hoping to have some Senator indicate is what we shall do if the United Nations continues to debate, as it has, week after week, playing directly into the hands of the opposition by its delaying tactics.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I thought I had answered the Senator's question. I certainly did not mean to evade or avoid it.

Mr. AIKEN. How can we force action? How much time do we have before we should do something?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I said that I thought we should notify the United Nations we would wait only two more days and give the Chinese Communist regime 48 hours to start reversing their movement and getting out of Korea. We should notify them that if they did not do that, we would untie the hands of our commanders, that we would permit strategic bombing of military concentrations in Manchuria, that we would blockade the China coast, and not permit anything to get in or out that could be of possible military value, that we would free the hands of the Republic of China and encourage the activities of the guerrillas. I thought that 48 hours should have been given a month ago.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator see any future for the United Nations as an agency to maintain peace in the world?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No. I referred to that in my remarks earlier.

Mr. AIKEN. I was not in the Chamber at that time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I agree with the Senator that the United Nations had the overwhelming support of the people of

the United States and of the free world when, because they recognized that unless aggression were stopped in its tracks, there was no limit, and no way of telling where it would finally end, they took action 2 days after the 24th of June.

Mr. AIKEN. In regard to North Korea?

Mr. KNOWLAND. In regard to North Korea. Two and a half months have passed since the Chinese Communists invaded Korea against the resolutions of the United Nations, and the United Nations are still filibustering and debating and palavering over whether or not this is aggression.

As I pointed out in my speech, more in sorrow than in anger, because I have supported the United Nations, I believe that if they follow this policy of appeasement, the United Nations will be destroyed, it will lose the moral leadership which it had an opportunity to exercise, and will become merely an organization with a large payroll of bureaucrats, the United States paying roughly 40 percent of the funds. I do not believe the people of the United States or the people of the free world will have any interest in supporting that type of bureaucracy, which could not rise to either military leadership in an hour of crisis, or rise to the moral leadership of the world, which the people had a right to expect. If they do not do what was expected, they are not entitled to the support of free men anywhere.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator believe that the fear of the loss of commerce and trade is influencing some of the members of the United Nations to be very reluctant to declare Communist China an aggressor, or is it military fear?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; to be fair, I think it is both. I think it is fear of the loss of trade by Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore, and fear that perhaps it might encourage the Chinese Communists to start moving in their direction. However, I point out to them again that if they destroy the concept that aggression by large aggressors is just as much aggression as aggression by small aggressors, and that if they subscribe to the doctrine of might makes right, it is as certain that their days are numbered as it is certain that we stand on the floor of the Senate. They may shed all the crocodile tears at that late hour they want to shed, but I predict it will be difficult to erase the moral indignation of the world if they sacrifice to communism today Korea and Formosa, and then expect the world to rally to the support of Hong Kong, Malaya, and the rest of southeast Asia.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. MALONE. I was very much interested in the distinguished Senator's comments today. Is the Senator from California aware of Mr. Bevin's announcement yesterday that the basis upon which they would discuss peace would be that of withdrawing from Korea, recognition of Communist China, and

throwing the question of the control of Formosa into the United Nations?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Not only recognition of Communist China, but the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. I am familiar with the press dispatches.

Mr. MALONE. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that in this evening's Washington Star there appears a dispatch headed "Further delay faces the UN in settlement of Korea question."

It states:

The General Assembly's 60-nation political committee was scheduled to meet at 3 p. m., but informed quarters said it probably would adjourn until next week because no one had any formal proposals to make.

Is the Senator familiar with the continued delay?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I had not been familiar with the press dispatch to which the Senator has referred, because I have not had an opportunity to read the evening newspapers or the ticker reports. However, I would say that there is no opportunity on the part of the Americans, the British, the French, and the Turks who are fighting in Korea today to adjourn until next week. I think it is outrageous that when men are dying day by day in Korea in the defense of the free world, the United Nations Organization, which pretends to represent the conscience of mankind, should adjourn from day to day, from week to week, and from month to month, while we suffer over 42,000 casualties. I say that it is time for the President of the United States to say to the United Nations, "There comes a time when you must cease talking and begin acting. If you are not going to do it, I shall go before a joint session of the Congress of the United States and ask Congress to withdraw our membership from the United Nations." [Manifestations of applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The occupants of the galleries will be in order.

Mr. MALONE. The distinguished Senator from California has been on the floor for a long time, and probably is not familiar with the fact that the news ticker announces that within the hour the State Department has informed the British Ambassador that their idea of having a holding situation in North Korea was to give them time to make up their minds. Apparently men are to be sacrificed on that basis.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to say that I commend strongly and almost in its entirety the excellent address and the splendid analysis of the whole foreign situation which has been made by the Senator from California. I should like to refer to three points, and then to ask a question of the Senator, if I may. I believe the Senator took high moral ground, and he took a position which will call to the attention of the people of this Nation in a way which has not been heretofore called to their attention, the fact that the withdrawal of United Na-

tions forces from Korea would bring on a blood bath of unprecedented proportions, and would mean the abandonment and cruel crucifixion of tens of thousands of South Koreans, and of North Korean refugees, too, whose sole offense has been to prefer democracy to communism. I think that this is high ground, and I think it will prove to have been taken to the very great enlightenment of the people of this Nation, in vividly calling to their attention the fact that there is a tremendous moral issue involved in this question which is now causing such deep concern to all of us.

The second point on which the Senator commented at several places in his very fine address, and to which I want to state my strong approval, is the clear word of caution which the Senator uttered, not once but several times, to the Government of India and the governments of other friendly countries in southeast Asia, but particularly India, to the effect that their oft-repeated intervention in sympathy with Communist China may well leave them friendless, alone, and helpless when the time comes for Communist aggression to extend itself against them, as it surely will, in the sequence of Communist plans. I believe this is a point that has long deserved to be clearly made on the floor of the Senate, and I commend the Senator for making it, as a true friend of those concerned.

I believe the third point overshadows the two points which I have just mentioned, and that is the one which was adverted to in the Senator's recent colloquy with the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN]. This point was mentioned several times by the Senator from California. The point is that it is quite apparent that a Munich of unparalleled proportions is being suggested and supported and advocated by those nations who as members of the United Nations are now unwilling or reluctant, and heretofore they have completely refused, to take action indicating a fact which is known to all the world, namely, that Communist China is an aggressor; and these nations are going a great deal further in suggesting and now insisting that Communist China be admitted to membership in the United Nations, as one of the great powers with veto power, which would present the spectacle of a new member, coming in on a plane equal in influence and authority to that of the United States of America, with hands red with the blood of American men, and assuming to sit down in that condition to participate in a solemn conclave which is devoted to the cause of peace and to the negotiation of world-wide peace and harmony. Such a Munich and such appeasement would, it seems to me, be so completely unforgivable by the conscience of mankind throughout the world that it would inescapably lead to the early dissolution and to the untimely death of the United Nations, the greatest effort which mankind has made up to now in its devoted search for peace. I hope that no such result will be accomplished.

The question I wanted to address to the Senator from California was for the

RECORD. My own mail, going up into hundreds of letters, has indicated to me that the people of my State, as well as of other States who have written to me, clearly recognize the fact which I have last mentioned, and which was so much more ably mentioned by the Senator from California; namely, that such utter appeasement on such a grand scale would constitute an unparalleled Munich and would inescapably mean the death of the United Nations and the defeat of what that great organization stands for. My question is: Has the mail of the Senator from California, coming to him from the people of his great State—and I am sure that it comes from an even much greater and wider area in the United States—also indicated to him that the conscience of the American people, as reflected in hundreds and thousands of letters, has already reached the point that the American people have concluded, as expressed in their very solemn and dignified written expressions—and that they have unalterably concluded that such a Munich, such appeasement, and such refusal to brand red-handed aggression as such, and the proposed admission of Red China to membership in the United Nations, would in their judgment forever deprive the United Nations, so long as such philosophy prevailed, of the approval of the conscience of the American people? Has the Senator's correspondence, great as it is, indicated that that conclusion has been reached by hundreds and thousands of our best people throughout the Nation?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will say to the Senator from Florida, specifically in answer to his question, that my mail, in great quantities, has indicated the point which the Senator has raised.

I should like to make this observation: There are some of our colleagues, some of our editors, and some in the executive branch of the Government of the United States who wonder why it is that at this critical hour there is so much confusion among the American people on this very basic issue. I venture the opinion that one reason for the confusion has been that the American people have had held up to them, and have themselves held up, the United Nations as an ideal, as an organization which would morally stand strong when aggression threatened in any sector of the world. They have been disillusioned by the fact that the United Nations has failed in its leadership of the free people at this critical hour in our history. They have been so disillusioned in the thing to which they had tied their hopes, the thing in which they had expressed a great hope for saving the world from aggression, that it was like casting a ship loose from its moorings during rough weather.

As a result, when they see 2½ months of aggression on the part of Communist China, and the United Nations does not have the intestinal fortitude to say that it is aggression, how can we expect them to tie to such an organization? It is like telling them, as Mr. Malik does in the United Nations, that black is white or white is black. It is a topsy-turvy world. I believe that one of the reasons

we are forced to have this great debate today is that the United Nations itself has contributed to undercutting the faith of the people in the moral leadership of that organization.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one further observation?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to say that I think the Senator has made a great contribution to this historic debate. I think it was necessary that somewhere in the course of this debate it be stated, as it has now been stated, that thousands and thousands of our best American citizens have reached the conclusion that this bald, inexplicable, unforgivable, shameless effort at appeasement, which is so clearly in progress, is recognized as such by them, and that if persisted in it will necessarily destroy the United Nations. I think that out of this record, those who can read and who are working for such an appeasement will understand that, detested as is the memory of a man named Chamberlain, with his umbrella, who once practiced appeasement, and whose name is connected with the original Munich, yet the thing which they propose, and the thing which they insist upon, defrauding of any chance of successful completion the prayers and devout efforts of all peace-loving humanity, would leave them in a position so far overshadowing Mr. Chamberlain and his umbrella that his memory would scarcely persist on the pages of history, so much greater, so much more enormous, so much more miserable, is the deliberate act which they have proposed, and to which apparently they are giving their every effort.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I know that the Senator has been a strong advocate of American assistance to the end of helping the Chinese Nationalist troops to the mainland, where they would be supplied with the means to at least divert the Red China armies.

I will not say that there has been opposition to that plan, but skepticism has been raised in the minds of many people, for three reasons.

First, they feel that if we assisted the Chinese Nationalists to land on China, there would then be at least a moral commitment to assist them with the Air Force and eventually with troops. That has been one deterrent, and the Senator has expressed his opinion on that subject this afternoon.

However, there are two other reasons why so many American people are reluctant to go along with this proposal. The first is that they fear that the means and the money put into such a venture on the part of the United States might not be spent for the purpose for which it was intended, but would be dissipated in one way or another. They believe that some of the contributions of the past have been dissipated, and that in the future such contributions might not be properly used.

The third reason is fear that the Nationalist Army of three or four hundred thousand men, once landed in China,

would be ineffective in coping with the Red troops, which are supposed to number something like 4,000,000, I believe, at the present time. Will the Senator briefly express his opinion on the last two points—first, that the means and money would not be properly spent for the purpose for which they were given; and, second, that the comparatively small army of Chiang Kai-shek would be ineffective in opposing the greater armies of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Very briefly in answer to the two queries, which I think are quite proper, let me say this: I am cognizant of the fact that there are those who have some misgivings for the reasons which have been stated. As I pointed out earlier, I have never advocated that aid be given to the Republic of China, or, for that matter, to any other Asiatic or European country, unless there was proper supervision. It was necessary to do that in Greece, and it is no disparagement of the Greek people to say that it was necessary. It was necessary to do it in other areas of the world. Therefore, I would not advocate giving this aid unless we were prepared to send a mission under the leadership of a man such as General Wedemeyer. There may be many others, but I mention him because he knows the Chinese theater. He knows the weaknesses of China. All nations, including our own, have weaknesses. If one reads his report on China, he will find that he was very critical, as properly he should have been critical, of some of the things which the Government of China had done or failed to do. Nevertheless, the Chinese knew him to be a critical friend, a man who recognized the importance of not letting China go down the drain into international communism.

So I believe that that phase of the problem could be safeguarded by sending a mission under the leadership of a man such as General Wedemeyer to supervise the distribution of the equipment and the training of the troops who would get it.

We did not have success in Greece until General van Fleet and his mission went over there to see that the Greeks were properly trained in the use of the equipment, and that it was getting to the troops where it was needed. That is the best answer I can make to the second question.

The third question is whether or not the army of 500,000—and there are more than 500,000, but I do not wish to use the exact figures for obvious reasons—of the Republic of China would be able to make an adequate showing against the several million troops reportedly on the side of the Chinese Communists.

I want to point out that it would be very difficult for the Chinese Communists to concentrate all their troops at any one point for several reasons. First, their railroad transportation and road network in China is very bad by our standards, and it takes a long time to move troops.

Second, the terrain of the country is such that it is a very difficult operation to concentrate large bodies of troops.

Third, there is enough discontent in the country that if large areas of China are stripped of Communist troops the

guerrillas may come out and the civil population rise up and take over those areas behind the Communists. So the Communists would not dare to concentrate all their troops.

The Government of the Republic of China has the advantage of having a compact force, a very large coast line of China which is most difficult to defend, large areas of which do not have even today, with the Chinese Communists there, one soldier along the coast in a good many miles. So that the Nationalists are able, with a concentrated striking force, to strike at any one of several hundred places along the coast line of more than a thousand miles. In that situation they have an opportunity, in my judgment—and I do not rely on my own judgment, but I have talked with a great many persons in whom I have confidence—of bringing at the particular scene of activity a larger body of trained troops than the Chinese Communists will have, unless they can outguess the Nationalists as to where they are going to land.

In addition to that, there are a great many people who believe quite sincerely that once there has been made a substantial landing on the coast of China the disillusioned people of China who thought that nothing could be worse than the conditions under which they had lived, and that communism was going to bring them the new blessings of liberty and so forth; the farmer, who is now paying a larger tax than he ever paid under the Nationalist regime; the businessman, who has had his small business destroyed; the student, who thought, for idealistic reasons, that communism was the "wave of the future" who now understands that it is destructive of all the teachings of China of family life and religious life and everything else—will in considerable numbers augment the invasion force, as guerrillas and others who would join up so that they would have a chance to live again as freemen.

In this uncertain life in which we live and the uncertain world in which we exist no one can guarantee that those things would happen, but I would say from my personal observation, from seeing the morale of the people, many of them educated in our western universities and our eastern universities, and in New England and in the South, who are in the Republic of China today, that there are thousands of men of integrity in China who love freedom as much as we love freedom, and who recognize that they made some very serious mistakes in the past, and they are not going to repeat those mistakes if it is humanly possible to prevent it. I personally believe that if given some moral help now and some material aid, which they need, they would be able to make a successful invasion of the mainland.

COMMUNISM OR COLONIAL EMPIRE BONDAGE

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, the wrong kind of thinking has got us where we are today. It is time for those who have been doing this wrong thinking to change the pattern of their thoughts.

There is no hope if wrong thinking continues to prevail.

As a matter of fact, the junior Senator from Nevada has long suspected that action has been substituted for thinking, in our dealings with world affairs.

There is nothing basically wrong with the United States, except our assumption that every nation that fought with us in World War II is and will forever be our friend.

PERMANENT INTERESTS DETERMINE FRIENDSHIPS

We need to remember that a great Englishman, Viscount Henry Temple Palmerston, a former Prime Minister, once said:

We (England) have no permanent friendships or enmities; we have but permanent interests.

Mr. President, the British do not fight for principle; they frankly fight for profit.

This is still the basic policy, not only of England, but of all European and Asiatic nations.

Complete understanding of this pronouncement is the key to successful dealing with all foreign nations outside of the Western Hemisphere; a knowledge of where their current interests lie is the answer to the now pertinent question of where will our erstwhile allies be "when the chips are down" in the next war.

OBJECTIVE: OUR OWN ULTIMATE SAFETY

The present uncertainty makes it imperative that we start any defense preparations with a determination of the areas in the world that are necessary for us to currently defend for our own ultimate safety.

Proceeding upon this basis, the United States has nothing to fear.

The "permanent interests" to which that great former Prime Minister of England referred were doubtless the colonial empire possessions stretching from Hong Kong and Singapore to East Africa.

In my speech on the Senate floor on December 14, I listed 10 steps which in my opinion we should take in our present international difficulties.

The first step listed was:

Forthwith stop assistance of every nature to Communist nations and to nations in any way assisting Russia or her satellites to consolidate Soviet gains and to prepare for World War III.

I have previously dealt with this point, listing 96 trade treaties under which Marshall plan countries are arming Russia and her satellites and providing the necessary manufactured and processed goods to enable Russia to consolidate her gains in Eastern Europe and China.

The second point is:

Stop supporting colonial slavery in any form anywhere.

It is this point to which I wish to address myself briefly today. In order, I intend to discuss on future dates the remaining eight recommendations.

GRAVE SITUATION

The matter of going into a global war is a grave question that only the citizens of these United States should decide. They do the fighting and make the su-

preme sacrifice. No one man should take unto himself the right to gamble with our heritage and with the lives of our young men. Their only voice is through the Members of Congress.

Looking back to VJ-day, Mr. President, we see these things:

The greatest period of prosperity ever known to any nation has been squandered.

The public debt has gone up, instead of down.

The largest peacetime military appropriations in history have left the Nation unprepared.

The billions spent in foreign aid have left the Nation without one countable ally in all of Europe.

And the Nation at the present time is fighting a losing fight with Red China.

UNDERTAKING MORE THAN WE CAN DO

It would appear that our foreign policy can be summed up in this way:

Six percent of the people of the world live in the United States; and this 6 percent of the world's population has contracted to support as wards or be prepared to fight the other 94 percent of the people of the world.

The administration is to blame for committing this Nation to such a situation. History is replete with examples of how nations in the past have destroyed themselves in undertaking more than they were capable of handling.

The Elamites, 600 years B. C., destroyed themselves; the Athenians never recovered from their invasion of Sicily; the Romans took on more of the world than they could defend; Napoleon never recovered from his invasion of Russia; and a century later Hitler repeated Napoleon's folly.

So moves the world story.

FREE NATIONS BELIEVE IN DIGNITY AND WORTH OF MAN

In the President's state of the Union message he said:

The free nations believe in the dignity and worth of man. We believe in independence for all nations.

The dignity and worth of man.

The junior Senator from Nevada is deeply interested in the working men and women of the world, particularly those oppressed by the nations we have aided. This Senator has not been stampeded into actions against labor, possibly because he himself has been a workingman. I know what it is to stand in front of a furnace and shovel in the coal when the heat was of such intensity as to cause my gloves to catch on fire.

I have known what it is to work in a glass factory. I grew up on a ranch. I have been associated all my life with working people, and I am not going to turn my back on them, whether they live in the United States, or in the work camps of colonies despoiled for England, France, or the Netherlands.

COLONIAL EMPIRE SLAVES WANT BETTER EXISTENCE

The people who are fighting Russia's battles in Asia today are fighting in the hope that communism can provide them a better existence than they obtained under colonialism.

If I were a laborer in Indochina or one of the other colonies of Asia and had

to choose between communism and the continuance of colonial empire bondage, I would probably choose communism, just as the people of the Far East are now doing, because in their minds nothing can be worse than the colonial slavery under which they are living.

We are offering them nothing better.

CAPITALISM MEANS COLONIALISM TO NATIVES

We cannot expect to win the native of Indochina over to a love for capitalism, our system of economic life, as long as the native associates in his mind capitalism with the colonial slavery to which he is accustomed.

EASY CONVERTS TO COMMUNISM

All people under the yoke of colonial bondage are easy converts to communism or any other "ism" which means a change.

Empire-minded nations have farmed their colonies for the sole benefit of the mother country in each case. Apparently, it has never occurred to the officials of empire-minded nations to help the people of their possession.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MARTIN in the chair). Does the Senator from Nevada yield to the Senator from Vermont?

Mr. MALONE. I am glad to yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I take it that the Senator from Nevada refers to political colonialism, such as that which has been practiced by the countries of Europe in times past. Is there not also an industrial colonialism, such as is occurring today in countries in the Near East, particularly in regard to oil? I shall not mention by name the countries—the Senator knows which ones they are—where oil has been discovered. In those countries a few persons have become extremely rich as a result of the discovery and development of oil, whereas the great mass of the people of those countries are almost destitute. As the situation exists there today, Russia could take over those people without having them raise a hand in opposition, because of the industrial colonialism which prevails there.

Mr. MALONE. I should like to have the Senator understand that I am referring to the nations which have been dominated by colonial policies for more than 150 or 175 years.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLAND in the chair). Does the Senator from Nevada yield to the Senator from Vermont?

Mr. MALONE. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Let me say that I understand the nature of the reference the Senator from Nevada has made. I was simply pointing out that the same thing is happening today, in a different way, in other countries, and in my opinion, it creates a very fertile field for the spread of any unknown doctrine which has not been practiced there up to the present time.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I would point out that at least the industrial colonizing nations make contracts with the leaders of those countries, they pay

an enormous amount of money to the countries, and perhaps assist those in power within those countries to prevent much of the money reaching the wage earners. Some of the people are not even wage earners. How they are hard to determine.

Mr. AIKEN. I am not saying that outside countries are doing the exploiting. It is done by a few people within those countries. It is domestic exploitation, which is as bad as colonial exploitation.

Mr. MALONE. The junior Senator from Nevada intends to discuss that particular subject at a later date, as one of the things laid down in his opening address on December 14; but at this time he wants to discuss particularly the matter of the colonial possessions of, let us say, England, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, where, frankly, the colonies are farmed out as one would operate a farm in Vermont and expect an income from it. If one paid for the farm, he would expect to receive an income; and those countries expect incomes from their colonial possessions. For a hundred years they have prevented the industrial development of those nations. The existence of the raw materials in those areas constitutes the primary consideration for wanting to control them, in the first place, in order to force those raw materials to be sent to the mother country, and then to force their processing within the mother country. While I think the system is bad, we have not realized it. In other words, through contributions to empire-minded nations, we are in effect supporting a system which makes every native of these areas unhappy. Stated clearly, what we are doing is to give them a choice between our form of government, capitalism, and the form of government offered by Russia. The capitalistic form of government, our American way of life, is represented by colonial slavery; and the natives do not see how anything could be worse than that particular form, regardless of what might happen in the future. The result is that we are making Communists, hand over hand.

UNITED STATES GUILTY OF FINANCING SLAVERY SYSTEM

I am unhappy to say that our own Government, through the Marshall plan give-away program, has been guilty of financing a slavery system repulsive to every true American. Look how we have aided those who have perpetuated the colonial slavery system in the Malayan States, Indochina, and the Negro states of Africa.

MARSHALL-PLAN MONEY USED FOR VILE PURPOSE

Our taxpayers' money has been used by the ECA for the vile purpose of strengthening the yoke of bondage and slavery and perpetuating misery among the primitive peoples ruled and worked by imperial overlords. We should immediately stop this filthy business of bolstering colonial slavery.

WE HAVE TO OFFER SOMETHING BETTER

We cannot succeed in stopping communism in Asia and Africa by supporting a system which is considered worse by the residents of those areas.

We condemn Russia for her slave labor camps, while at the same time our Government helps Britain, France, and the Netherlands maintain theirs. In times past, we Americans prided ourselves upon being protectors of downtrodden people and champions of independence, but we no longer can make that claim. The United States has fallen from its high pedestal.

WE HELP ENGLAND DESPOIL HER COLONIES

We have gone too far in helping England develop her colonies, later to be more profitably despoiled. Britain's colonies cover 2,000,000 square miles. They consist of 36 separately governed areas with a total population of approximately 60,000,000, most of whom are uneducated and unskilled. Millions are primitive peoples still living in the tribal state. The bulk of the territory they inhabit is untouched by civilization. These are the downtrodden people Britain is keeping under the yoke for her selfish gain.

WE TURNED OUR BACK ON NORTH AFRICAN NATIVES

We should no longer help France to consolidate its economic and political domination in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The French are operating a police state in north Africa.

President Roosevelt at Casablanca pledged American support for the independence of Morocco. That pledge has not been kept. We turned our back on these people, despite the fact that north African forces in the late war numbered 275,000, some 65,000 of whom died on the Allies' battlefields.

United States officials announced upon the formation of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 that henceforth all nations would be free under the auspices of that organization. In five short years we have repudiated that pronouncement and are now supporting the 150-year-old colonial empire system.

HALF SLAVE AND HALF FREE

President Lincoln's pronouncement that the United States could not exist half slave and half free is equally applicable to the world today.

We speak continually of defending the American way of life and at the same time support with our money and our military might a system quite different.

Is history to say of us that the United States of America fought to support a diabolical system of colonialism?

We are not going to get Asia to turn its back on communism unless something better than colonialism can be offered them in its place.

Our first step must be to deny all aid to those countries which practice the diabolical system of colonialism.

BLACK PEOPLE NOT YET ACCEPTED

Let us face the facts. Black people the world over are not yet accepted as equals. We condone this when we finance France which continues its slavery system in Africa.

We have been maneuvered into protecting Hong Kong for the British.

HONG KONG AND OPIUM TRADE

The history of Hong Kong and its control by the British is an ugly story criss-

crossed with opium wars and opium traffic.

Britain's gaining of Hong Kong, confirmed by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, was the chief result of the opium war. The history of Hong Kong since the British took it over has been inseparably connected with trade. First, and for many years, it was the opium trade. Next it was the center for traffic in slave labor for Australia. British interest in Asia has been trade.

NO PERMANENT FRIENDSHIPS—ONLY PERMANENT INTERESTS

What the Prime Minister of England said in 1860, "We—England—have no permanent friendships or enmities; we have but permanent interests," is still the English philosophy which dominates all European thinking today. The colonial empires—Britain, France, and the Netherlands—have their interests in what they can get out of their colonies. As things are now, with no change in our relations with these countries, when we fight communism in Asia, we are but protecting colonial slavery, which does not represent the American way of life.

WE MUST OPPOSE COLONIALISM

We should do everything in our power to oppose the ideological and economic system of colonialism which has always been distasteful to the American people, as emphasized by the American Revolution in 1776.

WE MUST PROVE TO NATIVES WE OPPOSE COLONIALISM

We must then sell the Asiatic people whom we would help on the idea that we are not on the side of colonialism and that we do not condone its abuses.

We cannot win them over unless we prove that we are against the colonial empire system of exploiting the weaker nations for the benefit of the stronger nations. We cannot do this as long as we support this system.

After we have cleared our skirts of the taint of aiding colonial slavery, then we must educate the Asiatic countries to the fact that capitalism, the American way of life, is not colonialism; it is our job to prove to them that we are not for colonialism any more than we are for communism.

WHAT MEN FIGHT FOR

Down through the centuries men have fought for self-preservation or for more bread or other substance. It appears that those who have been deciding our foreign policy have overlooked the great intercourse of trade, commerce, and profit. Peoples throughout the world would rather work for profit than fight for glory and a grave. Nations are built by businessmen; destroyed by diplomats.

UNITED NATIONS WORTHLESS TO UNITED STATES

In his state of the Union message, the President also said that we "have laid the cornerstone for a peaceful world in the United Nations."

UN HANDICAPS OUR EFFORTS IN KOREA

Let us look at the United Nations.

While our boys in a desperately uneven struggle are being killed by the thousands by the Chinese Communists, President Truman announces that the United States has no intention of bombing Com-

munist China or the enemy supply lines in Manchuria—the sources of men and material being used against us—unless the United Nations tells him to. The United Nations has proved itself to be simply a forum for continuous smear for our honor, our ideals, and our purposes.

The United Nations is being utilized for a purpose which it cannot, by its very nature, fulfill.

A FORUM FOR INSULTS TO UNITED STATES

After Pearl Harbor in 1941 there was no international forum in New York where Japanese and other Axis representatives could blackguard the United States as much as they wished. But there have been no restrictions on the activities of Mr. Wu and Mr. Vishinsky.

How long the American people will put up with a situation which combines the worst features of both war and appeasement remains to be seen.

UN CANNOT PRODUCE

We expect something from the United Nations which it is not prepared to produce.

In a United Nations, which is supported almost wholly by our dollars and whose present fighting forces are 90 percent that of the United States, the commitment to resist aggression everywhere is a commitment to fight perpetual war, and, as it turns out, these wars are to be in the places, against the forces, and on the terms of Communist Russia.

The worthlessness of the United Nations as an agency for directing an army has been proved, yet it is this ineffective morally bankrupt debating society to which President Truman looks for authority and field direction in fighting for the best interest of the United States.

RUSSIA HAS NOT LOST A MAN

Russia now has taken over in all of Eastern Europe. It now has most of Asia. Yet not a Russian has been killed on any battle line.

ARE ENGLAND AND FRANCE OUR ALLIES?

Who are our allies?

A news dispatch of January 6, by the Associated Press, tells us that Great Britain has stepped up its shipments of raw rubber, an essential war material, to Russia. In 1950 it shipped around 10,000 tons, or 20 times as much raw rubber, to Russia as it shipped in 1949.

I would say, Mr. President, that on the occasion of my visit to Singapore in November 1948, huge shipments of raw rubber and tin were being made directly from Singapore to Russia at that moment; and they have never ceased.

BRITAIN ARMING THE REDS

Recently, Winston Churchill charged—and the Labor government admitted—that British factories were turning out tools, including those to repair tanks, on order from the Soviet Union. Only within the past few days have such orders been embargoed.

The rubber-shipment figures did not include the amount of rubber which the Soviet Union purchased directly from British Malaya. Some sources estimated this at 62,598 tons in the first 11 months of 1950.

England is not the only country sending to the Reds war materials with which to kill American boys.

FRANCE ARMING THE REDS

France has only recently refused to cancel an order for 139,000 tons of steel rails for the Chinese Communists. When our Ambassador threatened to stop Marshall-plan aid to France unless France canceled the order, the French said our demand was "brutal." Our dollars build French mills to produce steel with which to kill our boys. Could that be what the State Department likes to refer to as "total diplomacy"?

TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION ARMING THE REDS

The French, in refusing to stop arming our enemy, point out that Red China also has ordered 13,000 tons of rails from West Germany and that this has been done with the full approval of the American authorities in Germany.

France also points out that the United States was daily doing business with the Communists until late October, months after the beginning of the Korean conflict.

BRITAIN AND FRANCE ON BOTH SIDES

As a matter of fact, France has denied the Soviet accusations that she broke the Franco-Russian military and economic alliance by joining the North Atlantic Pact with the United States and other countries. In other words, France is insisting that she is a friend of Russia.

In 1942 Britain and Russia entered into a 20-year military and economic alliance. Now both the French and British solemnly insist that their alliances with Russia are as good as ever.

The Government of the United States has been acting for almost 2 years on the assumption that Britain and France are its military partners, and that their good faith is not to be questioned. But, even as Mr. Truman, Secretary Acheson, and General Eisenhower plan to pool American troops in Europe with the forces of these nations for common defense against Russia, both Britain and France assure Russia that they are its military and economic allies. That is a pact which each has signed separately with Russia and which they insist is in operation. There is no attempt to cancel it, Mr. President, and it reads startlingly like the North Atlantic Pact which has been signed by us.

SOMEONE IS LYING

Someone is lying, and the subject of interest to Americans is whether they or the Russians, or both nations, are to be played for suckers by the British and French. There is going to be an awful let-down if it turns out to be us.

NO HARD-HEADED EXAMINATION OF WHAT WE CAN DO

War or no war, it is obvious this country is contributing to its own destruction by refusing to shorten its lines and define its commitments. In attempting to save face, it is losing its shirt in an ideological struggle that has far less practical bearing on American survival than is imagined generally.

With so much money and effort down the drain already, it is surprising there has been no hard-headed examination of possible alternatives to the disastrous policies of the past 5 years. There have

been few attempts to appraise realistically the probable effects of measures other than those taken.

PRACTICAL STEPS IN ASIA

Mr. President, China can be blockaded. Its centers of military concentration, industry and communication can be shattered by air attack. Chiang Kai-shek can be encouraged and aided in using Formosa as a base for raids and descents on the China coast. Anti-Communist guerrillas can be helped. Japan can be rearmed. If Chinese volunteers can appear in Korea, why not Japanese?

ASIATICS CAN STOP ASIATICS

The flood tide of aggressive Asiatic communism can be stemmed by Asiatics. Our repeated failures to give a fighting chance to our potential friends in Asia, to the South Koreans before last June, to the Japanese, to the Chinese Nationalists is calculated to raise the old question: Stupidity or treason?

CAN WE WIN WITH THIS STATE DEPARTMENT?

Probably there is nothing in prospect in Asia but defeat, disaster, and disgrace until the State Department is put in charge of someone with wit enough to realize that a regime which throws a million men in battle array against us is really waging war, and firmness enough to make a clean sweep of "experts" of the Alger Hiss and Owen Lattimore type of thinking.

Mr. President, in an Associated Press dispatch in an afternoon newspaper, it is reported that the United Nations, not having made up its mind on anything, and no one having anything to offer, has adjourned until next week. I suppose it is generally known that when President Truman washed his hands of the American Army, after taking what he called a police action in Korea, and was successful in getting the United Nations to approve his action, he left the matter in the hands of the United Nations. What did that organization do? It arranged for a cease-fire committee, the so-called Committee of Three. This committee is made up of the representatives of Canada, Iran and India. It is interesting to note that Canada's mother country, Great Britain, has recognized Communist China, and so has India.

This committee is to arrange for a cease-fire or a truce, on terms the Chinese Communists will agree to. There is no attempt to call the Red Chinese outright aggressors, but only weak-kneed attempts to placate the enemy and cater to his sensitivities. This, of course, is also born out by the failure to permit MacArthur to bomb the bases and northern-most supply lines of the enemy.

Seemingly unmindful of all history, heedless of much experience, and somewhat thoughtless about its safety, this Nation rushes forward to a destiny unknown. In other words, it is substituting action for thinking.

STATE DEPARTMENT SAYS CHINESE REDS ARE OUR FRIENDS

As a horde of Red Chinese swept southward in Korea, the Secretary of State spoke of starting a number of measures designed to increase the effec-

tiveness of United Nations action against aggression. About the same time Mr. Dulles, the United States representative in the General Assembly of the United Nations, held forth. Reviewing the occasions upon which the United States had demonstrated its good will toward China, he told of the bond of friendship which had been forged between the peoples of the two countries, and then added that this is a bond "that the Soviet Government is now trying, and I am convinced, fruitlessly, to break."

AMERICAN BOYS LOOKING INTO MUZZLES OF CHINESE GUNS

Such was the language of the American diplomat as the American soldier in Korea looked into the muzzle of a Chinese gun, and tried to figure out how the man who was about to shoot him could be his friend.

LET US FACE THE PAINFUL TRUTH

Lacking indeed in the administration was a voice that spoke with the clarity of one that still echoes in the annals of history. Have we forgotten the words of Patrick Henry? Speaking to a convention of citizens in Richmond, Va., on March 23, 1775, he said:

Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth. . . . Is this the part of wise men engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? . . .

For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth—to know the worst and provide for it.

Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves longer.

Thus rang the voice of Patrick Henry.

BOAST LOUDLY AND CARRY A LITTLE STICK

Theodore Roosevelt embodied his concept of foreign policy in the homely proverb, "Speak softly but carry a big stick." This administration not only departed from that policy, but it reversed it. It has boasted loudly and carried a little stick.

The question that must be faced now is not what we might like to do, or what, under better conditions, we ought to do, but what we can do.

CAN WE FIGHT 20 KOREAS?

Is anyone so foolish as to think that the United States can meet aggression wherever it occurs? Must we fight another Korea? Must we fight 20 Koreas?

EISENHOWER TO EUROPE

Without the approval of Congress, the President has sent General Eisenhower to Europe. For what purpose? We should withdraw General Eisenhower from his military headquarters in Europe, because his presence there is regarded by the Europeans as a pledge of unlimited American support. If such a pledge has been made, the Congress of the United States has no knowledge of it, and all reference to the Constitution of the United States has been swept aside.

THE THOUGHT OF MANY AMERICANS

The defense of America is the paramount duty of Americans. This is the thought that has been occurring to many Americans as the United States wallows

deeper in its vague commitments and spends billions from one end of the world to another.

EUROPE TAKES ALL, GIVES NOTHING

Europe has taken aid, picked from the pockets of our hard-pressed taxpayers, and has called for more, but she has not used that aid for her own defense. Europe's will to defend cannot be imposed from the outside.

EUROPE SHOULD SHOW INTEREST IN DEFENDING HERSELF

If we should withhold foot soldiers from Europe, at least until she shows some interest in defending herself, it would serve notice on the world that we are determined not to involve the country in another war just as futile as the two world wars and the Korean War. Europeans cannot expect us to do for them what they have failed to do for themselves.

We must do the practical, sensible things to protect our American people.

UNITY?

Mr. President, let me mention one more important point before I close.

The President asked for unity in his state of the Union speech, and on the same day his representative, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, William M. Boyle, Jr., issued a statement asserting that the Democratic Party would continue to seek new partisan advantage in the fields of foreign relations and national defense.

What does the President mean by "unity"?

Are we asked to turn all decision-making over to a single official in charge of our country? Does the administration want no scrutiny, no examination, no study, only obedience?

THE UNITY THAT TOOK CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AWAY FROM CONGRESS

Is it not this kind of philosophy that has caused the administration to take away from Congress its exclusive constitutional authority to approve treaties?

UNITY IN MISERY

There certainly is unity in the misery of our times and the President bears no heavier burden upon his spirit than the smallest among us.

UNITY IN COST

There is also unity in the terrific cost of these troubled times upon each family. This cost is represented in different ways:

First. Taxes.

Second. The constantly rising cost of living.

Third. Depreciated currency, which lessens and destroys the value of our savings, including insurance policies.

These costs are as great upon each of our families as they are upon Mr. Truman's family.

NO UNITY IN TAX EXEMPTION OF PRESIDENT

As a matter of fact, Mr. Truman is tax-exempt to a certain extent. In that, there is no unity.

His advantage seems to be unwarranted. The cost of maintaining him in the White House with cars, private airplanes, private yachts, and so on, bur-

dens the taxpayer with nearly \$5,000,-000 a year.

It would seem that when all of us are paying terrifying taxes, the President might become unified with the rest of the country by paying full taxes and cutting down his running expenses, for which we pay.

After all, no one should get rich out of these troubled times. The country would welcome unity on that score.

A LITTLE SICK OF WORD "UNITY"

Let me read you a few lines from an editorial in the January 2, 1951, issue of the New York Daily Mirror:

We have heard so many appeals for unity of recent days that, frankly, we are a little sick of the word and more than a little suspicious of the chorus of appealers.

Unity for providing arms for Americans who must fight, yes.

Unity in sacrifice and in the period of austerity that is ahead of us—in which it appears we will say good-bye once and for all to the good old days, yes.

Unity to the point that we are supposed to shut our lips and refrain from criticizing the bird brains in Washington who have got us into this awful mess, no.

As far as we can determine, there are a lot of people in Washington who confuse unity with dictatorship.

They would like us to swallow Acheson without a burp—in the holy interest of unity.

They would like us to forget the long series of tragic bunglings, extending from the Roosevelt administration into the Truman administration, and to be good little boys and never mention them again—in the interests of unity.

Bunk. Stalin has that kind of unity. Hitler had it. Mussolini had it.

It is not the kind of unity that can be fostered in a free country, and it is not unity at all. It is dead rot.

If we have strength, it is because we have critics, men of courage and patriotism and status, unafraid of the petty insults of the one-world political mob.

True unity can come only in the tempering fires of national, controversial discussion, among a people alert, aware, free, and permitted to speak their minds. Suppression, whether it is voluntary or enforced, is the agent of disunity.

Thank God that Americans who hold American interests paramount to all other interests have not lost their voices. Unity is not the sheeplike, blind pursuit of a crooked trail over a precipice.

A RE-CREATION OF A NATIONALISTIC SPIRIT

A rereading of the Declaration of Independence, a re-creation of a nationalistic spirit, is called for. Let us get back on the road of self-determination, self-respect, and self-preservation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD at this point in my remarks the list of 10 points submitted in my address to the Senate on December 14.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1. Forthwith stop assistance of every nature to Communist nations and to nations in any way assisting Russia or her satellites to consolidate Soviet gains and to prepare for world war III.
2. Stop supporting colonial slavery in any form anywhere.
3. Oppose the recognition of Communist China by the United Nations with every means at our command.

4. Three suggested approaches to the war in Korea and Asia:

(a) We could do the obvious thing—arm Chiang Kai-shek's Nationals and guerrillas to furnish the foot soldiers for the job, then under General MacArthur make the most efficient use of our air power, our Navy, including submarines, to destroy the war-making power of Communist Korea and the aggressor Communist China troops.

(b) We could withdraw from Korea, arm and equip Chiang Kai-shek's troops and let him do the job. It would require a longer time but he would engage the Communist forces to the extent that it would be doubtful if they could harass us for a considerable time and Nationalist China would then be fighting Communist China in a China civil war and the Russian dominated Communists would eventually be defeated.

(c) We can completely abandon Korea and China, with all of its possible consequences and repercussions. We can then establish our first line of defense through Japan, Formosa, Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, New Guinea, and Australia.

(d) If these suggestions should be discarded, then we can come home and defend the Western Hemisphere. We must be prepared to defend this continent in any case.

The one thing that we cannot do is to continue the present course of indecision and nervous jittery attitude in Asia.

5. Inform the governments of Europe which still maintain political and economic agreements with the Soviet Union that these should be terminated at the earliest possible date, as a prerequisite to the continued friendship and assistance of Europe by the United States. Both England and France have separate economic and military pacts with Communist Russia reading startlingly like the North Atlantic Pact that they have signed with us.

6. Give no more money as loans or gifts to any government, but if such help is necessary, then loan such funds to private business in strategic areas, without weakening our economy, in the same manner and upon the same terms that the RFC loans such funds to private business in this country in times of stress.

7. Build as rapidly as possible a military force, spearheaded by an adequate submarine fleet and an air corps of whatever number of groups may be called for, and install radar equipment to protect the Western Hemisphere.

8. If the European people will enlist in their own armies and furnish the ground troops, then serve notice on Russia that any move on Europe will be met with an aggressive aerial attack on their means of making war, using every means at our command to defeat their purpose of controlling Europe.

9. In every possible way protect and strengthen our national economy; while making all possible speed toward proper preparedness, guard well our national economy; stop wasting the hard-earned dollars of our taxpayers through Marshall plan and other give-away schemes; inaugurate a business-like fiscal policy.

10. Clean up our own Government. Throw out the Communists, Communist associates, adherents to foreign ideologies, persons of abnormal moral weakness, and other dangerous security risks. The Armed Services Committees of the Congress should immediately institute a thorough investigation to determine why we are not prepared to fight a war.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a copy of a United Press dispatch from London dated January 10, according to which the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, laid down several points for stop-

ping the war in Korea, which included recognition of Communist China, withdrawing from Korea, and putting Formosa in the hands of the United Nations for discussion and disposition.

There being no objection, the dispatch was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AS CEASE-FIRE PRELIMINARY, BEVIN PROPOSES UN SEAT FOR CHINA

LONDON, January 10.—British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin has told the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference that Communist China should be admitted to the UN to bring about a cease-fire in Korea and a solution of far eastern problems, it was learned today.

Mr. Bevin submitted a working paper to the conference outlining six main points:

Recognition and admission of Communist China to the UN.

Negotiations should be started after this action to bring about a cease-fire in Korea.

Establishment of a security zone in Korea.

Thereafter a UN commission should be set up to handle subsequent problems.

Gradual withdrawal of all UN and Chinese Communist forces from Korea.

A free and impartial plebiscite regarding the unification of Korea.

The conference has laid aside the far eastern problem temporarily to await future developments on the subject, including those in the UN.

"It would be safe to say that British policy in the Far East today greatly depends on what happens in Korea," informed sources said. "Neither the British Government nor any commonwealth government yet knows what the policy would be if the Chinese Communists persist in their drive to force the UN into the sea."

The conference turned to a discussion of the world's supply of raw materials today and also may discuss European affairs.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks an Associated Press dispatch from Lake Success, outlining the fact that the General Assembly's Political Committee was scheduled to meet at 3 p. m., but that informed quarters said it probably would adjourn until next week because no one had any formal proposals ready yet in regard to how to stop the war, while delaying any possible defense by cutting the supply lines of the Communist troops.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D. C.) Evening Star of January 11, 1951]

FURTHER DELAY FACES UN IN SETTLEMENT OF KOREAN WAR QUESTION—NO FORMAL CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS READY YET; ADJOURNMENT LIKELY

LAKE SUCCESS, January 11.—The United Nations today faced a new delay in its quest for a Korean peace settlement.

The General Assembly's 60-nation Political Committee was scheduled to meet at 3 p. m., but informed quarters said it probably would adjourn until next week because no one had any formal proposals ready yet.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks an article entitled "British Papers Hit UN War Reports," published in the New York Times of January 9,

1951. The article is written by Benjamin Welles, and is dated London, January 8.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRITISH PAPERS HIT UN WAR REPORTS—MIRROR SAYS ESTIMATES BY AIR FORCE OF ENEMY DEAD IN KOREA ARE "ALMOST ALWAYS FALSE"

(By Benjamin Welles)

LONDON, January 8.—Today for the fourth successive day one of Britain's mass circulation newspapers attacked alleged distortion and hysteria in communiqués issued on the Korean fighting by Gen. Douglas MacArthur's headquarters.

The Daily Mirror, which reputedly has the widest daily circulation in Britain, has been maintaining that estimates of the enemy killed and buildings destroyed issued by the United States Fifth Air Force, under General MacArthur's command, have been valueless because almost always false.

This campaign has been taken up in other widely read newspapers.

The Daily Mirror's campaign led off last Thursday with front-page editorial entitled "Silly Headquarters Hand-Outs on Korean War." Next day the front page was dominated by a headline, "Fairy tales from Korea: the world is not getting the truth."

[The United States Far East Air Forces, taking note of charges in the British press, denied on January 6 that Air Force communiqués exaggerated the losses inflicted on the enemy by air action.]

CORRESPONDENT BACK FROM FRONT

"The picture of actual events in Korea and especially of the fighting—or lack of it—has been dreadfully distorted," said David Walker, Daily Mirror correspondent, who recently returned from the Korean front.

"This," said Mr. Walker, "was the fault of Alice in Wonderland information handed out to the press in Tokyo or at Eighth Army headquarters."

Specifically he listed Air Force claims such as 341 enemy killed, 91 enemy killed, or, on another occasion, 50 enemy killed in a tunnel.

"A modern 10-year-old boy in short trousers knows that, whether it be low-flying jets or high-flying B-29's, no air force can possibly know exactly how many people it has killed," Mr. Walker asserted.

Yesterday the Sunday Pictorial, which is owned by the same interests as the Daily Mirror, said in a front-page editorial headed "Is this a private war?" that British troops had been ordered by United States headquarters to retreat continuously, in some cases 200 miles, without ever sighting the enemy.

WILLOUGHBY IS CHIDED

Lord Beaverbrook's Sunday Express also took up the cry yesterday by turning its attention to Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's intelligence chief.

"If his communiqués are to be believed," the Express said, "his intelligence system is nothing short of miraculous." Noting that a communiqué of December 26 stated that there were 444,406 Communist enemy forces in Korea, of whom 277,173 were Chinese and 167,233 North Koreans, a Sunday Express columnist said:

"I have never seen a wartime report of enemy strength in such precise terms. . . . What kind of man is this General Willoughby? Is he, as his critics say, publicity officer for MacArthur or is he a secret service genius?"

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks an editorial entitled "Sure Road to Disaster," published in the Boston Evening American of January 3, 1951.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SURE ROAD TO DISASTER

The Truman administration, having bungled the Nation into a disastrous war in Korea and into the imminent prospect of a world-wide conflict, chooses this anxious moment as the time to deliver a damaging blow to the Nation's economy.

The administration, hostile as it is to American industry, nevertheless recognizes the fact that only a swift and enormous increase of industrial output now can save the Nation from disaster.

Accordingly, the administration is urgently appealing to industry for fresh miracles of production.

But at the same time the administration has sent a delegation of State Department officials to Torquay, England, to give away to foreign nations the American market on which American industry depends for its strength and its existence.

This betrayal of American security is being accomplished through the International Trade Conference, and the method is simple.

The State Department delegation, acting on and abusing the authority of the Trade Agreement Act of 1934, simply grants drastic reductions in our tariff rates on whatever products foreign nations wish to send into our domestic market to compete with our own products.

And since the products of many of those nations come from machines operated by low-wage labor or even slave labor, our products frequently cannot compete.

Already the Truman administration's fatuous tariff reductions have put long-established American industries out of business.

Every such collapse takes away the jobs of American workers and gives them to workers in a foreign land. It is always an economic disaster to America.

But in these times it is also a military disaster, since it deprives the Nation of an urgently needed source of production.

In view of this obvious fact, the Truman administration's insistence on continuing and accelerating, at Torquay, the progress of destroying American productive capacity can only be attributed to the pathological confusion that pervades all the administration's thinking.

The administration must be halted in its bemused and disastrous course, for the Nation's safety.

Senator MALONE, of Nevada, suggests that the Eighty-second Congress accomplish it by permitting the Trade Agreement Act to expire next June 30.

Better still, let the Eighty-second Congress repeal the Trade Agreement Act immediately before the current sell-out at Torquay can be consummated.

HEALTHY SIGN

It is a very good and beneficial thing for the United States that some of its statesmen have not lost the courage to speak their minds.

One of these statesmen is Senator GEORGE MALONE, who recently told his colleagues:

"We have fumbled ourselves into a position of defending the self-interest of almost every nation in the world at the expense of our own."

"We have been soft-talked into apologizing that the appropriations passed on the floor of the Senate for the benefit of foreign nations are not larger—and if someone inadvertently mentions our own best interests, he is immediately branded an isolationist."

As long as statesmen can speak out like that, our freedoms will survive.

Unity based on silence, or fear to express one's mind, is not unity at all.

It is the selfsame regimentation which has made Stalin a dictator and a tyrant.

If we enjoy strength, it is because we have leaders like Herbert Hoover who exploded the greatest issue of our times—the one involving our very lives—and who caused millions of Americans to demand a reexamination of our policies and practices.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks an editorial entitled, "Unity Is Not Silence," published in the New York Daily Mirror of January 2, 1951.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITY IS NOT SILENCE

We have heard so many appeals for unity of recent days that, frankly, we are a little sick of the word and more than a little suspicious of the chorus of appealers.

Unity for providing arms for Americans who must fight, yes.

Unity in sacrifice and in the period of austerity that is ahead of us—in which it appears we will say good-bye once and for all to the good old days, yes.

Unity to the point that we are supposed to shut our lips and refrain from criticizing the bird brains in Washington who have got us into this awful mess, no.

As far as we can determine, there are a lot of people in Washington who confuse unity with dictatorship.

They would like us to swallow Acheson without a burp—in the holy interests of unity.

They would like us to forget the long series of tragic bunglings, extending from the Roosevelt administration into the Truman administration, and to be good little boys and never mention them again—in the interests of unity.

Bunk. Stalin has that kind of unity. Hitler had it. Mussolini had it.

It is not the kind of unity that can be fostered in a free country, and it is not unity at all. It is dead rot.

If we have strength, it is because we have criticism.

Why, even Mr. Acheson apparently no longer feels that the Chinese Communists are simple agrarians, and he has become quite a vocal anti-Communist.

If we have strength, it is because we have great critics like Herbert Hoover, men of courage and patriotism and stature, unafraid of the petty insults of the one-world political mob.

It was Herbert Hoover who exploded the greatest issue of our times, the vital issue of our lives, out into the open, into national debate and scrutiny and reexamination.

And the reverberations of that explosion from among the people have had a rocking and shocking and altogether salutary effect upon the policy makers who smugly believed they knew the temper and will of the people and who were wrong.

True unity can come only in the tempering fires of national, controversial discussion, among a people alert, aware, free, and permitted to speak their minds. Suppression, whether it is voluntary or enforced, is the agent of disunity.

"We have fumbled ourselves into a position of defending the self-interest of almost every nation in the world at the expense of our own," says Senator GEORGE MALONE on the Senate floor. "We have been soft-talked into apologizing that the appropriations passed on the floor of the Senate for the benefit of foreign nations are not larger—and if someone inadvertently mentions our own best interests, he is immediately branded an isolationist."

Thank God that Americans who hold American interests paramount to all other interests have not lost their voices. Certainly they have not lost their audience. Unity is not the sheeplike, blind pursuit of a crooked trail over a precipice.

UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN THE ANTHRACITE AREA OF PENNSYLVANIA

During Mr. MALONE's address, Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada yield to me for about 5 minutes to make a statement, without the Senator losing the floor thereby?

Mr. MALONE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania under those conditions, with the understanding that whatever the Senator has to say shall appear at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LONG in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, the American people will be called upon to assume an extremely heavy burden of taxation to pay the cost of our preparations for national defense.

Even though we escape the tragedies of another world war, as we all hope and pray, the cost of these defense preparations will have a profound effect upon the standard of living which we now enjoy.

We are now engaged in a great program of industrial expansion. We are pouring out billions of dollars in order to assure vastly increased production of everything needed to arm and equip our Armed Forces. In planning and administering that program it is incumbent upon every agency of Government to protect the taxpayers from every form of wasteful expenditure.

In this connection I have called the attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the heads of the war mobilization agencies to a situation in my own State of Pennsylvania where there is an opportunity to save many millions of dollars and at the same time alleviate the worst unemployment condition in the Nation.

I refer to the anthracite coal area of Pennsylvania which, according to the Federal Government's own survey, has been the hardest hit economically in the United States.

The metropolitan districts in two counties in this area, Lackawanna and Luzerne, are the only remaining districts in the Nation that are classified by the Bureau of Employment Security of the United States Department of Labor as E areas. That classification, as the Senate is aware, is the lowest designation given.

It means that at least 12 percent of the available labor force is unemployed.

This labor force, of which more than 12 percent is unemployed, is made up of skilled workers, good hard working, patriotic Americans. They ask only a decent opportunity to work. They are well qualified to render a real service to the Nation in the defense program.

Here is a surplus of manpower, ready and able to apply their skills and craftsmanship in the national interest. That is why I urge that contracts be chan-

neled into these areas where they are so badly needed.

The expanding defense production program will call for the construction of many new manufacturing plants. Some of these unquestionably will be located in sparsely populated sections.

In such areas much additional construction will be required, such as housing for workers, service establishments, recreational centers, hospitals, schools, and churches. In many places it will be necessary to provide transportation facilities. In addition it will be necessary to recruit workers from other parts of the country and relocate them in the new defense factory areas.

Mr. President, none of these costly factors will enter into the building of defense plants in the anthracite area of Pennsylvania.

With economy in mind it seems to me that every consideration should be given to the advantages from which the Nation can benefit in this section.

An adequate supply of skilled manpower is immediately available.

Existing churches, schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, and cultural centers are ample to serve the needs of their respective communities.

All necessary transportation facilities are now functioning.

Mr. President, in bringing this situation to the attention of my colleagues, I do not imply that the anthracite area in Pennsylvania is the only one which is in need of such help as may be gained through the defense program. There are other sections where similar conditions exist but not to the same critical extent.

I am therefore urging that a substantial saving be made by placing a share of the defense contracts and building some of the new defense plants in areas which have a labor surplus, adequate housing and other facilities rather than in places where the Government will have to start from scratch.

Such a policy would not only speed up the program, but, in addition, would save scarce building material for other essential construction and would lighten the burden on the taxpayers.

Mr. President, I have made these facts available to the President and to the heads of various agencies which have the responsibility for mobilizing our industrial strength for defense production.

For the information of my colleagues I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point in my remarks a copy of a letter I have addressed to President Truman, General Marshall, the Honorable Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization, the Honorable William H. Harrison, Director of the Defense Production Administration, and the Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

I want to call your attention to an area in my State of Pennsylvania, which, according to the Federal Government's own surveys, has been the hardest hit economically in the entire United States.

I refer to the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania where there is a surplus of manpower which can render a real service in the national defense program.

On November 5, the United States Bureau of the Census issued a population report covering the 168 standard metropolitan areas of the Nation. The figures are for April 1, 1950, the official date of the 10-year census of population.

The report shows that Luzerne County, Pa., which includes the cities of Wilkes-Barre and Hazleton, had a population of 391,226 on April 1. In striking contrast, the county population was 441,518 in the 1940 census. Thus, in a decade, the district's population declined by 11.4 percent. In the same decade the national population gain was 14.3 percent.

Bordering Luzerne County on the north is Lackawanna County which includes the city of Scranton. This county's population was 256,208 in the 1950 census, a drop of 14.9 percent from its 301,243 population of 1940.

Of the 168 standard metropolitan areas listed on November 5, nearly all reported population gains. Among those which had losses, the Scranton and Wilkes-Barre areas were by far the hardest hit.

Recent reports of the Bureau of Employment Security of the United States Department of Labor disclose that the Scranton and Wilkes-Barre areas are the only two remaining E areas in the United States. As you know, an E area is the lowest classification given. It means that at least 12 percent of the labor force is unemployed.

Thus, unemployment conditions in these sections are the worst in the Nation, despite the fact that such a very large portion of the population has already moved away to seek work.

At present our Government is engaged in a vast industrial expansion program for national defense. If some contracts under that program were placed in Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties it would go a long way toward alleviating the critical unemployment situation and at the same time would give these patriotic, hard-working people an opportunity to do real service in the country's time of need.

In the expanding defense program, it will be necessary to erect new factory buildings. I urge that some be built in these areas. If the experience of World War II means anything, many manufacturing plants will be erected in open, thinly populated portions of the Nation. This means the Government will have to build and pay for much construction in addition to the new factories.

It will have to provide housing for workers. It will have to build schools and recreation centers. It will have to provide transportation systems to serve these workers.

In addition, it will have to recruit workers in other parts of the country and transplant them in the new defense factory areas.

For your consideration, I submit the advantages offered by the Wilkes-Barre and Scranton areas:

An adequate supply of skilled labor is available immediately.

Schools, transportation, and stores are already there.

So are theaters, playgrounds, athletic fields, and other recreational facilities. The money to build them can be saved for the taxpayers. The scarce building materials can be saved for other essential construction.

I urge the Government and its agencies to take advantage of these factors. In that way, not only the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre area, but also the State and Nation would be helped.

Will you please give this matter prompt attention? I would deeply appreciate being advised concerning any steps your agency can take in the establishment of defense plants or the placing of defense orders in this area where they are so badly needed.

QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTORS—PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I have today introduced in the Senate for myself and 11 other Senators from Southern States a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the qualifications of electors participating in the election of elective Federal officials, including electors for President or Vice President, and Senators and Representatives in Congress. The proposed new article of the Constitution contains two sections, as follows:

SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax or to meet any property qualifications.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The adoption of this amendment as a part of the Federal Constitution would result in preventing both the United States and any of the States of the Union from denying or abridging the right of citizens from participating in the election of Federal officials because of failure to pay any poll or head tax or any tax of any other kind or to meet any property qualification. The adoption of this amendment would, therefore, bring a complete end to the so-called poll tax controversy and would at the same time prevent the setting up of some new requirement as a qualification for voting, such as the requirement that some other tax be paid or some certain class or amount of property be owned by a citizen in order to qualify him for voting.

It will be recalled that I introduced an identical joint resolution in the first session of the Eighty-first Congress on January 13, 1949, for nine other southern Senators and myself. This resolution was never acted upon during the Eighty-first Congress by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to which it was referred. I am now glad to announce that in reintroducing this joint resolution today I am joined by the following distinguished Senators as cosponsors, namely, my colleague from Florida, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. GEORGE, of Georgia; Mr. HOEY and Mr. SMITH, of North Carolina; Mr. BYRD and Mr. ROBERTSON, of Virginia; Mr. O'CONOR, of Maryland; Mr. ELLENDER and Mr. LONG, of Louisiana; Mr. McCLELLAN and Mr. FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas.

We sponsors of this joint resolution strongly believe that the resolution should be speedily submitted by this Congress to the States for ratification, and, if so submitted, we believe that it will be quickly ratified by at least the required 36 States. Because we are so sure that the requisite number of States would speedily ratify the resolution we are quite agreeable to the allowing of any reasonable short period of time for the consideration and ratification of this resolution. In the case that either the Committee on the Judiciary or the Senate feels that such a time limitation

should be imposed, we are agreeable to limiting the time of consideration of the amendment by the States to as little as 3 years. We call attention to the fact that when the seventeenth amendment providing for the direct election of United States Senators, and opposed on many of the identical grounds voiced against our proposed amendment, was submitted to the States for ratification on May 13, 1912, the ratification completed by the 36th ratifying State on April 8, 1913, or less than 11 months after the date of submission. Of the 37 ratifying States, 5 of them were Southern States which at the time had in force under State law poll-tax requirements for voting. The nineteenth amendment, providing suffrage for women, required less than 15 months for adoption.

At the present time only six States—Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—require the payment of poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. South Carolina, until recently, had a constitutional provision requiring poll tax, but this was repealed by the adoption at the general election last November of a constitutional amendment proposed by the 1950 State legislature. I am advised that the South Carolina Legislature, which is now in session, must approve the action of the electorate in the November election, and that such approval appears to be imminent. For the record I want the Senate to know that the poll-tax requirement was repealed by the State of Florida by legislative action in 1937 at which time I was a member of the State senate and was one of the supporters of the action by which repeal was accomplished.

The poll-tax requirement, now limited to the six States already mentioned, has been accorded far greater importance than it deserves. The fact of the matter is that the amount of poll tax required to be paid in the several States is so small as to impose only a slight economic obstacle for any citizen who desires to qualify to cast a ballot. This requirement operates, of course, equally on citizens of all races and colors and is generally subject to important exemptions which limit its application, such as the exemption of veterans, of women, and of citizens beyond a certain age limit.

Notwithstanding the fact that all cosponsors of this proposed amendment feel that the importance of the poll-tax question has been magnified far beyond its actual effect, it is our feeling that the problem has been so widely discussed and has been so generally regarded as the imposition of an undemocratic handicap on Negro citizens who comprise a minority group in our Nation, that it would be good public policy and in the interest of sounder democratic government to speedily move, through this proposed amendment, to bring a complete end to the imposition of the poll-tax requirement as a condition of participation in Federal elections. The proposed amendment would have no effect whatever upon the election of officials at the State or local level, but would leave this subject, as heretofore, to the discretion and jurisdiction of the several States.

Since there are many good citizens who have indicated their feeling that this subject matter should be dealt with through the passage of a Federal statute rather than through the adoption of a Federal constitutional amendment, we feel that it is proper to call attention to the fact that as shown by the debates on this subject over many years, in both the Senate and House of Representatives, there are many able constitutional lawyers, coming not only from the South but also from all other portions of the Nation, who have always believed and contended that the only legal way to deal with this question, other than through action by the States themselves, is by Federal constitutional amendment, and that action through Federal statute would clearly violate the provisions and requirements of the Federal Constitution under which the qualification of electors, as prescribed under the laws of the several States, is adopted as the qualification of electors to vote upon Federal officials.

The sponsors of the resolution which I have just introduced have very deep convictions on this matter, and I feel that I should say for each and all of us that we regard the Federal Government as without any authority whatsoever to deal with this subject matter except by the submission and ratification of a Federal constitutional amendment.

While this is no time or place for a full statement of the position of the sponsors of the proposed amendment, I feel that it is proper to call brief attention to the following facts which support our conviction:

First. The framers of the original Constitution in 1787 provided for the election of Members of the House of Representatives under section 2 of article I of the original Constitution, part of which reads as follows:

The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

At the very time that the original Constitution was being drafted and while it was being considered by the several States there appeared in the constitutions of most of the Original Thirteen States specific requirements for electors of the most numerous branch of their respective legislatures, which requirements were described by the use of the very word "qualifications," which requirements comprised either ownership of property of a stated nature or value or payment of taxes in a stated amount, or payment of poll taxes, specifically named as such. In the case of the State of New Hampshire, under its constitution of 1784, a poll or head tax was specifically required as one of the qualifications for a citizen to vote for a member of the House of Representatives of New Hampshire which was the most numerous branch of the State legislature. It was against such an existing background in 1787 that the members of the Constitutional Convention wrote into our original Constitution the provision of section 2 of article I which I have already mentioned and which adopted as Federal qualifications for electors of Members of

the House of Representatives the "qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature."

Second. In 1912, 125 years after the drafting of the original Constitution, the Congress submitted the seventeenth amendment providing for the direct election of United States Senators. The Congress saw fit at that time to incorporate in the seventeenth amendment and as a part of it the exact words which appear in section 2 of article I of the original Constitution where they apply to the election of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words, in submitting the seventeenth amendment the Congress used, and in ratifying the seventeenth amendment the several States again approved, the specific requirement thus made applicable to Members of the Senate that "the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature." It is, of course, well known to every Member of the Senate that at the time of the submission and ratification of the seventeenth amendment a considerably larger number of States than the six which still preserve the poll tax requirement, not only enforced that requirement but had embodied the same in their several State constitutions as a qualification for voting, which fact was well known to the general public and to the Members of the Sixty-second Congress which submitted the amendment.

Without arguing the matter at greater length at this time, I simply want to restate the fact that the sponsors of the proposed amendment have strong convictions that the Congress is without power to deal effectively with this subject matter through the passage of a Federal statute and that the adoption of such a statute would bring on protracted and unfruitful litigation, long delay, and questionable results. In the event such a statute should ever be upheld by the Supreme Court in the face of what we believe to be its complete unconstitutionality, it is clear that such a ruling would invite the Congress to adopt further provisions affecting the qualification of electors, as for instance provisions affecting the age requirement, the period of residence in the State or county, or both, and other requirements, all of which would seriously impinge upon the rights of the several States to fix these matters of important public policy within their own respective jurisdictions and based on their own experience and judgment.

The introducers of the proposed amendment are exceedingly anxious that it be acted upon speedily and favorably by the Congress so that this subject matter, which has been the source of such long controversy and fruitless debate, and on which both of the political parties are so fully committed, may be quickly submitted to the States where we believe that it will be promptly ratified. We feel that such a conclusion of this long-standing controversy is decidedly in the interest of sound democratic government and stronger unity among all of the people of our Nation. Perhaps the speedy

settlement of this issue may lead the way to moderate and clearly legal settlements of other long-standing questions on which we have been long divided and sometimes even bitterly divided.

We are offering this amendment in the hope that it may receive friendly, favorable, and speedy action by the Congress. In the event it appears that this hope cannot be realized, but that the issue will again be subjected to long, protracted, and even bitter debate, we would prefer of course that it be laid aside, as the grave national and international problems which confront our Nation do not justify in our judgment the expenditure of any great time or effort or the indulging in any extended discussion of this subject. These perilous times call, in our opinion, for unity and harmony, and for quick, just, and lawful settlement of domestic controversy where such is reasonably possible. Where not possible we believe that such controversies should be laid aside so that all citizens may unite in the tremendous joint effort which our national and international problems require of us.

AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND AMERICAN TROOPS ABROAD

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, several times this afternoon in colloquy I have addressed a question to Senators who have spoken, as to whether or not they were in favor before the Congress has an opportunity to determine the policy, either under the North Atlantic Treaty or under the Constitution, of making commitments of our American boys to be assigned to an integrated international army in Europe.

In his message on the state of the Union the President was silent as to the particular provision which I have just mentioned. However, the news ticker this afternoon carries a purported statement by the President. Of course, as the majority leader well knows, there is always an opportunity for human error. This is what the President is reported to have said this afternoon:

Over and over again at a news conference, the President said there was no question about the authority of a President to send troops anywhere in the world.

He said this authority is recognized abundantly throughout the history of this country.

Mr. Truman said, however, that this Government always consults with congressional committees on foreign policy decisions, particularly the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The only restriction Congress could place on his power to send troops where needed, he said, would necessarily be by restricting appropriations for this purpose.

And Mr. Truman made it clear that present plans are to supply troops for the united command of General Eisenhower for the defense of the North Atlantic countries.

Mr. President, if that report is true, and I take it to be true, the President for the first time has flatly told the Congress and the American people that he expects to send troops abroad, and, if I correctly interpret the release, the President feels he can do so without coming to the Congress of the United States for it to determine whether or not he has the authority, either under the North Atlantic

Treaty or under the Constitution, to take such action.

My reason for mentioning the matter—and I do so with the desire to be constructive, as the majority leader knows—is because I have submitted a resolution on the subject. I did so after I had read headlines in the newspapers saying that commitments had been made. Feeling that the Congress should determine whether American foot soldiers are to be placed in an integrated army in Europe, I submitted a resolution which reads:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that no Ground Forces of the United States shall be assigned to duty in European areas for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the formulation of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress.

The resolution asks only one thing; that before any commitment is made or American soldiers are assigned to this integrated army, the President shall permit Congress to determine whether or not we are to follow such a policy. I took the matter up with the majority leader, who has very kindly cooperated. It had been my intention to move or to ask unanimous consent, before the session today ended, that the resolution be made the unfinished business, because I think the issues are now joined. I think Members of Congress will agree on that point. To me this question represents the crux of the whole foreign policy, because our appropriations, our taxes, our allocations in this country—yes, the question of manpower, including even 18 year old boys—will be dependent upon the policy of sending land troops to Europe as a part of an integrated army.

I respectfully call the matter to the attention of the distinguished majority leader, and I hope that after the Senate convenes on Monday as soon as possible after the business of the Senate with respect to organization matters has been concluded, we may determine upon a time when the resolution can come before the Senate and be debated and disposition made of it.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, as has been stated by the minority leader, I told him that I would discuss with him the time for taking up the resolution. However, I also told him that I thought it should have the consideration of a committee. At the proper time I shall move that the resolution be referred to the appropriate committee. I shall also discuss that matter with the minority leader.

Mr. President, I understand that the minority have about completed their committee assignments, but that they are going to have a caucus tomorrow when they will determine whether they will make a motion which will in effect change the Reorganization Act. I had hoped that we could complete the committee organization today. I had hoped, as a matter of fact, that we might have completed it several days ago. But I understand the difficulty in making assignments, and I have wanted to give the members of the minority party every possible consideration. For that reason, Mr. President, I feel that under the circumstances, it being uncertain as to just

what will be done, the only thing we can do is to wait until after the caucus has been held, and then there can be presented to the Senate the proposal to be made which will in effect change the Reorganization Act.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment?

Mr. McFARLAND. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. I think the RECORD ought to show that, as stated by the majority leader, a conference will be held tomorrow to approve the assignments of Senators on the minority side as proposed by the Committee on Committees. I want the RECORD also to show that, while one can never be sure what a conference may approve, I have no doubt that by noon tomorrow the minority will be able to present its committee assignments for the organization of the Senate, and that we can cooperate with the majority leader in that respect.

Mr. McFARLAND. But the Senator has not given us information as to whether there will be an attempt made in effect to change the Reorganization Act. Of course, we need to have some notice of such a proposal. I would certainly appreciate it if the Senator from Nebraska would communicate with me tomorrow in regard to the action taken by the caucus on that point, so that I can notify Members on this side, in order that we can be ready to proceed to a vote on that question possibly on Monday. The Reorganization Act is regarded as very important by a great many Senators, and they do not want to change it. So, in fairness to them, I feel that they must have at least 24 hours' notice of any effort the caucus may propose to make along that line. The distinguished Senator from Nebraska can communicate with me tomorrow as to what the caucus decides in that regard, without going through the inconvenience of having a session so that the communication can be made on the floor. I will take the responsibility of notifying other Senators as to what the caucus decides.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I can give the distinguished majority leader assurance now that there will not be any attempt made permanently to change the Reorganization Act. That would have to be done by submitting a measure to the Committee on Rules and Administration, on which hearings would be had, and a subsequent report by the committee to the Senate. But I should like to say to the distinguished Senator that we are going to attempt to convince the majority that we need more Republican members on more committees, so as to distribute more equitably the load of work that must be done. I suggest once more to the majority leader that something be done along that line.

Since the majority leader feels that he should have a full attendance of the membership, I believe the thing to do is to take a recess to Monday, and I serve notice now that it is agreeable to us that the committees of the Senate be organized at that time. We are giving more than 24 hours' notice, so the majority leader can prepare for it.

Mr. McFARLAND. Will the Senator from Nebraska kindly communicate with me the decision in regard to what kind

of motion will be made after the Republican caucus has been held? Will the Senator be at liberty to do so?

Mr. WHERRY. I myself do not know what will be done. Since the Senator believes he should have a full representation on Monday, or any other day he wants to take up the subject of organization, I think he ought to move a recess until Monday, and I will give him all the information I can in the meantime. I suggest to the Senator, in view of the fact that he desires a full attendance, that I believe it would be best to recess until Monday.

RECESS TO MONDAY

Mr. McFARLAND. I would appreciate it if the Senator would convey to me tomorrow, after the Republican caucus, the nature of the motion which will be made, if it is agreeable to the caucus membership for him to do so.

I now move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon Monday.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 28 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until Monday, January 15, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate Friday, January 11 (legislative day of January 8), 1951:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Rear Adm. Herbert L. Pugh, Medical Corps, United States Navy, to be Surgeon General and Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Department of the Navy for a term of 4 years.

DEFENSE PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATOR

William H. Harrison, of New York, to be Defense Production Administrator.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named person for appointment in the Army Nurse Corps, Regular Army of the United States, in the grade of second lieutenant under the provisions of Public Law 36, Eightieth Congress:

Peggy Sappington, N805037.

APPOINTMENTS IN THE REGULAR ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States, in the grades and corps specified, under the provisions of section 506 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381, 80th Cong.), title II of the act of August 5, 1947 (Public Law 365, 80th Cong.), and Public Law 36, Eightieth Congress as amended by Public Law 514, Eighty-first Congress, subject to physical qualification:

To be major

Raymond Maret, MC, O329011.

To be captains

Blanche C. Albright, ANC, N728982.

Edythe Alt, ANC, N742202.

Ida B. Ayer, ANC, N768699.

Dorothy J. Barber, ANC, N735521.

Jane T. Becker, ANC, N728047.

Grace D. Boisvert, ANC, N730776.

Dorothea V. Bowers, ANC, N721221.

Margarita E. Breton, ANC, N783005.

Mary C. Bryan, ANC, N726867.

Doyle E. Burns, DC, O1775377.

Frances E. Cale, ANC, N763747.

James D. Caskie, MC, O1705710.

Elizabeth S. Chamberlin, ANC, N757040.

Dorothy M. Chartrau, ANC, N733447.

Gertrude M. Classen, ANC, N775131.

Ethel W. Coeling, WMSC, M516.

Edward F. Counts, Jr., MC, O935617.

Gladys M. Crosno, ANC, N736195.

Myrtle A. Crowell, ANC, N771131.

Elizabeth J. Davies, WMSC, M2497.

June M. Dickie, ANC, N751533.

Mary L. Dombrosky, ANC, N723550.

Helen I. Dunne, ANC, N726819.

Ruth Edenfield, ANC, N767392.

Margaret M. Egan, ANC, N722650.

Vera A. Enquist, ANC, N736267.

Gladys M. Eppright, ANC, N779972.

Adeline C. Evans, ANC, N767057.

Mercedes M. Fischer, ANC, N732315.

Georgia I. Fleet, ANC, N723382.

Janet M. Fleming, ANC, N741892.

Lillian Fore, ANC, N779252.

Gladys O. Fowle, ANC, N727976.

Sybil C. Freiman, ANC, N726035.

Edith F. Frew, ANC, N742165.

Mary H. Gayle, ANC, N736305.

Rita M. Geis, ANC, N732135.

Beatrice Goldberger, WMSC, R1331.

Mary M. Grant, ANC, N745086.

Mabel Hammarlund, ANC, N733333.

Elizabeth T. Hanna, ANC, N727354.

Ebba V. Hanson, ANC, N787479.

Levenia E. Hill, ANC, N764708.

Alice E. Holland, ANC, N723789.

Edith E. Hopkins, WMSC, R2222.

George W. Houck, MC, O1725757.

M. Marguerite Huff, ANC, N724643.

Helen F. Kay, ANC, N743771.

Marie Kimmet, ANC, N736074.

Nancy B. Kinsey, ANC, N724922.

Mary S. Kollner, ANC, N744834.

Olga R. Kugler, ANC, N756911.

Janie L. Lassiter, ANC, N763875.

Marguerite M. Lavin, ANC, N759550.

Mary S. Lawrence, WMSC, M601.

Margaret L. Loucks, ANC, N723105.

Martha C. McLaughlin, ANC, N743335.

Florence C. Malone, ANC, N720370.

Maria L. Marshall, ANC, N728687.

Dorothy C. Martone, ANC, N759391.

Beulah L. Marwine, ANC, N745567.

Margaret E. McGill, ANC, N724008.

Hubert W. Merchant, DC, O487380.

Mary C. Morris, ANC, N744161.

Clara R. Oberg, ANC, N730086.

Marie A. Oswald, ANC, N779052.

Floyce Parham, ANC, N775813.

Sylvia R. Pavlovich, ANC, N741620.

Loucelle E. Peck, ANC, N758550.

Alice E. Pettengill, ANC, N721998.

Ollie W. Plunkett, ANC, N745327.

Mary M. Preston, ANC, N763725.

Eleanor R. Reimers, WMSC, R1087.

Mary E. Riley, ANC, N772827.

Sophia D. Sedor, ANC, N761695.

Geraldine S. Smith, ANC, N724120.

Thelma I. Sooman, ANC, N783778.

Barbara C. Sox, ANC, N727839.

Ruth M. Steenburgh, ANC, N756235.

Alice E. Still, ANC, N742943.

Ida R. Strickland, WMSC, R408.

Ruth M. Stroemer, ANC, N772941.

Mary A. Taney, ANC, N755309.

Elizabeth P. Taylor, ANC, N728297.

Gladys A. Theiss, ANC, N736098.

Jeanne M. Treacy, ANC, N724830.

Celestia H. Uffring, ANC, N767068.

Fanny Urette, ANC, N730574.

Eileen M. Waite, ANC, N787274.

Nellie E. Walls, ANC, N759333.

Gladys M. Welch, ANC, N731925.

Margaret H. Wheeler, ANC, N774699.

Mary E. White, ANC, N752315.

Althea E. Williams, ANC, N733494.

Miriam E. Young, ANC, N733473.

To be first lieutenants

Mayna R. Allen, ANC, N776564.

Eugene J. Bell, Jr., JAGC, O989155.

Angela R. Benda, ANC, N784722.

Eugene F. Chandler, MC, O976732.

Betty P. Chellman, WMSC, R2293.

Edwin T. Cooke, MC, O984778.

Alyce-Marie C. Cushnie, ANC, N793733.

Virginia L. Jones, WMSC, R1394.

Robert L. Massonneau, MC, O975718.

Dorothy J. Matheson, ANC, N785581.

Patricia T. Murphy, ANC, N752652.

Marjorie K. Neuman, ANC, N797941.

Joseph P. O'Leary, DC, O950923.

Edwin M. Schmidt, JAGC, O989985.

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States in the grade of second lieutenant, under the provisions of section 506 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381, 80th Cong.), subject to physical qualification:

Marion C. Allbright, O1179758.
Raymond H. Beaty, O2021091.
Ian K. Burgess, O2203170.
Edwin D. Chavous, O2205567.
Jack R. Clawson, O978547.
Harry H. Collier, O2203917.
Carroll C. Davis, O2202355.
Eley P. Denson, Jr., O2211054.
Thomas J. Dilbeck, O967483.
Earl D. Downing, O2207320.
Robert C. Ebersberger, O966933.
Robert C. Effinger, Jr., O2204907.
Elmer D. Gates, O2201156.
Angelo Giambusso, AO712799.
James C. Griffith, O2207065.
Robert L. Harper, O2704789.
Gerald G. Hennis, O2202952.
William J. Hoar, O2200449.
Ernest P. Hoff, Jr., O971161.
Edward B. Kenney, O2205222.
Richard D. Kolter, O973381.
Keith E. Larsen, O2210833.
John F. Prendiville, Jr.
Albert E. Riley.
Hansel Y. Smith, Jr., O2209902.

APPOINTMENTS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

The officers named herein for appointment in the National Guard of the United States of the Army of the United States under the provisions of section 38 of the National Defense Act as amended:

To be major generals of the line

Maj. Gen. Harry Lynn Bolen, O185986, Illinois National Guard, to date from October 26, 1950.

Maj. Gen. Curtis Dion O'Sullivan, O113537, California National Guard, to date from October 26, 1950.

To be brigadier generals of the line

Brig. Gen. James William Cook, O298148, California National Guard, to date from October 26, 1950.

Brig. Gen. Vincent Paul Coyne, O236410, Massachusetts National Guard, to date from August 28, 1950.

Brig. Gen. Roy Albert Green, O226513, California National Guard, to date from October 26, 1950.

Brig. Gen. William Henry Naylor, O265997, Connecticut National Guard, to date from August 28, 1950.

To be brigadier generals, Adjutant General's Corps

Brig. Gen. James Aloysius Murphy, O143370, Rhode Island National Guard, to date from June 1, 1950.

Brig. Gen. Ralph Julian Olson, O232882, Wisconsin National Guard, to date from October 26, 1950.

Brig. Gen. Fred Calvin Tandy, O206131, Iowa National Guard, to date from October 26, 1950.

PROMOTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

The following-named officers for promotion in the United States Air Force under the provisions of sections 502, 508, and 509 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. All medical officers nominated for promotion have been found professionally qualified for promotion as required by law. Those officers whose names are preceded by the symbol (X) are subject to physical examination required by law. All others have been examined and found physically qualified for promotion.

To be majors

CHAPLAINS

Ellenbogen, Edward, 18771A.
Rogers, Vernon Otto, 18770A.

To be captains

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Anderson, Robert Seymour, 15199A.
Andrews, George Allen, 15103A.
Antosz, Leo Joseph, 15197A.
Bales, Glenn Edward, 15055A.
Bartek, Joe John, 15211A.
Barth, John Craig, 15152A.
Bathurst, John Forrest, 15144A.
Blunk, John Robert, 15066A.
Borbe, Alfred Thomas, 15050A.
Brazelton, Leslie Felix, 15214A.
Brock, Arthur Wellington, 15173A.
Brown, Bernard Leon, 15081A.
Brown, Henry William, 15225A.
Bryan, Warren Leroy, 15109A.
Burke, John Thomas, 15181A.
Butler, Ralph Joseph, 15142A.
Campbell, Glenn Vincent, 15070A.
Carlstrom, Robert Donald, 15098A.
Cavanaugh, Charles Elmer, Jr., 15200A.
X Chafin, James Troy, Jr., 15113A.
Chauret, Colin Joseph Nicholas, 15218A.
Chmura, Edward, 15077A.
X Cismowski, Aloysius Michael, 15106A.
Clark, Frederick A., 15189A.
Coleman, Fred, 15119A.
Conway, Jack Melvin, 15124A.
Corbin, Zane Edwin, 15082A.
Cox, Harold Donavon, 15068A.
Daffern, Troey, 15048A.
Dankof, Karl Elson, 15171A.
Deschamps, Elzeard John, 15216A.
X Di Labbio, Paul, 15047A.
Dix, Roy Arthur, 15111A.
Doering, Edward Wayne, 15118A.
Douglas, Logan Albert, 15227A.
Downey, Richard Forrest, 15190A.
Drake, William Henry, 15219A.
Edens, Billy Gene, 15209A.
Eggleston, John Waller, 15169A.
Elrod, John Hale, 15187A.
England, John Brooke, 15188A.
Englebreton, Robert Edward, 15088A.
Erickson, Arnold Theodore, 15215A.
Fairbank, Charles Edward, 15059A.
Falkenberg, Harold Stanton, 15083A.
Fisher, Harrison Lee, 15148A.
Fisher, Robert Jeremy, 15166A.
Fox, Bob Duane, 15058A.
French, George Holmes, 15201A.
X Frost, Douglas Hugh, 15194A.
Frost, Jack Junior, 15150A.
Garrison, Keith M., 15180A.
Gibson, John Raymond, 15122A.
Glasgow, Thurman Arnold, 15080A.
X Goldblum, Theodore, 15174A.
Graham, Harold Bruce, 15183A.
Graham, Neil James, 15052A.
Hall, Marvin Russell, 15163A.
Hanlen, John Wayne, 15195A.
Hardy, Nathan Chester, 15069A.
Hargis, Horace Peyton, 15139A.
X Hartman, Richard John, 15056A.
Harvey, Theodore Richard, 15204A.
Hasselbaum, Roth Oscar, 15196A.
Heller, Richard Frederick, Jr., 15089A.
Higgins, Richard William, 15153A.
X Hilburn, John E., 15213A.
X Hinkle, Arthur Lee, 15061A.
Hobbs, Robert Alan, 15206A.
Hoyl, Basil Landon, 15154A.
Hunt, Hollis Hubert, 15133A.
X Hunt, Raymond Dale, 15051A.
Hurley, Raymond Leo, 15054A.
X Hurtle, Robert Paige, 15138A.
Hurst, Eugene Edward, 15170A.
Iannacito, George James, 15101A.
Jensen, Loyd Eugene, 15074A.
X Johnson, Haddon, Jr., 15100A.
X Jones, Paul Daniel, 15146A.
X Keppler, Elmer Charles, 15158A.
Kerr, Teddy Junior, 15179A.
Lane, Harry Wesley, 15096A.
Laster, Tom Garrison, 15110A.
Leone, Joseph Michele, 15102A.
Lindsey, Wilbur Ross, Jr., 15071A.
Lozito, Francis Carmel, 15065A.
Mabrey, Thomas Franklin, 15063A.
Madara, George Leonard, Jr., 15202A.
Madsen, Lawrence Edwards, 15092A.

Maloney, Robert Alphonse, 15078A.
Martin, Walter Don, 15108A.
Martin, Warren Harry, 15210A.
Matthews, Albert McKay, 15131A.
Mattick, Stephen, 15049A.
McCulloch, Donald Edward, 15151A.
McDaniel, Henry Bailey, Jr., 15105A.
McGill, Allen Keith, 15175A.
McKee, Donald Eugene, 15149A.
McKee, William Vincent, 15172A.
Meintsma, Seward Mortimer, 15127A.
Melton, Ramon Reeves, 15086A.
Miller, Francis Leo, 15128A.
Mitchell, Frank Grover, Jr., 15177A.
Moore, Robert Edward, 15126A.
Morrow, Craig Godfrey, 15094A.
Morrow, Russell Ellis, 15168A.
Moser, Fred A., Jr., 15141A.
Mullins, George Herbert, 15067A.
Myers, Thomas Ellis, 15136A.
Neuharth, Richard Emanuel, 15182A.
Nevill, Rex Ferrall, 15162A.
X Noll, John Roger, 15134A.
Nourie, Robert Baron, 15114A.
Ochs, Robert Glen, 15229A.
O'Grady, Joe Milton, 15164A.
Parks, Joseph Wayne, Jr., 15212A.
Pensinger, Wilbur Carl, 15167A.
Peters, Marvin Leroy Wells, 15057A.
Plummer, John Augustine, 15087A.
Poindexter, Walter Edwin, 15205A.
Popham, Jack Edward, 15097A.
Preston, William Nathaniel, 15076A.
Rattie, Joseph Jackson, 15090A.
X Rayner, Clyde Frederick, 15159A.
Regis, Edward Robert, 15223A.
Robinson, Lester William, 15075A.
Rodriguez, Miguel Ramon, Jr., 15120A.
Rohr, Charles Edmond, 15117A.
Rose, Eugene Simon, Jr., 15060A.
Rose, Franklin, Jr., 15224A.
Savage, Thomas Potter, 15208A.
Scheider, Rube Frank, Jr., 15185A.
Sewell, Jack Kennard, 15130A.
Sharp, William Carmen, 15160A.
Sittler, Lloyd Wayne, 15178A.
Smith, Bernard Cyril, 15112A.
Smith, Douglas Ray, 15186A.
Smith, Robert Ritchie, 15191A.
Sorensen, Glenn Kenneth, 15132A.
Sparkman, Donald Herrick, 15165A.
Stewart, William Henry, 15123A.
Stout, Carl Edward, 15221A.
Stringer, Thomas Henry, 15135A.
Stuempfle, Robert Alan, 15125A.
Svimonoff, Constantine, 15072A.
Swalm, Thomas Stephen, 15203A.
Swigler, Adam William, Jr., 15099A.
X Taylor, Robert Guilford, 15116A.
Tench, William Cabell, 15115A.
Thomas, Lyle Scott, 15121A.
Thomas, Richard Jay, 15147A.
Thompson, Lyle William, 15228A.
Thorne, Richard Eugene, 15079A.
Torgensen, Elmer, 15107A.
Upton, Julian Bernard, 15064A.
Upton, Thomas Jefferson, 15053A.
Van Camp, Lawrence Fisher, 15155A.
Vickery, William Wilson, 15073A.
Voss, Robert Henry, 15129A.
Walker, George Thomas, 15161A.
Wallace, Jamie Walker, Jr., 15207A.
Warmack, Charles William, 15140A.
Waterhouse, William Carson, 15104A.
White, Alan Ralph, 15085A.
Wienberg, Harold Frank, 15220A.
Wilhelmi, William Henry, 15095A.
Willoughby, Albert Milton, Jr., 15156A.
Wilson, Edward Spaulding, 15217A.
Wilson, Thomas Lee, 15143A.
Winn, Earl Hardy, 15157A.
Wise, Earl Hardy, 15157A.
Wise, Henry Grady, Jr., 15084A.
Wright, Tandy Allison, 15222A.
Young, Herbert Lee, 15137A.

MEDICAL

Foley, Francis Edward, 19543A.
Hamilton, Charles Irving, Jr., 19558A.
Leavel, Boude Bowman, 19542A.
Payne, John William, 19544A.
Thornton, Nathaniel Albert, 19583A.

MEDICAL SERVICE

Goings, Charles Edward, Jr., 19522A.

To be first lieutenants

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Adams, Gordon Sackett, 18186A.
 Adcock, James Kenneth, 20589A.
 Ahrens, George Leo, 17732A.
 Alexander, Ernest Lee, 18143A.
 Allison, Thomas I., 17713A.
 Anderson, Charles Keller, 20616A.
 Anderson, George Olaf, 18184A.
 Anderson, Hunter Wilson, 17737A.
 Anderson, Jack Garner, 18188A.
 Avise, Herbert Jack, 18114A.
 Aust, Abner Maurice, Jr., 20631A.
 Ayres, Frank Lawrence, 18173A.
 Baker, Marshall Erbie, 20675A.
 Baker, Wilson Kirby, Jr., 17740A.
 Baldwin, Richard Allen, 18262A.
 Barns, William Frederick, 20630A.
 Barry, Russell John, 20656A.
 Barter, John Wallace, 18208A.
 Bass, Robert Albert, 20632A.
 Baumann, Robert Price, Jr., 18203A.
 Becker, Bertram David, 17971A.
 Beisner, Gerald Jean, 18251A.
 Bell, Robert Malcolm, 18145A.
 Bennett, George Alfred, 18154A.
 Beno, William George, 18205A.
 Bieber, Robert Warren, 17739A.
 Blanton, Franklin Dickinson, 21459A.
 Blodgett, Henry Parson, Jr., 18214A.
 Blount, Buford Charles, 17699A.
 Bobbitt, Aubrey, Malcolm, 20644A.
 Bohannon, James Raymond, Jr., 18146A.
 Boone, Warren Wallace, 17708A.
 Borders, Charles Wesley, 18149A.
 Bostick, Arthur Worth, 18239A.
 Boswell, Marion Lillard, 17719A.
 Bowman, Ralph Irving, Jr., 18209A.
 Boyle, William Fredrick, 17729A.
 Bray, Leslie William, Jr., 18136A.
 Brennan, Joseph Xavier, 17728A.
 Brinson, William Leslie, 18117A.
 Brisley, Bernard Anthony, 18265A.
 Brown, Jack Riley, 20599A.
 Brownfield, Paul Wehrle, 20597A.
 Brumm, Robert Ellsworth, 17717A.
 Burkhart, James Murrell, 18230A.
 Burnett, Elvin Earl, 20601A.
 Burns, Robert Bernard, 17727A.
 Bush, Frederick Eugene, 20643A.
 Busha, George Francis, 20628A.
 Byrn, John Stanford, 18196A.
 Canning, Douglas Strickland, 20577A.
 Chapman, John Monroe, Jr., 17700A.
 Clark, Earl Otis, Jr., 20682A.
 Clements, Ben Hill, Jr., 17733A.
 Clifton, Leecroy, 20650A.
 Collington, Frederick, 20663A.
 Collings, Perry Vermont, 18156A.
 Cook, William, Jr., 18257A.
 Cooney, Jack Bernard, 20657A.
 Cooper, Dewey Glenn, 18260A.
 Craig, Robert Peter, 20649A.
 Crosby, Samuel Eugene, Jr., 20612A.
 Crowley, John McBride, 18217A.
 Crowther, Frederick Earl, 18221A.
 Cude, Willis Augustus, Jr., 21463A.
 Cummins, James Dirickson, Jr., 20618A.
 Curry, Ralph Jack, 18245A.
 Davis, Bruce, 18120A.
 De Gennaro, Carlo Nicola, 20570A.
 Doe, Irving Chester, 18155A.
 Doiron, Claude Joseph, Jr., 20596A.
 Donegan, Charles Edward, 18283A.
 Doran, Patrick Leo, 18207A.
 Dotson, Herbert Forrest, Jr., 20587A.
 DuFault, William Francis, 20680A.
 DuMontier, Louis Devine, 18171A.
 Eagle, Comly Joel, 18115A.
 Eberhardt, Donald Elwin, 18182A.
 Ecklund, Eugene, 20600A.
 Eckmann, Frederick Charles, 17718A.
 Elliott, Donald Ancil, 20636A.
 Ellzey, J. Murray, 18204A.
 Ernst, William Joseph, 20609A.
 Escue, Walter Harbin, 17702A.
 Eubank, Graydon Knox, 18132A.
 Fahrney, Richard Lee, 18191A.

Farnsworth, Al W., 18229A.

Farr, John Wesley, 20660A.

Foote, Richard Harold, 18219A.

Fowler, Oscar Frank, 20583A.

Fraser, Paul Victor, 20654A.

Frazier, Max Eugene, 21456A.

Gaertner, Adolph, Jr., 20603A.

Gallagher, Rial Frederick, 20621A.

Geary, James Eugene, 17701A.

Gentzler, Robert Francis, 20678A.

Gilpin, Harry Duncan, 18124A.

Gleaves, Donald Heavner, 18282A.

Glines, Carroll Vane, Jr., 20579A.

Glover, Jerry C., 20659A.

Goppert, Jean Glen, 18167A.

Gourley, Edwin Parker, 18181A.

Gray, Donald Underwood, Jr., 18223A.

Green, Norman Morgan, 18237A.

Greene, Sidney, 20658A.

Greenamyre, Vernie Baird, 18140A.

Gregory, Willie Preston, 18236A.

Griffard, Robert Marcel, 18264A.

Gruber, Kenneth Willis, 20623A.

Haggard, Richard Lowell, 17725A.

Hall, Benny Bob, 18272A.

Hall, Harvey Preston, 20674A.

Hamilton, Calvin Lee, 18139A.

Hanigan, Edward James, Jr., 18222A.

Hansen, Robert Paul, 18159A.

Hanton, John Thomas, 18138A.

Hawes, Warren Harding, 18160A.

Haynes, Clarence Gilbert, 20653A.

Henry, David Watters, Jr., 20590A.

Henry, Mervin Lester, 20604A.

Herrera, Alfred Charles, 20608A.

Hicks, Malcolm Glenn, 18185A.

Hill, Marcus Lee, Jr., 20622A.

Hinerman, Maurice Elwyn, 18218A.

Hink, Harry Devere, 17710A.

Hochstetler, George Edward, 18216A.

Hoffman, Charles Addison, Jr., 18244A.

Holt, Garland Edward, 20607A.

Horn, Robert Paul, 17743A.

Houghtby, James Kenneth, 18240A.

Howes, Lewis Langdon, Jr., 18220A.

Humphries, Buford Milton, 18175A.

Hurlburt, Dana Follett, 18119A.

Hurst, Guy, Jr., 18243A.

Hutchinson, Paul Eugene, 18158A.

Jensen, Lloyd Kenneth, 20624A.

Jensen, Sigurd Lars, Jr., 20651A.

Jewell, Malcolm Eugene, 20588A.

Johanson, Alvin Lars Anton, 18248A.

Johnson, Clarence LaVerne, 18213A.

Johnson, George Alvin, 20672A.

Jones, David Boone, 18183A.

Jones, Donald Alfred, 18157A.

Jones, Richard Ernest, 18170A.

Jones, William Monroe, 20641A.

Kane, Richard Weidner, 17711A.

Kar, Edward George, 18252A.

Kelly, James Wyatt, 21462A.

Kemerling, William Earl, 21460A.

Kennedy, Dean Lewis, 18235A.

Kent, Joseph Francis, Jr., 17724A.

Kenyon, Benjamin Clarence, Jr., 18215A.

Kenyon, Donald Edward, 18268A.

Kester, Clifford Daniel, 18163A.

King, Edwin Vernon, 20585A.

Kirschman, Iran Paul, 18258A.

Kohrman, Elwood Netherton, 20602A.

Latta, Arthur W., 18273A.

Lauterbach, Harris Young, 18256A.

Lawson, Francis Robert, 20606A.

Lewis, Oliver Wendell, 18227A.

Light, Herbert Myron, 18128A.

Lineham, Thomas Uriah, Jr., 18112A.

Little, David Lee, 18253A.

Littlewood, Theodore Peterson, 20642A.

Lloyd, Glenn Howard, 18226A.

Lockhart, George Andrew, Jr., 20594A.

Locklear, James Quinton, 18133A.

Loman, William Thomas, Jr., 20669A.

Long, Paul Henry, 20635A.

Long, Robert Francis, 18142A.

Lopez, Donald Sewell, 18164A.

Luber, Vernon Norton, 18127A.

Lunos, Austin Edward, 20645A.

Magill, Francis William, 20652A.

Maher, Thomas Joseph, 20655A.

Malloy, William James, 18197A.

Mandina, Sidney Reginald I., 18125A.

Marshall, Sidney Currier, 18206A.

Martin, Eugene, Jr., 18233A.

McAnally, Paul Edward, 20581A.

McBride, Hugh Walker, 17736A.

McCleary, George Carlton, 17735A.

McCully, Robert Humes, 18274A.

McGaughey, Donald Keith, 20662A.

McGowan, Samuel Benjamin, 20572A.

McKay, Allen Fraser, 20613A.

McMinis, Jonathan Burns, 18249A.

McNeil, Edwin Evan, 18192A.

Melton, Carl Mudgett, 18190A.

Melucas, Paul Joseph, 20640A.

Melvin, Robert Elwood, 18193A.

Meredith, Jim Tom, 17706A.

Merino, Robert Francis, 18224A.

Mertely, Frank, 18201A.

Miller, Edgar Cornelius, 20614A.

Miller, John William, 18198A.

Miller, Sidney Harry, 21459A.

Mills, Arthur Julius, 18180A.

Mills, James Edward, Jr., 18281A.

Moehle, Charles Fred, 18131A.

Moir, James Ferriss, 17712A.

Monaco, Anthony William, Jr., 20605A.

Montgomery, Bill Alexander, 17705A.

Montgomery, Joe Sheldon, 20633A.

Moore, Jack Kenneth, 18135A.

Moore, James Conway, Jr., 20664A.

Moore, Richard Raymond, 17995A.

Moore, Winston Eugene, 17722A.

Morton, Walter Pickney, Jr., 18129A.

Mullan, Alfred William, Jr., 17709A.

Munns, Orin Charles, 18199A.

Myers, Andrew Jackson, Jr., 20769A.

Nanney, James Thomas, 18177A.

Neville, Harry Walter, 17704A.

Newgarden, George Joseph, 3d, 20591A.

Newton, Frederick Carter, 18228A.

Niemczyk, Julian Martin, 20671A.

Nole, Jack Dean, 20598A.

O'Donnell, William Joseph, 20574A.

O'Halloran, Christopher John, 18259A.

Olivera-Barroso, Manuel, 17744A.

Orillion, Arthur Joseph, Jr., 20593A.

Palge, Carl Addison, 18241A.

Payant, Peter, 18232A.

Pedersen, Stanley Cartwright, 20617A.

Pendergraft, Wesley Lael, 18242A.

Penick, Everett Smith, Jr., 18234A.

Perry, James Wallace, 20673A.

Perry, Roland Archibald, 18231A.

Peters, Francis David, Jr., 18137A.

Peters, Warren Edmund, 18276A.

Peterson, Harry William, 18275A.

Pettitt, Bert Edward, Jr., 17698A.

Phillips, Thomas Roland, Jr., 18286A.

Phillips, Lowell Gene, 18050A.

Pierce, Russell Kurtz, Jr., 18118A.

Potter, Edward Mac, Jr., 17716A.

Prager, Arthur, 20681A.

Prager, John William, 20586A.

Preller, Gordon Charles, 18144A.

Price, Robert Harold, 20571A.

Purcell, Richard McKnight, 18267A.

Radcliffe, John Bilton, Jr., 20667A.

Raley, Theodore Maxwell, 18200A.

Randall, Richard Clary, 18212A.

Raphun, Leland Richards, 18130A.

Rath, Leland John, 20620A.

Rea, Thomas Samuel, 17707A.

Reeder, William Dean, 18161A.

Reid, Milton Morgan, 20647A.

Reisner, Horace Jackson, 18271A.

Rementer, William John, Jr., 18250A.

Reuteler, Bruce Ervin, 18168A.

Riley, Eldon Stanley, 17703A.

Ristau, Siegfried Edward, 18169A.

Roderick, Jack Victor, 18122A.

Rogers, Dan Terrance, 20665A.

Rosenberg, Leslie Benjamin, 18210A.

Rotstan, Robert, 17723A.

Rutherford, Richard Thomas, 18134A.

Salyards, John Albert, Jr., 18279A.

Sandvig, Kenneth Leslie, 20595A.

Sanna, Francis Patsy, 18148A.

Saylor, Warren Daniel, 20637A.

Scarpiero, William John, 20677A.

Schmidt, George Robert, 18202A.

Schmidt, Howard Richard, 18123A.
 Schoeffler, Clifford, 18179A.
 Schuering, Alvin George, 18166A.
 Scroggin, Orville Oliver, 3d, 17738A.
 Schwallier, Charles Dale, 17731A.
 Schwaner, Charles Fred, 17714A.
 Selbie, Frederick Donald, Jr., 18225A.
 Sever, James Edward, 20592A.
 Sharp, Stuart Mayer, 20629A.
 Shawhan, Zac George, 20576A.
 Sheperd, Olen Dean, 20619A.
 Shewan, Clifford Wayne, 18150A.
 Shusta, Chester Joseph, 21461A.
 Simpson, Russell Reavely, 19565A.
 Singer, Solomon Elias, 20666A.
 Sinnett, Jefferson David, 18269A.
 Slade, William Arthur, 20573A.
 Smith, Bennie Cozzens, 18141A.
 Smith, Clark Bridgland, 17730A.
 Smith, J. B., 20638A.
 Smith, Mart, Gary, Jr., 17976A.
 Smith, Maurice Hunter, 18172A.
 Snyder, George Francis, 18153A.
 Son, Herman Franklin, 17734A.
 Spencer, Jack, 20661A.
 Spencer, Loren James, 18255A.
 Spiro, Bernard, 20627A.
 Springer, Paul Richard, 17715A.
 Staples, Johnston Raleigh, 20578A.
 Stephenson, Wayne Louis, 18238A.
 Stevens, Jack Duane, 20679A.
 Stevens, Wendelle Castyle, 18195A.
 Stewart, Walter Claiborne, Jr., 20639A.
 Stone, James Samuel, 18247A.
 Stroff, Michael John, Jr., 20648A.
 Sturm, Wilmer Ross, 20676A.
 Suttle, James, 20646A.
 Talbot, George Edward, 18126A.
 Taylor, Charles Kersey, Jr., 18113A.
 Taylor, Jay Johnson, 20580A.
 Taylor, Joseph Thomas, 20611A.
 Theus, Lucius, 18270A.
 Thomas, Alan Brainerd, 17721A.
 Thompson, George Willard, 17726A.
 Titus, Frank Alvin, 17741A.
 Tony, Nicholas, 21464A.
 Trammell, Andrew Jack, 17720A.
 Traylor, Horace Cleveland, Jr., 18165A.
 Urquhart, Charles Thomas, Jr., 20584A.
 Urquhart, Roland Leslie, Jr., 18162A.
 Van Bloom, Jay Clark, 18147A.
 Vega, John William, 18280A.
 Vincent, Robert Wilson, 20575A.
 Volger, Alfred Fritz, 20670A.
 Violet, Leonard, 18174A.
 Voris, George Arthur, 17968A.
 Warner, Walter Eugene, 20610A.
 Watkins, Marvin Maurice, 17742A.
 Weeks, Roy Franklin, Jr., 18189A.
 Welsh, Stephen Jackson, 20634A.
 Wendt, Willard Arthur, 20625A.
 Werber, William Alexander, 18178A.
 White, Boyd Barnard, 20626A.
 Wilborn, William Thomas, 18194A.
 Williams, James Coleman, 18261A.
 Williams, Lawrence, 18152A.
 Williams, Wilson Byron, 20668A.
 Wilson, Elbert, Jr., 18263A.
 Wilson, Richard Stanley, 18121A.
 Winfree, Douglas Woodson, Jr., 18278A.
 Winner, Donald Carlton, 17973A.
 Wolfe, Charles Spurgeon, 18176A.
 Woolf, Simpson Molen, 20569A.
 Yeager, Paul Meryald, 18116A.
 Yusevich, John Joseph, 20582A.

MEDICAL SERVICE

Allinson, John Nils, 21626A.
 Beck, William Stanislaus, 21612A.
 Cook, Raymond John, 21610A.
 Garner, Walter Frank, 21609A.
 Herrin, Daniel Monroe, Jr., 21620A.
 Holihan, Francis Leonard, 21607A.
 Johnson, John Alfred, 21611A.
 Little, Herman Ivy, 21616A.
 Marolf, Kenneth Loyd, 21613A.
 Nicely, Harry Benson, Jr., 21622A.
 Roffis, Robert Jesse, 21623A.
 Ruffing, Donald Joseph, 21621A.
 Schult, Harold George, 21617A.
 Smyth, Kenneth E., 21619A.
 Weller, William Edgar, 21618A.

Whitt, Orbin Russell, 21625A.
 Winkelblech, Donald Ray, 21624A.
 Woolf, Henry McCune, 21615A.
 Zellers, Billy Bob, 21614A.

The following-named officer for promotion in the United States Air Force under the provisions of section 107 of the Army-Navy Nurses Act of 1947, as amended by Public Law 514, Eighty-first Congress. This officer is subject to physical examination required by law.
 × Hetland, Mona Oline, AN1737.

(NOTE.—All officers nominated for promotion to major, captain, and first lieutenant are eligible for permanent promotion during the month of January 1951. Dates of rank will be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force.)

PROMOTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

The following-named officers for promotion in the United States Air Force under the provisions of sections 502, 508, and 509 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Those officers whose names are preceded by the symbol (×) are subject to physical examination required by law. All others have been examined and found physically qualified for promotion.

To be majors

CHAPLAINS

Geigel, Francis Gerald, 18772A.
 Montcalm, Rosario Louis Ulric, 18773A.

To be captains

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Abbott, Charles Whitney, 15243A.
 Alexander, James Constantine, 15372A.
 × Amundson, Ray Kenneth, 15367A.
 Angelakis, Charles, 15362A.
 Atkinson, Berkeley, 15329A.
 Baker, William Harding, 15261A.
 Barthelmess, Robert Platt, 15309A.
 Baxter, James Marvin, 15301A.
 Beasley, Roland Clark, 15293A.
 Benham, Harold Nolan, 15249A.
 Bennett, Robert Alexander, 15312A.
 × Beveridge, Richard Franklin, 15352A.
 Bird, Raymond Casimer, 15256A.
 Blake, Earl Gifford, 15303A.
 Blizzard, Alpheus Wesley, Jr., 15290A.
 Bosworth, Richard Arnold, 15330A.
 × Boyd, Raymond Andrew, 15295A.
 Brady, James William, 15285A.
 Brown, Albert James, 15246A.
 Butler, John Bryon, 15308A.
 Butt, Oscar Adolph, 15346A.
 Cahill, Robert Joseph, 15334A.
 × Caples, James Edward, 15315A.
 Cardin, Philip George, 15257A.
 Carlisle, Paul Leroy, 15306A.
 Carter, Richard Bruce, 15363A.
 Chance, James Harvey, 15355A.
 Collins, Fred Alvin, Jr., 15374A.
 Collins, Richard Vincent, 15380A.
 Cook, Harvey Andrew, Jr., 15382A.
 Croys, Harold Simon, 15277A.
 Cundiff, Jack Baker, 15269A.
 Dacus, Rector Claiborne, 15258A.
 Dallman, Howard Marvin, 15281A.
 Danielson, James Elmer, 15323A.
 Dewberry, Raymond Kenneth, 15344A.
 Dingivan, Edward Arthur, 15262A.
 Donohue, William Roberts, 15233A.
 × Driskell, Claude Thomas, 15381A.
 Duckett, Wayne George, 15265A.
 Dunlap, Carl K., 15364A.
 Evans, George Ollie, 15337A.
 Evans, Ivor Parry, 15353A.
 Farrar, George Balch, 15354A.
 Fernbaugh, Richard Mathew, 15370A.
 Galligar, Newton Ray, 15379A.
 Gammons, David Bradley, 15297A.
 George, Harry Hendrick, 15271A.
 George, Rex Hall, 15242A.
 Goetz, Paul Arthur, 15376A.
 Goodson, John Schley, Jr., 15339A.
 Grobe, Joe Bailey, 15328A.
 Harris, Paul Edgar, 15278A.
 Hart, Frederick Francis, 15351A.
 Hartzell, James Harris, 15263A.
 Hayes, Robert Ralph, 15255A.

Hearne, Alfred Carroll, 15321A.
 Hesse, George Albert, Jr., 15311A.
 Hight, James Russell, 15325A.
 Holman, Albert Hugh, 15319A.
 Howze, Stuart Alston, Jr., 15345A.
 Hoza, Paul Peter, 15268A.
 Hughes, Lloyd Chalmers, 15267A.
 Hunt, Robert Louis, 15234A.
 Hybki, Casimir Francis, Jr., 15273A.
 Johnson, Milo Claude, 15241A.
 Jones, John Preston, 15360A.
 Joseph, Edward Bell, 15366A.
 Keegan, George Joseph, Jr., 15333A.
 Kielgass, Earl Lehman, 15292A.
 Kinder, Richard Oscar, 15245A.
 Kinkade, Otis Mansel, 15266A.
 Kirschbaum, Everett Julius, 15317A.
 Klibbe, Frank William, 15342A.
 Knight, Lyle Franklin, 15316A.
 Kocher, John Wayland, 15254A.
 Kopit, Alfred Leo, 15327A.
 Kunkel, William Roy, 15231A.
 Lathrop, Robert Young, 15250A.
 Latimore, Henry James, Jr., 15368A.
 Lawrence, Willard James, 15369A.
 Leonard, William Charles, Jr., 15279A.
 Lester, Clarence Dewey, 15338A.
 × Lollis, Clyde Washington, Jr., 15314A.
 Macken, Gerald Bernard, 15291A.
 × McCarthy, Peter James, Jr., 15244A.
 McDonald, Bill, 15358A.
 McDonald, William Allan, 15350A.
 McKnight, Douglas Knox, 15365A.
 Mikell, Emory Allen, 15323A.
 Miller, Homer Britt, 15322A.
 Mims, Hayden Pegram, 15375A.
 × Montone, Neil Anthony, 15248A.
 Myers, George Harvey, 15324A.
 Newmeyer, Howard Walter, 15300A.
 Neill, John Cleo, 15286A.
 Oberg, John Joseph William, 15348A.
 Ostrye, Norbert Benedict, 15299A.
 Parnell, Roland Cleveland, 15313A.
 Pazin, Peter, 15239A.
 × Peterson, John Francis, 15356A.
 Pollyea, Albert, 15275A.
 Prichard, Artist Hudson, Jr., 15326A.
 Provancha, Earl Deloss, 15383A.
 Queen, Thomas Walter, Jr., 15335A.
 Raymer, John Cecil, Jr., 15310A.
 Reinert, Robert Amandus, 15270A.
 Rieker, Thomas Henry, 15251A.
 Rhodehamel, Wesley Richard, 15347A.
 Roberts, John Wendell, 15280A.
 Rodgers, John Robert, 15341A.
 Roe, David Allen, 15282A.
 Ruehle, John Richard, 15276A.
 Sales, Robert Newton, 15294A.
 Sanders, James Burton, 15235A.
 Sanderson, Edward Jennings, 15274A.
 Sawyer, Clyde Lenox, Jr., 15238A.
 Sawyer, Russell, 15272A.
 Scheller, Donald Richard, 15318A.
 Schroeder, Norman Clark, 15359A.
 Scott, Samuel Woodward, 15264A.
 Shafer, Jonathan Karl, 15298A.
 Shelton, William Edgar, 15247A.
 Simeone, Harold Martin, 15373A.
 Smith, Chester Allen Arthur, 15230A.
 Snoden, Charles Arthur, 15361A.
 Spurrier, Paul McLellan, 15305A.
 Stamm, Eugene Clarence, Jr., 15302A.
 Stearns, Richard Charles, 15283A.
 Steere, Lowell Beall, 15340A.
 Stratton, Edward Earl, 15289A.
 Stormo, Virgil MacArthur, 15287A.
 Swindell, Charles William, 15240A.
 × Taylor, Frank Raymond, 15377A.
 Terry, Charles Millard, 15378A.
 Thome, Joseph Eduard, 15371A.
 Tipton, Jack Ray, 15336A.
 Tomlinson, William Warren, 15236A.
 Townsend, James Gordon, 15260A.
 Vincenzi, August, 15252A.
 Ward, Walter Earl, 15259A.
 Webber, John Wallace, 15331A.
 Wengel, Emil Joe, 15296A.
 Wheelless, Ellis Joe, 15332A.
 White, Herbert Richard, 15343A.
 Willets, Ray Joseph, 15349A.
 Wilson, Joseph Griswold, 15284A.
 Workman, John Richard, 15253A.

To be first lieutenants

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Buchanan, Robert Sylvester, 18292A.
Gross, Kenneth Eugene, 18289A.
Jackson, Charles Wilbur, 18284A.
League, Miles Richard, 18286A.
Matte, Joseph Zannet, 20615A.
Pulley, John Hubert, Jr., 18288A.
Rigsby, Cecil Harding, 18285A.
Tanner, Theodore John, 18287A.
Terrell, Harry Evans, Jr., 18291A.
Werbeck, Donald Louis, 18290A.

The following-named officers for promotion in the United States Air Force under the provisions of section 107 of the Army-Navy Nurses Act of 1947, as amended by Public Law 514, Eighty-first Congress. The officer whose name is preceded by the symbol (X) is subject to physical examination required by law. All others have been examined and found physically qualified for promotion.

To be captains

AIR FORCE NURSES

Casey, Corinne, 21152W.
X Cigagna, Valarie Prima, 21083W.
Schadt, Sophia Marie, 21130W.
Visnovsky, Helen M., 21043W.

(NOTE.—All officers nominated for promotion to major, captain, and first lieutenant are eligible for permanent promotion during the month of February 1951. Dates of rank will be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force.)

IN THE NAVY

Rear Adm. Harold M. Martin, United States Navy, to have the grade, rank, pay, and allowances of a vice admiral while serving as a fleet commander.

The following-named line officers for temporary appointment to the grade of rear admiral in the Navy, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Clarence L. C. Atke-	William K. Menden-
son, Jr.	hall, Jr.
John B. Pearson, Jr.	Harry D. Felt
Harry Sanders	John M. Will
William B. Ammon	Francis M. Hughes
Roland N. Smoot	Murr E. Arnold
James H. Thach, Jr.	John B. Moss
Frederick M. Trap-	
nell	

The following-named officers for temporary appointment to the grade of rear admiral in the Supply Corps of the Navy, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Robert F. Batchelder
Charles H. Gillilan

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Most merciful and gracious God, whose divine love, wisdom, and power are the inspiration and strength of the God-fearing and the faithful, may we daily go forth courageously in the high adventure of building a finer civilization.

May we begin each day with a vital and radiant faith in the Lord, our God. Make us more eager to seek and more willing to accept the overtures of our Master's counsel and companionship.

Grant that our vision of peace on earth may be so clear and commanding that every lofty and holy aspiration within our souls shall respond with a fervent desire and determination to bring it to fulfillment.

We pray that these Thy servants may be guided by Thy spirit in some special way as they formulate the policies and administer the affairs of government and as they labor for a just and righteous solution of all the difficult problems in the areas of international relationship.

Hear us in Christ's name. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, January 9, 1951, was read and approved.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

JANUARY 12, 1951.

The honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

SIR: A certificate of election in due form of law showing the election of Hon. ERNEST GREENWOOD as a Representative-elect to the Eighty-second Congress from the First Congressional District of the State of New York has been received and is on file in this office.

Respectfully yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

The SPEAKER. The Member-elect will present himself at the bar of the House to receive the oath of office.

Mr. GREENWOOD appeared at the bar of the House and took the oath of office.

RESIGNATIONS FROM COMMITTEES

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following resignation from a committee:

JANUARY 11, 1951.

Hon. SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby resign, as of this date, from the Committee on House Administration.

Sincerely yours,

EDNA F. KELLY.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resignation is accepted.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following resignation from a committee:

JANUARY 12, 1951.

The Honorable SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby wish to tender my resignation as a member of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives.

Respectfully yours,

PAUL C. JONES,
Member of Congress, Tenth Missouri District.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resignation is accepted.

There was no objection.

ECONOMIC REPORT—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 30)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was

read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Joint Committee on the Economic Report and ordered to be printed with illustrations:

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, D. C., January 12, 1951.

The honorable the PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,

The honorable the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIRS: I am presenting herewith my Economic Report to the Congress, as required under the Employment Act of 1946.

In preparing this report, I have had the advice and assistance of the Council of Economic Advisers, members of the Cabinet, and heads of independent agencies.

Together with this report, I am transmitting a report, the Annual Economic Review: January 1951, prepared for me by the Council of Economic Advisers in accordance with section 4 (c) (2) of the Employment Act of 1946.

Respectfully,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

REPORT OF SECRETARY OF STATE—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 38)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report by the Secretary of State, showing all receipts and disbursements on account of refunds, allowances, and annuities for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950, in connection with the Foreign Service retirement and disability system as required by section 862, Foreign Service Act of 1946 (Public Law 724).

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

The WHITE HOUSE, January 11, 1951.

(Enclosure: Report concerning retirement and disability fund, Foreign Service.)

CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL VESSELS

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it may be in order on Tuesday, January 16, 1951, to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for consideration of the bill (H. R. 1001) to authorize the construction of modern naval vessels, and for other purposes; that there be not to exceed 1 hour of general debate, to be confined to the bill, to be equally divided and controlled by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT] and myself, after which the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, when I had the conference with the gentleman from Georgia and suggested to him I would be agreeable to this procedure provided it was in accordance